A negotiated solution for the Jordan Basin

Abstract

The use of water in the Jordan Basin has been a key factor in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and among Israel and its neighbours. In this paper, we explore possible ways of sharing water through a negotiation game with two players—Arabs and Israelis. We estimate a set of optimum Pareto allocations, as well as identifying a range of negotiated solutions. Our results suggest that viable solutions would improve incomes by some 20% compared to the current status quo. These solutions are close to the long-standing proposal contained in the Johnston Plan. Meanwhile, theoretical fairness criteria, which are more favourable to the Arabs than the Johnston Plan, maybe are not actually better in technical terms and could in any case only be achieved if the Arabs’ negotiating position were much stronger than the Israelis’.

Keywords:

• Jordan basin
• water allocation
• water conflict
• negotiation game