Abstract
Recent studies point to dramatic ‘mandate switches’ by elected politicians, while others suggest higher levels of mandate loyalty. Yet, two of the oldest party systems in Latin America, Colombia and Venezuela, have not been extensively examined. Legislative activity across single issue parties is examined to determine whether they are able to stay focused and consistent with the party's policy goals. The analysis identifies the importance of stated policy goals, which are likely to provide long-term electoral benefits, and nomination procedures as important determinants of legislative action among single issue parties. The results shed a new light on parties in Latin America by suggesting that parties are capable of acting in accordance with their stated single-issue platforms.
Notes
1 Party leaders and members were interviewed during several field research trips to Colombia and Venezuela. Only where leaders and members identified the organization as a single issue party were parties categorized as such.
2 Items used to determine single or multi-issue status include:
“What does your party represent, in ideological terms?” (Open ended); Does your party represent a specific segment of society?” (Open ended).
3 Items used to determine the level of centralization within parties, with regard to nominations include:
“Are party nominees selected by party leaders?” (Closed ended) If respondents answer yes to the previous question they are directed to the following: “Does the nomination process occur at the national, state, or local levels?” (Closed ended). “What mechanisms are used to nominate candidates?” (open ended) “Are party primaries used to determine nominations for national legislative candidates?” (closed ended). “If primaries are used to determine nominations for national legislative candidates, who administers them: local, state, or national authorities” (closed ended).
4 Additional models (not presented here) were also estimated. They included interaction terms (nominations*single issue status; nominations*new party; nominations*size of party). They performed much like the model presented in , single issue parties, new parties and centralized nominations procedures were all statistically significant in reducing the effective number of parties. The models are not presented here but are available upon request.