Psychobiology of Drug-Induced Religious Experience: From the Brain “Locus of Religion” to Cognitive Unbinding

Abstract

The recent interest in the psychopharmacological underpinnings of religious experiences has led to both the laboratory characterizations of drug-induced mystical events and psychobiological models of religious experiences rooted in evolution and fitness. Our examination of this literature suggests that these theories may be congruent only within more modern religious and cultural settings and are not generalizable to all historical beliefs, as would be expected from an evolutionarily conserved biological mechanism. The strong influence of culture on the subjective effects of drugs as well as religious thoughts argues against the concept of a common pathway in the brain uniquely responsible for these experiences. Rather, the role of personal beliefs, expectations and experiences may interject bias into the interpretation of psychoactive drug action as a reflection of biologically based religious thought. Thus, psychobiological research proposing specific brain mechanisms should consider anthropological and historical data to address alternative explanations to the “fitness” of religious thought. A psychobiological model of the religious experience based on the concept of cognitive unbinding seems to accommodate these data better than that of a specific brain locus of religion.

RÉSUMÉ

L’intérêt tout récent pour les fondements psychopharmacologiques des pratiques religieuses a donné lieu aux caractérisations en laboratoire d’événements mystiques d’origine médicamenteuse et à des modèles psychobiologiques de pratiques religieuses trouvant leur origine dans l’évolution et le conditionnement physique. Il ressort de notre examen de cette documentation que ces théories entrent uniquement dans la logique de cadres religieux et culturels plus modernes et qu’une généralisation de ceux-ci à toutes les croyances historiques est impossible, bien que ce soit ce que l’on attende d’un mécanisme biologique préservé de manière évolutive. L’influence culturelle conséquente sur les effets subjectifs des médicaments et les réflexions religieuses tendent à réfuter le concept d’une voie commune dans le cerveau qui serait responsable à elle seule de ces pratiques. Au lieu de cela, le rôle des croyances, des attentes et des expériences personnelles sont susceptibles d’interposer un parti pris dans l’interprétation de l’activité médicamenteuse psychoactive comme le reflet de la pensée religieuse fondée sur des références biologiques. Aussi, il revient aux recherches psychobiologiques suggérant le recours à des mécanismes cérébraux spécifiques de se pencher sur les données anthropologiques et historiques pour aborder les autres explications du «conditionnement physique» de la pensée religieuse. Un modèle psychobiologique de la pratique religieuse reposant sur le concept de libération cognitive semble s’adapter davantage à ces données qu’à celles d’un locus cérébral particulier.

RESUMEN

El recién interés por los fundamentos farmacológicos de las experiencias religiosas ha llevado tanto a la caracterización experimental de los eventos místicos inducidos por los fármacos, como al desarrollo de unos modelos psicobiológicos de las experiencias religiosas que tienen su base en la evolución y en la adaptación. El examen de esta literatura sugiere que estas teorías son congruentes sólo en contextos religiosos y culturales modernos y no se pueden extender a todas las creencias religiosas históricamente conocidas, como podría esperarse a partir de un mecanismo biológico evolutivamente conservado. La fuerte influencia de la cultura sobre los efectos subjetivos de los fármacos y sobre el pensamiento religioso niegan el concepto de una vía común en el cerebro, como única responsable de estas experiencias. Más bien, el papel de las creencias personales, de las expectativas y de las experiencias puede interferir con lainterpretación de la acción de los fármacos psicoactivos que refleja el pensamiento religioso basado en la biologia. De esta manera, la investigación psicofarmacológica, proponiendo mecanismos cerebrales específicos debería tomar en cuenta datos antopológicos e históricos para proponer hipótesis alternativas acerca de la capacidad adptativa, en sentido darwiniano, del pensamiento religioso. En este sentido, la hipótesis de que la experiencia religiosa podría consistir en un caso especial de “disociación cognitiva” toma un fuerte releve psicobiológico.

RIASSUNTI

Il recente interesse nei fondamenti farmacologico delle esperienze religiose ha condotto sia alla caratterizzazione sperimentale degli eventi mistici indotti dai farmaci sia a allo sviluppo di modelli psicobiologici della esperienza religiosa fondati sull’evoluzione e sull’adattamento. L’esame di questa letteratura suggerisce che queste teorie sono congruenti solo con i contesti religiosi e culturali moderni e non sono generalizzabili a tutti le credenze religiose storicamente attestate, come ci si aspetterebbe da un meccanismo biologico evolutivamente conservato. La robusta influenza della cultura sugli effetti soggettivi dei farmaci e sul pensiero religioso depongono contro il concetto di una via comune nel cervello come unico responsabile di queste esperienze. Piuttosto, il ruolo dei convincimenti personali, delle aspettative e delle esperienze può interferire con l’interpretazione dell’azione dei farmaci psicoattivi che riflette il pensiero religioso basato sulla biologia. Così, la ricerca psicofarmacologica proponendo meccanismi cerebrali specifici dovrebbe considerare dati antropologici e storici per proporre ipotesi alternative riguardo la capacità adattativa, in senso darwiniano, del pensiero religioso. In questo contesto, l’ipotesi che l’esperienza religiosa consista in un caso particolare di “dissociazione cognitiva” assume una robusta valenza psicobiologica.

Keywords :

• Psychobiology
• religiousness
• religious experience

THE AUTHORS

Paolo Nencini, MD, is Professor of Pharmacology at the Medical School of the University of Rome “La Sapienza” and head of the Drug Dependence Unit of the University Hospital Policlinico Umberto I. His main research interest is the behavioral pharmacology of psychostimulants and opioids in both humans and laboratory animals. He is also interested in the cultural factors modulating drug-taking behaviors and has conducted field studies on khat chewing in Somalia.

Kathleen A. Grant, Ph.D., is a Professor in the Department of Behavioral Neurosciences at Oregon Health and Science University and a senior scientist in the Division of Neuroscience at the ONPRC. She earned her Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Washington in 1984. This was followed by a three-year postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Chicago. In 1987 she took an appointment as Staff Fellow at the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, becoming a Senior Staff Fellow in 1990. In 1991 she joined the faculty at Wake Forest University School of Medicine, where she remained until her appointment to the ONPRC and OHSU in 2005.

Notes

1 According to this definition, we consider the expression “religious experience” equivalent to “mystic experience,” “trance-like state,” and “ecstasy” and hence we will use it throughout the paper.

2 For a comprehensive review of Neolithic braziers with hemp remains found in a vast region from southeastern to central Europe, see Sherratt (1991). For the supposed use of hemp by Scythians, see Erodotus I, 202, 2 and IV, 75, 1 e 2; by Thracians, see Strabo, Geography VII.3.3, c296. For general reviews on ethnographic studies on ritual use of psychotropic drugs, see Harner (1973a, 1973b) and Rudgley (1993).

3 These positions are epitomized by Eliade (1951), who argued that the use of drugs represented the decline of shamanism, and by La Barre (1972), who, in contrast, believed that the intoxication was the core of the shamanic experience: “…all our knowledge of the supernatural derives de facto from the statements made by religious visionaries or ecstatics (i.e., prophets and shamans)…and that the nature of the shamanic ecstasy may be illuminated by attention to ancient hallucinogens (p. 3).”

4 Social constructionists reject the postulate of “causal indifference” whereby drug-induced religious experiences are identical to those that occur spontaneously or are induced by meditation. This position has been clearly expressed by Bulkeley: “… [Hood’s] mystical experience scale is so thoroughly committed to Stace's concepts that, on this point, his findings are inevitably reproductions of his initial premises. Hood's research proves many things, but not the common core thesis.” Furthermore, we should “…not automatically assume we know what the mystic is ‘really’ experiencing. Mystical experience is profoundly creative—it is not an absorption into a supposedly universal unity, but a fresh new emergence of human possibility.” (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 143)

5 The issue of rational/irrational thought in determining religiosity is obviously crucial. Among the core manifestations of the religious experience, in this case called mysticism, the following has been put: “A cessation of normal intellectual operations (e.g., deduction, discrimination, ratiocination, speculation, etc.) or the substitution for them of some ‘higher’ or qualitatively different mode of intellect (e.g., intuition)” (Gimello R., 1978, quoted by d’Aquili and Newberg, 1998). On the other hand, religious beliefs as a whole are the result of nonrational thought, as indeed they appear when examined with the instruments of modern psychology: “… since religious beliefs and behaviors cannot be verified logically, adherents verify them ‘emotionally’ through the ‘religious experience’” (Sosis and Alcorta, 2003). It is interesting to note, again, the radical difference with Greek religion which rationalism can be epitomized by the fact that Plato, who can rightly be considered a religious genius, considered him self and was considered by his contemporaries, a philosopher (Nilsson, 1970, p. 4).

6 The soteriological function of the Eleusinian mystery is indicated by a Sophocles’ fragment (fr. 719 Dindorf, 348 Didot): “Thrice happy are those mortals who see these rites before they depart for Hades; for to them alone is it granted to have true life on the other side. To the rest all there is evil.” (Translation: W. K. C. Guthrie, 1993, p. 154).

7 The complete fragment is the following: “Then [at the point of death] it [i.e., the soul] suffers something like what those who participate in the great initiation suffer. Hence even the word ‘dying’ is like the word ‘to be initiated,’ and the act (of dying) is like the act (of being initiated). First of all there are wanderings and wearisome rushings about and certain journeys fearful and unending through the darkness, and then before the very end all the terrors—fright and trembling and sweating and amazement. But then one encounters an extraordinary light, and pure regions and meadows offer welcome, with voices and dances and majesties of sacred sounds, and holy sights; in which now the completely initiated one becoming free and set loose enjoys the rite, crowned, and consorts with holy and pure men” (translated by K. Clinton, 2003, p. 66).

8 Lucius Anneus Cornutus, a follower of the orphic doctrine active in the first century AD, openly explained the offer of poppies to Demeter by worshippers in the following way: “the roundness [of poppy heads] represents the shape of the earth… its internal parts resemble cavernous and subterranean environments, moreover they produce endless seeds as the earth does.” (Cornutus L. A., Theologiae Grecae Compendium, 28)

9 Eventually, the hand holding poppy heads will change. A conspicuous example is in a third century AD. sarcophagi preserved in the Museo dei Conservatori at the Capitol in Rome: a child holding two heads of poppy is laying down in a sleepy position (see the picture in Nencini, 1997, p. 1406). The remarkable point is that the hand holding poppies is not any more the left but is the right. Hence, we may argue that in a funeral setting poppies acquired symbolic meanings different from those connected with agrarian fertility. The hint to interpret this change is in an orphic hymn probably composed in a period shortly antecedent that funeral scene, and entitled “Scent of the Sleep With poppy.” Here, sleep is the brother of Oblivion and of Death and he is praised for relieving humans from the burden of everyday toils and pains. Mostly because it prepares to death but sparing the souls and, at the end of the hymn, it is invoked to come preserving the initiates (mystai) for divine deeds. Thus, poppy, intended as Papaver somniferum, eventually became a pharmacological tool that induced such a profound sleep that resembles to death, but from which it was possible to awake: a perfect symbolism of the orphic theory of rebirth or palingenesis. In this perspective, it is easy to understand the reason why the death child in the Museo dei Conservatori held poppies with his right hand: as mentioned above, this hand points to the heaven, but also to the air and to the light, necessary for life. In the hope of parents, poppies in the right hand of their son predict the continuity of his life, either as a free spirit in the heaven or again in a mundane existence.