Alternative Models of Salesmen's Response to Financial Incentives

Abstract

The assumption underlying any sales force incentive compensation plan is that salesmen react to financial incentives according to some definite and consistent pattern. In order to influence salesmen's activities through financial compensation a manager must know the “rule” salesmen follow in reacting to money incentives. There is relatively little theoretical and empirical research in this area and the partial findings do not support the presence of a single behavioural pattern in response to financial incentives.

This paper describes a model mainly based on a series of linear programs simulating salesmen's reactions to financial incentives under alternative basic behavioural hypotheses. By determining which hypothesis best explains actual data, a sales manager can possibly identify and infer the rule followed by his salesmen, and adjust the compensation scheme accordingly. The implications of such results for compensating salesmen are noted and a sample application of the model to an actual situation is described.