Abstract
In two published studies, we used a variant of Neely's (1977) lexical decision paradigm to study shifts of attention and automatic lexical activation in nondemented individuals with Parkinson's disease (McDonald, Brown, & Gorell, 1996; Spicer, Brown, & Gorell, 1994). Arnott and Chenery (in press) noticed differences between Neely's results and the results we observed in our control group that raise questions about some of the conclusions presented in the McDonald et al. (1996) and Spicer et al. (1994) papers. Even when considering the important differences between Neely's (1977) results and those in our control groups, we argue that our results support the conclusions of normal automatic semantic activation and deficient set-shifting in Parkinson's disease. We also introduce the notion of generalized priming to account for some of the priming effects observed in our studies.