ANALYZING THE EFFICIENCY OF COLLABORATIVE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF TWO COMMUNITY WILDLIFE SANCTUARIES IN KENYA

REFERENCES

• 1997 . “ German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) ” . In World in Transition: The Research Challenge Berlin : Springer Verlag .
   Google Scholar
• Wells , M. and Brandon , K. 1995 . “ People and Parks: Linking Protected Area Management with Local Communities ” . Washington , D.C. : World Bank, World Wildlife Fund, US Agency for International Development . 3rd, pr.
   Google Scholar
• Lutz, E.; Caldecott, J. Decentralization and Biodiversity Conservation. A World Bank Symposium. The World Bank: Washington D.C., 1996
   Google Scholar
• Agrawal , A. and Ostrom , E. 2001 . “ Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Forest and Protected Area Management ” . In Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Natural Resource Management – Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy Edited by: Meinzen-Dick , R. , Knox , A. and Di Gregorio , M. 75 – 109 . Eurasburg CAPRi, ICLARM, ZEL/DSE
   Google Scholar
• Hanna , S. 1995 . User Participation and Fishery Management Performance within the Pacific Fishery Management Council . Ocean Coastal Management , 28 ( 1–3 ) : 23 – 44 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hanna , S. 1995 . “ Efficiencies of User Participation in Natural Resources Management ” . In Property Rights and the Environment. Social and Ecological Issues Edited by: Hanna , S and Munasinghe , M. 59 – 67 . Washington , D.C : The Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics and The World Bank .
   Google Scholar
• Birner, R.; Wittmer H. Co-management of Natural Resources: A Transaction Costs Economics Approach to Determine the “Efficient Boundaries of the State”, Paper presented at the Annual International Conference of the International Society of the New Institutional Economics (ISNIE) in Tübingen, September, 2000
   Google Scholar
• Emerton , L. 1998 . “ The Nature of Benefits and Benefits of Nature: Why Wildlife Conservation has not Economically Benefited Communities in Africa ” . In Community Conservation in Africa: Principles and Comparative Practice Manchester , , UK : Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester . Paper No. 5
   Google Scholar
• Hanna, S. Efficiencies of User Participation in Natural Resources Management, quoted above.[4]
   Google Scholar
• Meinzen-Dick , R. and Knox , A. 2001 . “ Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: A Conceptual Framework ” . In Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Natural Resource Management – Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy Edited by: Meinzen-Dick , R. , Knox , A. and Di Gregorio , M. 75 – 109 . Eurasburg CAPRi, ICLARM, ZEL/DSE:
   Google Scholar
• Kuperan, K.; Mustapha, N.; Abdullah, R.; Pomeroy, R.S.; Genio, E.; and Salamanca, A. (: Measuring Transaction Costs of Fisheries Co-management, Paper Presented at the 7th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver,http://www.indiana.edu/∼iascp/Drafts/kuperan.pdf, 1998 (accessed may 2000)
   Google Scholar
• North , D.C. and Wallis , J.J. 1994 . Integrating Institutional Change and Technical Change in Economic History, A Transaction Cost Approach . Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 150 ( 4 ) : 609 – 624 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kuperan et al., quoted above.[7]
   Google Scholar
• Norton-Griffiths , M. 1996 . Property rights and the marginal wildebeest: An Economic Analysis of Wildlife Conservation Options in Kenya . Biodiversity and Conservation , 5 : 1557 – 1577 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hampicke , U. 1991 . “ Naturschutz-Ökonomie ” . 63 Stuttgart : Verlag Eugen Ulmer .
   Google Scholar
• Norton-Griffiths, quoted above.[10]
   Google Scholar
• Williamson , E.O. 1991 . Comparative Economic Organisation: ‘The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’ . Administrative Science Quarterly , 36 ( 2, June ) : 269 – 296 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• In The Economics of Transaction Costs; Williamson, O.E., Masten, S.E., Eds.; An Elgar Critical Writings Reader: Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 1999; 101–128; North & Wallis, quoted above[8]
   Google Scholar
• Pearce , D.W. and Perrings , C.A. 1995 . “ Biodiversity Conservation and Economic Development: Local and Global Dimensions ” . In Biodiversity conservation Edited by: Perrings , C.A. , Maeler , K.-G. , Folke , C. , Holling , C.S. and Jansson , B.-O. 23 – 40 . London : Kluwer Academic publishers .
   Google Scholar
• Griffin , R.C. 1991 . The Welfare Analytics of Transaction Costs, Externalities, and Institutional Choice . American Agricultural Economics Association , 73 ( 3 ) : 601 – 614 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kuperan et al., quoted above;[7]
   Google Scholar
• Challen , R. 2000 . Institutions, Transaction Costs and Environmental Policy: Institutional Reform for Water Resources (New Horizons in Environmental Economics) 29 – 39 . Cheltenham , , UK : Edward Elgar Publishing Limited .
   Google Scholar
• Goessling , S. 1999 . Eco-tourism: A Means to Safeguard Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functions . Ecological Economics, Elsevier Science Ltd , 29 : 303 – 320 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moran , D. 1994 . Contingent Valuation and Biodiversity: Measuring the User Surplus of Kenyan Protected Areas . Biodiversity and Conservation , 3 : 663 – 684 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gittinger , J. P. 1982 . Economic Analysis of Agricultural Projects , 2 61 Baltimore , London : The Johns Hopkins University Press . published for the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank
   Google Scholar
• All the data was collected by the Kenyan author, assisted by research assistants who were locally based
   Google Scholar
• AL and BL stands for “before lease” and “after lease” to African Safari Club respectively
   Google Scholar
• Mwau, G. Wildlife Utilisation Study: Economic Analysis. A Study Conducted by Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas Project (COBRA), USAID, Nairobi, 1995. Mwau's study was authorised by USAID and KWS. Its results form the basis of the current wildlife utilisation policy in Kenya
   Google Scholar
• The production operational costs for Kimana BL and Kimana AL do not differ a lot because over 90% of them emanate from guarding farms and fence maintenance. However as shown in Sec. 5.3, the direct management costs of the latter organisation are almost double of those of the former
   Google Scholar
• The failure for GM sanctuary to meet its costs is evidently supported by its trading and profit/loss accounts. For example, from 1997 to 1999, it had an annual loss of US$1,300 even after taking account of an infusion of US$21,490 per year as cash donations from non-governmental organisations and friends of the Cliff area landowners (source: audited reports)
   Google Scholar
• Since the fence cannot prevent the wildlife from attacking human beings and livestock, it is assumed that landowners savings arise only from reduced time of guarding and crop losses
   Google Scholar
• Mwau, quoted above,[20] 17–18
   Google Scholar
• Emerton , L. The Economics of Tourism and Wildlife Conservation in Africa . Applied Conservation Economics Discussion Paper no. 4 . Nairobi : African Wildlife Foundation .
   Google Scholar
• Even if the sanctuaries are less than 100 km2, each has only one Game camp. Amboseli has four Game lodges while Shimba Hills is served by many hotels since it is located nearer to the coastal beaches
   Google Scholar
• Gittinger, quoted above,[17] 126
   Google Scholar
• Adjustments for inflation have however been done for those values estimated earlier than the year 2000
   Google Scholar
• In the OECD project evaluation guidelines, 25% is recommended by Little/Mirrlees (quoted by Gaspary and Schmidt, 1984) as the upper limit of the value that should be applied to convert actual wages to shadow ones. However, with an ever rising unemployment level in Kenya, 30% is applied instead
   Google Scholar
• Goessling , S. 1999 . Eco-tourism: A Means to Safeguard Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functions . Ecological Economics, Elsevier Science Ltd , 29 : 303 – 320 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Norton-Griffiths, quoted above.[10]
   Google Scholar
• Norton-Griffiths, quoted above.[10]
   Google Scholar
• Norton-Griffiths, quoted above.[10]
   Google Scholar
• Poole , J.H. and Leakey , R.E. 1996 . “ Kenyan case study ” . In Decentralization and Biodiversity Conservation Edited by: Lutz , E. and Caldecott , J. 54 – 63 . Washington D.C. , , U.S.A : The World Bank .
   Google Scholar
• Hanna, quoted above;[4] Kuperan et al., quoted above.[7]
   Google Scholar