Do Bureaucrats Contribute to the Resource Curse? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in New Oil States

References

• Andersen, J. J., Johannesen, N., Dreyer Lassen, D., & Paltseva, E. (2013). Petro rents, political institutions, and hidden wealth: Evidence from bank deposits in tax havens. EPRU Working Paper Series.
   Google Scholar
• Anderson, L. (1987). The state in the Middle East and North Africa. Comparative Politics, 20(1), 1–18.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bakker, A. B. (2015). A job demands–resources approach to public service motivation. Public Administration Review, 75(5), 723–732.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bates, R. H., & Lien, D.-H. D. (1985). A note on taxation, development, and representative government. Politics & Society, 14(1), 53–70.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bellé, N. (2013). Experimental evidence on the relationship between public service motivation and job performance. Public Administration Review, 73(1), 143–153.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brass, J. N., Schon, J., Baldwin, E., & MacLean, L. M. (2020). Spatial analysis of bureaucrats’ attempts to resist political capture in a developing democracy: The distribution of solar panels in Ghana. Political Geography, 76, 102087.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cappelen, A. W., Fjeldstad, O.-H., Mmari, D., Sjursen, I. H., & Tungodden, B. (2018). Understanding the resource curse: A large-scale experiment on corruption in Tanzania. CMI Working Paper.
   Google Scholar
• Carboni, N. (2010). Changing relationships between politicians and bureaucrats in contemporary democracies: An empirical analysis of the Italian experience. International Public Management Review, 11(1), 90–109.
   Google Scholar
• Chaudhry, K. A. (1997). The price of wealth: Economies and institutions in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Corbacho, A., Gingerich, D. W., Oliveros, V., & Ruiz-Vega, M. (2016). Corruption as a self-fulfilling prophecy: Evidence from a survey experiment in Costa Rica. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 1077–1092.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Crewson, P. E. (1997). Public-service motivation: Building empirical evidence of incidence and effect. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 7(4), 499–518.
   Google Scholar
• Croese, S. (2017). State-led housing delivery as an instrument of developmental patrimonialism: The case of post-war Angola. African Affairs, 116(462), 80–100.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dasgupta, A., & Kapur, D. (2020). The political economy of bureaucratic overload: Evidence from rural development officials in India. American Political Science Review, 114(4), 1316–1334.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• de La Cuesta, B., Milner, H. V., Nielson, D. L., & Knack, S. F. (2019). Oil and aid revenue produce equal demands for accountability as taxes in Ghana and Uganda. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(36), 17717–17722.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• De Oliveira, R. S. (2015). Magnificent and beggar land: Angola since the Civil War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dynes, A., & Holbein, J. B. (2020). Noisy retrospection: The effect of party control on policy outcomes. American Political Science Review, 114(1), 237–257.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frynas, J. G., Wood, G., & Hinks, T. (2017). The resource curse without natural resources: Expectations of resource booms and their impact. African Affairs, 116(463), 233–260.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Government of Uganda. (2012). Oil and gas revenue management policy. Retrieved from http://www.acode-u.org/Files/oildocs/Oil_Revenue_Mgt_Policy.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Harris, A S., Sigman, R., Meyer-Sahling, J. Mikkelsen, K. S. Schuster, C. (2020). Oiling the Bureaucracy? Political Spending, Bureaucrats and the Resource Curse. World Development, 127, Article https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104745.
   Google Scholar
• Hartman, E., & Hidalgo, F. D. (2018). An equivalence approach to balance and placebo tests. American Journal of Political Science, 62(4), 1000–1013.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hertog, S. (2010). Princes, brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hickey, S., Abdulai, A.-G., Izama, A., & Mohan, G. (2015). The politics of governing oil effectively: A comparative study of two new oil-rich states in Africa. Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Working Paper series, No. 54.
   Google Scholar
• Jensen, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2004). Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 37(7), 816–841.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Karl, T. L. (1997). The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states (Vol. 26). Berkeley: University of California Press.
   Google Scholar
• Karl, T. L. (1999). The perils of the petro-state: Reflections on the paradox of plenty. Journal of International Affairs, 53(1), 31–48.
   Google Scholar
• Knutsen, C. H., Kotsadam, A., Olsen, E. H., & Wig, T. (2017). Mining and local corruption in Africa. American Journal of Political Science, 61(2), 320–334.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Leite, C., & Weidmann, J. (1999). Does mother nature corrupt: Natural resources, corruption, and economic growth. IMF Working Papers, 99(85), 1.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, P. (2009). Growing apart: Oil, politics, and economic change in Indonesia and Nigeria. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
   Google Scholar
• Lyons, S. T., Duxbury, L. E., & Higgins, C. A. (2006). A comparison of the values and commitment of private sector, public sector, and parapublic sector employees. Public Administration Review, 66(4), 605–618.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mahdavy, H. (1970). The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in a Rentier Stare: The Case of Iran. In M. A. Cook (Ed.), Studies in Economic History of the Middle East, (p. 428–467). London: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mishra, A. (2006). Persistence of corruption: Some theoretical perspectives. World Development, 34(2), 349–358.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moore, M. (2004). Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in developing countries. International Political Science Review, 25(3), 297–319.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morrison, K. M. (2009). Oil, nontax revenue, and the redistributional foundations of regime stability. International Organization, 63(1), 107–138.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mostafa, A. M. S., Gould-Williams, J. S., & Bottomley, P. (2015). High-performance human resource practices and employee outcomes: The mediating role of public service motivation. Public Administration Review, 75(5), 747–757.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Oketch, M. (2014). “Uganda to Earn Shs9 Trillion from Oil Annually - Tullow” The Daily Monitor. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Uganda-to-earn-Shs9-trillion-from-oil-annually---Tullow/688334-2451478-rag0a9/index.html
   Google Scholar
• Paler, L., Springman, J., Grossman, G., & Pierskalla, J. (2020). Oil discoveries and political windfalls: Evidence on presidential support in Uganda.
   Google Scholar
• Paler, L. (2013). Keeping the public purse: An experiment in windfalls, taxes, and the incentives to restrain government. American Political Science Review, 107(4), 706–725.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Panter-Brick, S. (1978). Soldiers and Oil: The political transformation of Nigeria. Routledge Press.
   Google Scholar
• Perry, J. L., & Hondeghem, A. (2008). Motivation in public management: The call of public service. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pinder, C. C. (2014). Work motivation in organizational behavior. New York: Psychology Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pressman, J., & Wildavsky, A. (1984). Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland. Berkeley: Univ of California Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ramsay, K. W. (2011). Revisiting the resource curse: Natural disasters, the price of oil, and democracy. International Organization, 65(3), 507–529.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rasul, I., Rogger, D., & Williams, M. J. (2021). Organizational Performance, and Task Clarity: Evidence from Ghana’s Civil Service. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 31(2), 259–277.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006). Political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, 79(2), 447–468.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ross, M. L. (2001a). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325–361.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ross, M. L. (2001b). Timber booms and institutional breakdown in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ross, M. L. (2012). The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ross, M. L. (2015). What have we learned about the resource curse? Annual Review of Political Science, 18(1), 239–259.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What is quality of government? A theory of impartial government institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165–190.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 827–838.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sala-i Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2013). Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria. Journal of African Economies, 22(4), 570–615.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sandefur, J., Birdsall, N., Fishkin, J., & Moyo, M. (2020). Deliberative democracy and the resource curse: A nationwide experiment in Tanzania. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 548.
   Google Scholar
• Saylor, R. (2014). State Building in Boom Times: Commodities and coalitions in Latin America and Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Steinberg, J. (2019). Mines, communities, and states: The local politics of natural resource extraction in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vicente, P. C. (2010). Does oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 28–38.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wantchekon, L. (2002). Why do resource dependent countries have authoritarian governments? Journal of African Finance and Economic Development, 2(1), 57–77.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, J., Frantz, E., & Geddes, B. (2015). Oil and autocratic regime survival. British Journal of Political Science, 45(2), 287–306.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yates, D. A. (1996). The rentier state in Africa: Oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon. Africa World Press.
   Google Scholar