Abstract
The original concept of operational research (OR) was applied to RAF operations at Strike (née Bomber) Command during and after the Second World War and came under the leadership of the likes of Watson-Watt and Blackett. The tools used in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) have their origin in OR as developed in the 1950s and 1960s. OR was initially successful because of the use of independent scientists and mathematicians who cut-through the military hierarchy. PSA as proposed by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) as part of fault analysis of NPP can also be successful in improving the design and proposed operation, but it can be limited if only foreseen accident sequences are analysed. It is argued that OR can be applied to fault analysis of NPP in option assessment and hazard identification. In particular, synthesis of the experience from both fields would enable better analyses of the types of unforeseen accident sequences that occurred at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island and near-misses (Davis Besse).
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Matthew Robert Knott
Matthew Robert Knott is a senior lecturer in the Nuclear Department of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, which as an academic provider of training for the Royal Navy moved down to HMS Sultan following the closure of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich in 1998. Trained as a physicist and currently specializing in nuclear probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) he has, previously to his current appointment, spent 10 years working in the field of Operational Research starting at the OR Branch of Strike Command in 1984. After an 8-year period with Logica UK Ltd working on operational analysis projects for the UK MOD and NATO, he joined DRA Farnborough as a Senior Operational Analyst in air combat in 1993. He has recently joined the OR Society's Decision Analysis Special Interest Group and hopes to rekindle the formative links between the fields of OR and PSA.