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Abstract:
Scholarship on the connection between democratization and political violence typically views democracy through a liberal prism prioritizing elections and elite dynamics and qualifies violence through the lens of civil war or organized armed conflict, which leaves the political salience and effects of alternative modes of violent contentious mobilization underexamined. This study analyzes the connection between the weaponization of Egypt’s post-revolutionary democratizing roadmap and politically transformative street battles that divided and reconfigured social and political alliances through bloodshed, grievance and betrayal. Weaponization describes a process in which Egypt’s transitional democratizing roadmap championed free and fair elections while revolutionary activists were systematically repressed and stigmatized. The resultant polarization from street battles, particularly between the Muslim Brotherhood and their opponents, significantly contributed to support for the Tamarrod (rebellion) campaign, leading to mass mobilization and the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi of the Brotherhood. This ushered in an authoritarian restoration structured through heightened political polarization and repression. The analysis largely draws from the accounts of informal political actors, not least in order to address the underrepresentation of such experiences within orthodox democratization scholarship. The Battle of Mohamed Mahmoud Street and the Ittehadiyya presidential palace clashes are developed as two exemplar empirical cases (re)directing Egypt’s transitional trajectory, which enrich wider debates on democratization, authoritarian entrenchment, political violence and the fluidity of transitional politics.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Andrea Teti, as well as the anonymous peer reviewers for their constructive and insightful feedback. This article is connected with my doctoral research at the University of Aberdeen and I am grateful to have been the recipient of a Research Project Award which funded my research.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 Jennifer R. Dresden, Thomas E. Flores & Irfan Nooruddin (2019) Theories of Democratic Change Phase III: Transitions from Conflict. DRG Center Working Paper. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3713616, accessed March 8, 2023.
2 Lucie Ryzova (2020) The Battle of Muhammad Mahmoud Street in Cairo: The Politics and Poetics of Urban Violence in Revolutionary Time, Past and Present, 247(1), pp. 273–317.
3 Egypt’s authoritarian restoration was made possible by many factors, both structural and contingent, and ‘agential’ elements such as actors’ decisions, experiences, perceptions and representations should be accounted for in analysis of Egypt’s transitional period, see Gennaro Gervasio & Andrea Teti (forthcoming) Gramsci’s ‘Southern Question’ and Egypt’s Authoritarian Retrenchment: Subalternity, Disruption and Activist Agency, Review of African Political Economy.
4 Mona El-Ghobashy (2021) Bread and Freedom: Egypt’s Revolutionary Situation (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
5 Ibid.
6 Joshua Stacher (2020) Watermelon Democracy: Egypt’s Turbulent Transition (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press), chapter 2, pp. 55–94.
7 Vivienne Matthies-Boon & Naomi Head (2018) Trauma as Counter-Revolutionary Colonisation: Narratives from (Post)Revolutionary Egypt, Journal of International Political Theory, 14(3), pp. 258–279.
8 Robert A. Dahl (2005) What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?, Political Science Quarterly, 120 (2), pp. 187-197; Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press). From this point when the term democratization is used the author is referring to the hegemonic paradigm of liberal democratization which prioritizes elite dynamics and political institutionalism (especially elections).
9 Eva Bellin (2012) Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, 44(2), pp. 127–149; Holger Albrecht (2005) How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt, Democratization, 12 (3), pp. 378-397; Holger Albrecht & Oliver Schlumberger (2004) "Waiting for Godot": Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East, International Political Science Review, 25(4), pp. 371–392; Steven Heydemann & Reinoud Leenders (2011) Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the 'Arab Awakening', Globalizations, 8(5), pp. 647–653.
10 Michelle Pace & Francesco Cavatorta (2012) The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspective - An Introduction, Mediterranean Politics, 17 (2), p. 127.
11 Nadine Abdalla (2016) Youth Movements in the Egyptian Transformation: Strategies and Repetoires of Political Participations, Mediterranean Politics, 21(1), pp. 44–63.
12 Yasmine Berriane & Marie Duboc (2019) Allying Beyond Social Divides: An Introdution to Contentious Politics and Coalitions in the Middle East and North Africa, Mediterranean Politics, 24(4), pp. 399–419.
13 Asef Bayat (2017) Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
14 Gennaro Gervasio & Patrizia Manduchi (2021) Introduction: Reading the Revolutionary Process in North Africa with Gramsci, The Journal of North African Studies, 26(6), pp. 1051–1056.
15 Stacher, Watermelon Democracy.
16 Elizabeth R. Nugent (2020) After Repression: How Polarization Derails Democratic Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press). The effect of polarization on Egypt’s failed democratic consolidation also has been studied with respect to the military coup, see Hicham Bou Nassif (2017) Coups and Nascent Democracies: The Military and Egypt’s Failed Consolidation, Democratization, 24 (1), pp. 157-174.
17 Adrienne LeBas (2006) Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe, Comparative Politics, 38(4), pp. 419–438; Johan Brosché, Hanne Fjelde & Kristine Höglund (2020) Electoral Violence and the Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Kenya and Zambia, Journal of Peace Research, 57 (1), pp. 111-125; Laia Balcells (2012) The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain, Politics & Society, 40(3), pp. 311–347.
18 Dresden, Flores, & Nooruddin, “Theories of Democratic Change Phase III.”
19 Mohammad Ali Kadivar & Neil Ketchley (2018) Sticks, Stones, and Molotov Cocktails: Unarmed Collective Violence and Democratization, Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, 4, pp. 1–16.
20 Ibid, p. 4.
21 Matthies-Boon & Head, “Trauma as Counter-Revolutionary Colonisation.”
22 Salwa Ismail (2012) The Egyptian Revolution against the Police, Social Research, 79 (2), pp. 435–462. For further studies on political violence in post-revolutionary Egypt see Kira D. Jumet (2018) Contesting the Repressive State: Why Ordinary Egyptians Protested During the Arab Spring (New York: Oxford University Press); Mona Abaza (2016) Violence, Dramaturgical Repertoires and Neoliberal Imaginaries in Cairo, Theory, Culture & Society, 33 (7-8), pp. 111-135; and Samuli Schielke (2017) There will be Blood: Expectation and Ethics of Violence during Egypt’s Stormy Season, Middle East Critique, 26(3), pp. 205–220.
23 Ismail, “The Egyptian Revolution against the Police,” p. 454.
24 Gervasio and Teti, “Gramsci’s ‘Southern Question’ and Egypt’s Authoritarian Retrenchment.”
25 Ryzova, “The Battle of Muhammad Mahmoud Street in Cairo,” p. 288.
26 Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East”.
27 This is in line with El-Ghobashy’s argument that, rather than posing deterministic arguments for Egypt’s revolutionary outcome, there should be attention given to the indeterminacy of a ‘revolutionary situation’, see Bread and Freedom; Donatella della Porta also draws attention to the power of transformative events and moments of ‘eventful democratization’, refer to (2014) Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
28 The Ultras are supporters of the Cairo-based football club Al Ahly and were prominent in the 2011 demonstrations.
29 Nissim Cohen & Tamar Arieli (2011) Field Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological Challenges and Snowball Sampling, Journal of Peace Research, 48(4), pp. 423–435; Rowland Atkinson & John Flint (2001) Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies, Social Research Update, 33.
30 Ethics approval was granted by the College Research Ethics and Governance Committee at the University of Aberdeen, and participants were provided with a detailed informed consent form and information sheets about the study. The author made the decision not to use participant names due to Egypt’s repressive security landscape.
31 Ryzova, “The Battle of Muhammad Mahmoud Street in Cairo,” p. 275.
32 For a history of the 25 January 2011 uprising see El-Ghobashy, Bread and Freedom.
33 Stacher provides analysis of state violence including at Raba′a, see Watermelon Democracy, chapter 3, pp. 95–123.
34 For example, a Brotherhood member explained that following Mubarak’s ouster the SCAF met with opposition groups separately, delivering contrasting messages to each group to divide them, Interview, London, 2015.
35 Stacher, Watermelon Democracy, chapter 2, pp. 55–94.
36 Wael Eskandar (2012) Year of the SCAF: a Timeline of Mounting Repression. Jadaliyya (Mar 9). Available at: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24604, accessed March 10, 2023.
37 For a discussion on the referendum see Bjørn Olav Utvik (2017) A Question of Faith? Islamists and Secularists Fight over the Post-Mubarak State, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 10(1), pp. 98–99.
38 Saskia Brechenmacher (2017) Institutionalized Repression in Egypt. Carnegie (May 18). Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/18/institutionalized-repression-in-egypt-pub-69959, accessed March 10, 2023.
39 Hesham Sallam (2011) Elections in the Midst of Revolution. Jadaliyya (Nov 28). Available at: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24717, accessed March 10, 2023.
40 El-Ghobashy addresses the controversy over the Silmi document in Bread and Freedom, pp. 155–156.
41 Amnesty International (2012) Agents of Repression: Egypt's Police and the Case for Reform. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde12/029/2012/en/, accessed March 10, 2023.
42 Interview with member of the Ultras, Cairo, 2014.
43 Lucie Ryzova (2011) The Battle of Cairo’s Muhammad Mahmoud Street. Al Jazeera (Nov 29). Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2011/11/29/the-battle-of-cairos-muhammad-mahmoud-street, accessed March 10, 2023.
44 The term ‘fighters’ was used by Ryzova to describe those engaged in the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes, see “The Battle of Muhammad Mahmoud Street in Cairo.”
45 Mona Eltahawy (2011) Bruised but Defiant: Mona Eltahawy on Her Assault by Egyptian Security Forces. The Guardian (Dec 23). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/23/mona-eltahawy-assault-egyptian-forces, accessed March 11, 2023.
46 Amnesty International, “Agents of Repression.”
47 Abulkasim al-Jaberi (2012) Out of sight, but not out of mind: Mohamed Mahmoud remembered. Egypt Independent (Nov 18). Available at: https://egyptindependent.com/out-sight-not-out-mind-mohamed-mahmoud-remembered/, accesed March 11, 2023.
48 These phrases were used by several participants in this study.
49 Interview with Brotherhood supporter, Cairo, 2014.
50 Ibid; Ikhwanweb (2011) MB Calls for Halting Police Aggression, Securing Squares for Peaceful Protesters. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20111126045001/http://ikhwanweb.com/iweb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32734:mb-calls-for-halting-police-aggression-securing-squares-for-peaceful-protesters&catid=10387:newsflash&Itemid=858, accessed March 11, 2023.
51 Neil Ketchley (2017) Egypt in a Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 97. Though the organization did not endorse participating in the clashes it should be noted that many Brothers participated as individuals.
52 Mona El-Ghobashy (2005) The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37(3), pp. 373–395.
53 Interview with former Brotherhood member, Cairo, 2014.
54 Ketchley contends that the Brothers used protest ‘strategically’, see Egypt in a Time of Revolution, p. 94
55 Interview with Brotherhood member, London, 2015. This participant and other Brotherhood supporters interviewed rejected the claim that a ‘deal’ was struck with the SCAF.
56 Interview with human rights advocate, Cairo, 2014.
57 Neil Ketchley & Thoraya El-Rayyes (2021) Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization and Attitudes to Democracy in Post-Mubarak Egypt, The Journal of Politics, 83(1), pp. 291–305.
58 Zeinab Abul-Magd (2017) Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 186.
59 Ahmed Aboul Enein, Basil El-Dabh, Joel Gulhane & Connor Molloy (2012) Remembering Mohamed Mahmoud: The good, the bad, and the Brotherhood. Daily News Egypt (Nov 19). Available at: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/11/19/remembering-mohamed-mahmoud-the-good-the-bad-and-the-brotherhood/, accessed March 12, 2023.
60 Leila Fadel (2011) Clashes in Egypt Prompt Worry about Vote. The Washington Post (Nov 20). Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/second-day-of-clashes-in-egypt-could-lead-to-second-revolt/2011/11/20/gIQA1nvJeN_story.html, accessed March 12, 2023.
61 Anthony Shadid (2011) Egypt Military Tries to Woo Wider Public to Keep Power. The New York Times (Nov 25). Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/world/middleeast/egypt-military-tries-to-woo-wider-public-beyond-protesters.html, accessed March 12, 2023.
62 Rime Naguib (2011) A Year in Review: The SCAF Rules in 93 Letters. Egypt Independent (Dec 30). Available at: https://www.egyptindependent.com/year-review-scaf-rules-93-letters/, accessed March 12, 2023.
63 Dina Wahba (2020) A Thug, a Revolutionary or Both? Negotiating Masculinity in Post-Revolutionary Egypt, Middle East - Topics & Arguments, 14, p. 84.
64 David D. Kirkpatrick (2011) Egypt’s Cabinet Offers to Resign as Protests Rage. The New York Times (Nov 21). Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/world/middleeast/facing-calls-to-give-up-power-egypts-military-battles-crowds.html, accessed March 12, 2023.
65 Mayssoun Sukarieh (2012) Dispatch from Mohamed Mahmoud Street: Egyptian Revolts. Jadaliyya (Nov 27). Available at: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/27491, accessed March 12, 2023.
66 Michal Bauer, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel & Tamar Mitts (2016) Can War Foster Cooperation?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), pp. 249–274.
67 Nugent, After Repression, 10.
68 Berriane & Duboc, “Allying Beyond Social Divides”.
69 Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution, p. 99.
70 Human Rights Watch. (2012) Egypt: Investigate Brotherhood’s Abuse of Protesters. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/12/egypt-investigate-brotherhoods-abuse-protesters, accessed March 13, 2023.
71 El-Ghobashy specifies the points within Morsi’s decree and provides a detailed account of the President’s hurdles prior to the Ittehadiyya clashes in Bread and Freedom, chapter 5, pp. 210–258.
72 For a discussion on how the term ‘Brotherhoodization’ became part of a pervasive media campaign to demonize Morsi and the Brotherhood see Mohamad Elmasry (2013) Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Discourse. Jadaliyya (June 28). Available at: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/28855, accessed March 13, 2023. Though beyond this paper’s scope, it is important to consider the influence of Egyptian media on public perceptions of Morsi and the Brotherhood, see Mohamad Hamas Elmasry & Mohammed El-Nawawy (2014) One Country, Two Eras: How Three Egyptian Newspapers Framed Two Presidents, Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition, 9(1), pp. 27–39.
73 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2012) Al-Ittihadiyya “Presidential Palace” Clashes in Cairo 5 and 6 December 2012. Available at: https://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Ittihadiyya.rep_.CIHRS_.Eng_.Dec_.pdf, accessed March 13, 2023.
74 Interview with Brotherhood supporter, Cairo, 2014.
75 Ikhwanweb (2012) Egypt Muslim Brotherhood Martyrs, Patriotic Youth Defending Democratic Transformation. Available at: https://ikhwanweb.com/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-marty/, accessed March 13, 2023; Itehadia Martyrs and Victims Conference: Unarmed Brotherhood Youth Defended Democracy. Available at: https://ikhwanweb.com/itehadia-martyrs-and-victims-c/, accessed 13 March 2023.
76 Interview with Brotherhood supporter, Cairo, 2014.
77 Interview with two revolutionary activists, Cairo, 2014.
78 According to a journalist, the Brotherhood’s media claimed 80 percent of those protesting outside Ittehadiyya beginning in November 2012 were from Egypt’s Christian community, Interview, Cairo, 2014.
79 Interview with field hospital doctor, Cairo, 2014.
80 Ibid.
81 Matthies-Boon & Head, “Trauma as Counter-Revolutionary Colonisation,” p. 274.
82 Ikhwanweb (2012) Camel Battle 2 Targets Muslim Brotherhood Outside Itehadia Presidential Palace. Available at: https://ikhwanweb.com/camel-battle-2-targets-muslim/, accessed March 13, 2023; “Itehadia Martyrs and Victims Conference.”
83 Abdel-Rahman Hussein (2012) Egypt Erupts as Muslim Brotherhood Supporters Clash with Protesters. The Guardian (Dec 6). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/05/egypt-clashes-protesters-muslim-supporters, accessed March 13, 2023.
84 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Investigate Brotherhood’s Abuse of Protesters.”
85 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Al-Ittihadiyya ‘Presidential Palace’ Clashes in Cairo.”
86 Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi Address to Nation (2012). Al Jazeera posted on C-Span (Dec 6). Available at: https://www.c-span.org/video/?309839-1/egyptian-president-mohammad-morsi-address-nation, accessed March 13, 2023.
87 This included a loss of support from certain human rights advocates staunchly against the military-regime which (re)assumed power following Morsi’s removal. It should be noted that many human rights groups and much of the secular opposition sided with the military in violently removing the Brotherhood, Interview with human rights advocate, Cairo, 2014.