An Indonesian way of P/CVE and interpreting the whole-of-society approach: lessons from civil society organisations

ABSTRACT

In 2016, The United Nations (UN) issued the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism that prescribes member states to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) to combat violent extremism through whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches. A key aspect of the whole-of-society approach is to involve civil society organisations (CSOs). The collapse of the New Order regime in Indonesia, coupled with shifting global focus to P/CVE agendas, granted them wide latitude to pursue their objectives and the right environment to flourish. However, the mushrooming of P/CVE CSOs in Indonesia exposes the country to challenges such as uncoordinated programmes and competition. This article argues that these experiences prompted Indonesia to interpret the concept of the whole-of-society approach and to formulate a common NAP for relevant stakeholders to refer to. The NAP provides an official categorisation to assess the implementation of P/CVE programmes and identify required interventions. It also encourages all relevant stakeholders in the field to develop a unified database and a formal working mechanism among them. The availability of such regulations and mechanisms is critical to enhancing the impact of P/CVE initiatives, including the contributions of CSOs.

KEYWORDS:

• Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)
• civil society organisations
• whole-of-society approach
• Indonesia
• National action plan

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Prof. Jun Honna and Keoni Marzuki for their valuable feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In 2002, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) launched a terror attack against a club and a bar in Bali, Indonesia. A total of 202 people died, including 88 Australians. JI is also responsible for various terror attacks in Indonesia in the early 2000s.

2 Prior to 1998, the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) was at the forefront of Indonesia’s counterterrorism effort. However, the collapse of the authoritarian regime and the transition to the reformasi (reform) era forced the military to give up its internal security role. During the authoritarian regime, the military was notorious for its repressive measures through its internal security role. Subsequently, the internal security role was passed to the police and the military only served as an Auxiliary Force (Bantuan Kendali Operasi or BKO) to the police (see Honna, 2013; Haripin et al., 2020).

3 The idea to establish a new counterterrorism agency initially began during the formulation process of the bill on terrorism in early 2000s. The proposal was dropped due to criticism from the civil society activists who suggested that such agencies may become an oppressive tool of the government. At that time, Indonesia had just transitioned from an authoritarian regime to the reformasi (reform) era, hence the fear of oppression. However, the government proceeded with the proposal after the 2002 Bali Bombing. Instead of a new body or agency, President Megawati established a counterterrorism desk under the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. A high-ranking police officer, Ansyaad Mbai, was appointed as the head of the desk.

4 The Syrian Civil War and the Islamic State (IS) propaganda lured many aspiring jihadis to emigrate to Syria. The individuals who have spent their time in Syria and returned to Indonesia are identified as returnees. Meanwhile, the individuals who were unable to enter Syria and were deported back to Indonesia before doing so are identified as deportees. Deportees also include individuals who were exposed to radical ideologies while they were overseas and deported to Indonesia (see Anindya, 2019; Sumper, 2018).

5 In May 2018, two families detonated bombs in East Java. The first attack targeted three churches, while the second attack targeted a police headquarters. The perpetrators of the church bombings, Dita Oepriarto and his family, were initially under police surveillance. However, the family blended well into society to deceive the security apparatus (see IPAC, 2018).

6 The Indonesian government officially banned Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 2008 and Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the umbrella organisation of IS-symphatisers in Indonesia, in 2018.

7 ProPatria members have established track records in the country’s defence and security field since before the beginning of the reformasi era in 1998. They were engaged in the education programme of the Military Command and Staff College (Sesko). The members also established vast networks in the defence and security fields, including prominent military officers and other defence and security related institutions. Some of them are also relatives of high ranking military officers which helped them to build trust with the military (see Sukma, 2012; E. Prasetyono, member of ProPatria, personal communication, February 25, 2022).

8 P/CVE programmes originated as early as 2003 in Europe. The United Kingdom started its own strategy, CONTEST which outlines the four ‘Ps’: pursue, prevent, protect, prepare. The CONTEST strategy was developed over time and the incident of the 2005 London Bombing further shaped the focus of the strategy. The strategy emphasises a community-based approach that engages local stakeholders to prevent an individual from joining and supporting terrorist organisations. Other Western countries followed suit by acknowledging the importance of a comprehensive approach in eliminating terrorist threats but had yet to conceptualise the programme of P/CVE as early as the UK did. From 2005 to 2006, for instance, American and Australian policymakers underlined the link between poverty and terrorism, hence focus shifted to aid allocation. The scope of recipients expanded to other relevant agencies which worked on developmental issues (see Howell & Lind, 2009; Harris-Hogan, Barelle, & Zammit, 2016; Mastroe, 2016; Ucko, 2018).

9 Noor Huda Ismail is a Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) Ngruki graduate whose former roommate was involved in the 2002 Bali Bombing.

10 During the New Order Regime, INFID was very vocal in criticising Suharto’s developmental policy but in recent years the trend has shifted whereby they began working on P/CVE projects.

11 PKK was established under the New Order regime. This movement is mainly located in rural areas. It focuses on the role of women in the family. The movement was infamous as a tool of the Suharto government to control and dictate the role of women. However, the collapse of the New Order regime and the transition to the reformasi era gradually changed the role of PKK. It has incorporated the perspectives of gender mainstreaming in its activities. Their roles in campaigning for alternatives or improvement of policy is pivotal in enhancing the quality of the policy (see Dewi, 2023).

12 In 2022, the Indonesian government established a Thematic Working Group or Kelompok Kerja (Pokja) Tematis as a formal platform of coordination between governmental and non-governmental agencies. This working group allows the stakeholders to sit together and discuss the gaps in RAN PE’s implementation (see Pokja Tematis, 2023).

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the Japanese Monbukagakusho Scholarship and Ritsumeikan University.