https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1940-8116
ABSTRACT
Despite the increasing interest in science exhibitions, there has been hardly any work on mobile science exhibitions and their role within science diplomacy – a gap this thematic issue is meant to fill. Atomic mobile exhibitions are seen here not only as cultural sites but as multifaceted strategic processes of transnational nuclear history. We move beyond the bipolar Cold War history that portrays propagandist science exhibitions as instances of a one-way communication employed to promote the virtues of the two major and conflicting political powers. Instead, Science Diplomacy on Display follows mobile atomic exhibitions as they move across national borders and around the world, functioning as spaces for diplomatic encounters. Exhibitions play a vital role not only in the production of knowledge and the formation of political worldviews but also as assets in diplomatic negotiations and as promoters of a new worldview in which nuclear stands at the centre. They are powerful iconic diplomatic devices, that is systems of representations that capture the diplomatic processes in action and make the nitty-gritty details of international relations visible. This issue seeks to trace the multiple and often contradictory meanings that mobile exhibitions took on for various actors.
In the middle of the summer of 1959 a string of limousines pulled up in front of the Coliseum, New York City’s newly designed convention centre in Manhattan. The first to step out was the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, followed by Vice President Richard Nixon, Commerce Secretary Lewis Strauss, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, the Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Mikhail A. Menshikov, and the U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Inside the Coliseum, Frol Romanovich Kozlov, First Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R., waited to greet the president and his diplomatic entourage and present to them the Soviet National Exhibtion.Footnote1 A British Pathé newsreel of that day shows the warm handshaking of the two men, who were surrounded by journalists, photographers, and an excited crowd.Footnote2 Strongly associated with progress and the Soviet supremacy in space science, the Soviet exhibition in New York put on public display a replica of the Sputnik and a model of the world’s first nucelar-powered icebreaker.
The moment was historic. In his opening speech Kozlov was crystal clear: ‘Let us hope that the exchange of exhibitions, along with other measures to develop exchanges in the fields of science, culture and art, will become yet another breath of the warm wind which is destined to melt the ice of prejudices and misconceptions that cloaks American-Soviet relations.’Footnote3 Kozlov had arrived a few days earlier – with the first non-stop flight of a Tupolev Tu-114 from Moscow to New York – to open the Soviet exhibition, the first of its kind in the U.S. A result of a mutual agreement between the two powers signed a year earlier, the Soviet exhibition in New York was followed by an American exhibition in Moscow the same month.Footnote4 According to TIME magazine, the event ‘was a milestone in the new day of person-to-person diplomacy, and both sides were aware of the high stakes.’Footnote5 As a commentator for the Christian Science Monitor noted at the time, ‘competition by exhibition contains an important element of international strategy.’Footnote6
The two major 1959 national displays and those that followed them (see Tolvaisas 2010) have intensely occupied the interest of Cold War historians and shaped scholarship on the relations of the two superpowers. In this context, exhibitions have primarily been seen as cultural arenas that host political struggles. For instance, David Caute has framed the Cold War as a ‘struggle for cultural supremacy’ between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, including not only the performing and fine arts in his analysis but also the culture of exhibitions.Footnote7 For Ellen Mickiewicz, the 1959 American exhibition in Moscow ‘was the grandest, most complex, most ambitious cultural diplomacy project ever launched.’Footnote8 Klaus Gestwa and Stefan Rohdewald have argued that the Cold War was indeed a ‘war of words, images, and symbols.’Footnote9 Andrée Bergeron and Charlotte Bigg have examined science exhibitions as projects that ‘essentially seek to materially inscribe science and technology in space.’Footnote10 Arthur Molella and Scott Gabriel Knowles have analyzed the world fairs of the 1940s to 1980s as active processes that both mirrored and shaped Cold War cultureFootnote11, while other scholars have scrutinized the world fairs of the interwar years to understand the ideological struggles that preceded and formed the postwar period.Footnote12 In general, world fairs of the Cold War era have attracted a great amount of interest.Footnote13 Several scholars have already recognized the power of exhibitions to engage the public in the production of knowledgeFootnote14; to make political statementsFootnote15; to shape public attitudes towards the atomic bombFootnote16; or to become sites for the visualization of different social futures and especially the banalization of nuclear technologies.Footnote17
Despite the increasing interest in science exhibitions, however, there has been hardly any work on mobile science exhibitions and their role within science diplomacy – a gap this thematic issue is meant to fill. Atomic mobile exhibitions are seen here not only as cultural sites but as multifaceted strategic processes of transnational nuclear history. We move beyond the bipolar Cold War history that portrays propagandist science exhibitions as instances of a one-way communication employed to promote the virtues of the two major and conflicting political powers. Instead, Science Diplomacy on Display follows mobile atomic exhibitions as they move across national borders and around the world, functioning as spaces for diplomatic encounters. Exhibitions play a vital role not only in the production of knowledge and the formation of political worldviews but also as assets in diplomatic negotiations and as promoters of a new worldview in which nuclear stands at the centre. They are powerful iconic diplomatic devices, that is systems of representations that capture the diplomatic processes in action and make the nitty-gritty details of international relations visible.Footnote18 They move within political and scientific networks of exchange and knowledge flow; this is why mobility matters. They require important material investments and transform not only worldviews but also alternate local infrastructures.
This issue seeks to trace the multiple and often contradictory meanings that mobile exhibitions took on for various actors. For the countries and international organizations that designed and circulated atomic mobile exhibitions during the Cold War, these became a way of educating other nations in the peaceful uses of the atom, training a new generation of nuclear experts, promoting an optimistic representation of nuclear energy, and standardizing its use. For the nations that hosted them, their function depended on the local political, economic, and social environment; most often they inspired local actors to circulate home-made atomic exhibitions within national borders. An enormous endeavour in terms of their economics, moving logistics, local setting up and running, mobile atomic exhibitions allow us to unpack diplomatic and political tensions on a global level and explore the aesthetics of atomic power.
1. Atomic mobile exhibitions
Already at the end of the nineteenth century, American science institutions started to invest in travelling exhibitions, loan their collections, and use vehicles for transportation. One of the first portable museums was the St. Louis Educational Museum, launched in 1905. However, it was only after the Second World War that exhibitions started to be built inside the vehicles and gained momentum as mediums that extended educational opportunities and made cultural values widely accessible. In 1947, the first mobile exhibition inside a trailer coach was inaugurated in Cleveland, and this was followed by a number of other mobile units around the country, carrying exhibitions installed in busses and trucks.Footnote19 The same year a similar mobile initiative came from the British Atomic Scientists Association. Scientists concerned about their public image after the atomic bomb disasters launched an educational campaign in order to legitimize the peaceful uses of atomic energy and fashion themselves as guardians of the international control of atomic energy. The key aspect of the campaign was the Atom Train, a waggon that carried a mobile exhibition on atomic energy.Footnote20
Soon, picking up on the advancements in museology, its methods and material culture, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) started to use mobile units as propaganda devices to legitimize atomic energy on a national level. In August 1948, a mobile atomic exhibition toured the country, featuring wonders such as animals that had been fed radioactive sugar, silver dimes bombarded with neutrons to make cadmium, and radioactive fertilizers. The exhibition entitled ‘Man and the Atom’ was incredibly popular and at its peak attracted more than one million people during New York City’s Golden Jubilee Celebration from August 23 to September 19, 1948.Footnote21 A month later, on October 22, 1948, the AEC decided to test the waters for a more permanent atomic museum and thus transferred the exhibit to Oak Ridge where more than 70,000 visitors queued to see the marvels of the atom.Footnote22 Eventually, a year later, the American Museum of Atomic Energy was established in order to ‘tell the story of atomic energy in such a way that it will be interesting and understandable to young and old alike.’Footnote23
After President Eisenhower had delivered his speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1953, introducing the ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative, and after the Atomic Energy Act had come into effect in 1954, the AEC initiated a new countrywide programme of travelling exhibitions, more ambitious than ever and known as the ‘Atoms for Peace’ mobile campaign. According to the U.S. House of Representatives, the programme served as ‘a major instrument for public information’ concerning peacetime developments of atomic energy.Footnote24 As exhibits proved to be an exceptionally successful tool in promoting political messages, the AEC expanded its exhibit programme: in 1956 the staff at the Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies (ORINS) undertook the design and preparation of new innovative mobile units, namely, ‘[t]hree units of a type requiring a display area of about 6000 square feet and five units of a walk-through exhibit self-contained in truck trailers.’Footnote25
But the legitimation of nuclear energy on a national level was not enough. The ‘winning of men’s minds’Footnote26 became the major task of the United States Information Agency (USIA), a governmental agency created by Eisenhower in 1953 to handle all U.S. information programmes abroad. The ‘Atoms for Peace’ mobile exhibits organized by USIA became key instruments for capitalizing on America’s scientific and technological developments regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy. They proved to be an enormously effective educational tool by enabling a large number of people to see in practice the promised peaceful nuclear future. A National Security Council’s report on USIA’s activities in 1954 pointed out that ‘Major ‘Atoms for Peace’ exhibits in Berlin, Italy and Belgium capped USIA’s continuing press, radio and film campaign to popularize the President’s atom-pool proposal. A five-truck Italian exhibit was seen by nearly 2,000,000’Footnote27 (see Germanese in this issue). By the mid-1950s over two million visitors had supposedly seen such exhibits in more than fourteen countries, including Japan.Footnote28
The brand ‘Atoms for Peace’ was also adopted by the Soviet Union and used for science diplomacy missions such as the export of a popular exhibition on nuclear science to Czechoslovakia, ‘Atomy pro mír’ in 1956 (see Šmidrkalová in this issue). A telling example of the race of the two rivalling political systems in displaying the ‘peaceful atom’ is a statement by USIA in a report to the U.S. Congress: ‘The Communists watched the growth of favourable world opinion toward the peaceful atom field and, late in 1954, began to stage atomic energy exhibits of their own.’Footnote29 Indeed, the first stages of the competition consisted in a quick exchange of blows, as USIA launched the first travelling atomic exhibition in June 1954 in RomeFootnote30, while in August 1955, the Soviet Union presented a large exhibition in its own pavilion at the first Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and later sent it to India and Czechoslovakia.Footnote31 In countries where television was not yet established and therefore could not function as a channel of information for the masses, objects and messages of the nuclear age travelled in special exposition vans to the most remote places (e.g., in Italy and Latin America), or people were moved to the exhibits by means of dedicated trains and busses (e.g., in Czechoslovakia). Indeed, mobility mattered as political rivals were trying to form a transnational regulatory system of nuclear power.
2. Transnational case studies
The opening article by Germanese traces the planning, setting up, and travelling of the first mobile atomic exhibition that the United States Information Agency ever organized – the Italian Mostra Atomica exhibition which toured the peninsula from June 1954 until June 1955 and was later adapted for use in other countries. It gives a step-by-step account of how the exhibition was conceived, how it was supported by the governmental apparatus of the host country, and how it was received by the public. Based on archival materials, it offers a detailed description of the artifacts and panels on display, specifying the thematic breakdown within each car showroom. The article provides telling examples of the exhibition’s political context being simultaneously micro-local as well as transnational. Many facets, many actors, and many interests – converging as well diverging – were involved in such a venture into atomic science diplomacy. Italy possessed both a solid tradition in nuclear physics and recent joint endeavours of private businesses and public agencies; but while the atomic exhibition made occasional reference to such developments in the host country, it pursued the overall goal of explaining in simple terms a variety of civilian uses of atomic energy to the general population. Objects, photographs, diagrams, and entertaining experimental demonstrations were supported by short and plain sentences, making it easy for other countries to adapt the exhibition later. As Germanese additionally shows, the architectural design of mobile exhibitions proved to be a major creative as well as a deliberate political act. Thus, what the Mostra Atomica’s architect (and U.S. Army veteran) Peter G. Harnden called an ‘old-fashioned travelling circus’ was made into a ‘spectacular exhibition’ that succeeded in transforming the public’s opinion about nuclear energy.
Michaela Šmidrkalová’s article describes the planning and organization of the Czechoslovak-Soviet ‘Atoms for Peace’ exhibition that took place in 1956 in Prague and Bratislava. Drawing on archival and print materials, it shows how the atomic exhibition was the subject of negotiations within the geopolitical system of the Eastern Bloc: interventions by the Czechoslovak government and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia resulted in the addition of a Czechoslovak part to the original Soviet exposition. Likewise, in 1958 Czechoslovakia could participate in the Brussels World’s Fair (Expo 58) with its own pavilion, whose main attraction was a working betatron, a particle accelerator produced in Prague. The country was awarded the best pavilion prize by the international jury of Expo 58. Šmidrkalová ultimately deems the Czechoslovak atomic exhibitions a compromise between dependence and national pride. She reminds us that, after all, Soviet nuclear diplomacy did not take place only through bilateral agreements and the Soviet leadership of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). The policy of joint nuclear exhibitions of the Comecon countries, i.e., those that comprised the Eastern Bloc and a number of socialist states elsewhere in the world, became the façade behind which the promotion of nuclear energy and the economic influence of states beyond Comecon’s reach (such as India) was hidden.
The third and final case study of our special issue introduces photography as a metalevel of analysis of a mobile exhibition. Gisela Mateos and Edna Suárez-Díaz build on their studies of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s programmes of mobile technical assistance in Mexico and other Latin American countries.Footnote32 Their article is dedicated to the photographs taken by the driver of the IAEA Mobile Radioisotope Exhibition during its travel through Latin America. As they argue, in this case photographs were not only means of representation but mostly of appropriation, representing the Latin American countries as ideal loci for imperialism. Mateos and Suárez-Díaz point to the colonialist motivation of such photographs, be they shot by a foreigner or a national. Othering those in the focus of the camera – persons, animals, buildings, landscapes – provides a justification for active intervention in a place presented as empty and labelled as underdeveloped. In this beautifully documented piece, Mateos and Suárez-Díaz remind us that photography may serve political and diplomatic interests, as did the mobile exhibition itself.
By studying how nuclear exhibitions were constructed, lent, moved around, were set up and dismantled, documented and disseminated, the three articles offer concrete examples of the relationships between hegemonic powers and satellite countries. In other words, by analyzing representations of the nuclear present and future, as shown in mobile atomic exhibitions during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, this special issue explores the ways nuclear diplomacy went on display during the Cold War. The contributions highlight patterns of science policy related to economic and political interests that were underpinned by symbols of friendship (Rentetzi 2021). A shared topic are the sources of pride in the ‘periphery,’ here: in Mexico, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. These countries’ own achievements in scientific research and technological implementation – such as the betatron produced in Prague, a cohort of trained nuclear engineers in Mexico, or the cutting-edge nuclear research (in the 1930s) and various pilot projects conducted in Italy – constituted the basis for their independent advancements, while at the same time they faced difficulties due to their satellite positions in Cold War geopolitics.Footnote33 The articles included in this special issue collectively show that the competition in nuclear technology between the Soviet Union and the U.S. took place in Europe and Latin America by means of travelling exhibitions. Thus they complicate and undermine the binary understanding of the Cold War, as competition also arose between the host countries and their sponsors: the Soviet Union, the United States, and the IAEA.
Declaration of interest
We wish to confirm that there are no known conflicts of interest associated with this publication and there has been no significant financial support for this work that could have influenced its outcome.
Acknowledgments
This publication is part of the project ‘Living with Radiation: The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the History of Radiation Protection’ (HRP-IAEA).
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Notes
1 Ronald D. Landa, James E. Miller, David S. Patterson and Charles S. Sampson. ‘Editorial Note’ in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960. Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus (Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1993), doc. 78.
3 Frol R. Kozlov, ‘Text of Speeches by Nixon and Kozlov at Opening of Soviet Exhibition’, New York Times, 30 June 1959, 16.
4 See Frol R. Kozlov, ‘Text of Kozlov Statement’, New York Times, 29 June 1959, 12; Marilyn S. Kushner, ‘Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959: Domestic Politics and Cultural Diplomacy’, in Journal of Cold War Studies, 4 (2002), 6-26.
5 ‘Diplomacy: Kremlin Man’ TIME, 13 July 1959.
6 Qtd. in David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 33.
7 Caute, subtitle.
8 Ellen Mickiewicz, ‘Efficacy and Evidence: Evaluating U.S. Goals at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 13 (2011), 138–71 (p. 138). See also Andrew James Wulf, U.S. International Exhibitions During the Cold War: Winning Hearts and Minds Through Cultural Diplomacy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).
9 Klaus Gestwa and Stefan Rohdewald, ‘Verflechtungsstudien: Naturwissenschaft und Technik im Kalten Krieg’, Osteuropa, 59 (2009), 5–14 (p. 7). See also Sharon Macdonald, The Politics of Display: Museums, Science, Culture (New York: Routledge, 1998).
10 Andrée Bergeron and Charlotte Bigg, ‘The Spatial Inscription of Science in the Twentieth Century’, History of Science, 59 (2021), 121-32.
11 Arthur P. Molella and Scott Gabriel Knowles, World’s Fairs in the Cold War: Science, Technology, and the Culture of Progress (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019).
12 Robert H. Kargon, Karen Fiss, Morris Low and Arthur P. Molella, World’s Fairs on the Eve of War: Science, Technology, & Modernity, 1937–1942 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015).
13 See also Arne Schirrmacher, ‘North American World’s Fairs and the Reinvention of the Science Museum in the 1960s’, in Behind the Exhibit: Displaying Science and Technology at World's Fairs and Museums in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Elena Canadelli, Marco Beretta and Laura Ronzon (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2019), pp. 158-81; Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus and David Coulter, ‘Popularizing Science and Technology During the Cold War: Brussels 1958’, in Fair Representations: World’s Fairs and the Modern World, ed. by Robert W. Rydell and James B. Gilbert (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994), pp. 157–80.
14 Sally Kohlstedt, ‘Place and Museum Space: The Smithsonian Institution and the America West, 1850–1900’, in Geographies of Nineteenth-Century Science, ed. by David Livingstone and Charles Withers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), pp. 399-437; Karen Rader and Victoria Cain, Life on Display: Revolutionizing U.S. Museums of Science and Natural History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
15 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).
16 Arthur P. Molella, ‘Exhibiting Atomic Culture: The View from Oak Ridge’, History and Technology, 19 (2003), 211–26.
17 Jaume Sastre-Juan, ‘“If You Tilt This Game, Will It Explode?” The Politics of Nuclear Display at the New York Hall of Science (1966–1973)’, Centaurus, 61 (2019), 33–50.
18 Maria Rentetzi, ‘Mobility Matters: How to Form a Transnational System of Nuclear Power,’ paper presented at the conference of the European Society for the History of Science, Bologna, 2 Sep. 2020. For the notion of “iconic representations and representative practices,” see Chiara Ambrosio, ‘Iconic Representations and Representative Practices’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 28 (2014), 255–75.
19 Jessica Norberto Rocha and Martha Marandino, ‘Mobile Science Museums and Centres and Their History in the Public Communication of Science’, in Journal of Science Communication, 16 (2017), A04.
20 Christoph Laucht, ‘Atoms for the People: The Atomic Scientists’ Association, the British State and Nuclear Education in the Atom Train Exhibition, 1947–1948’, British Journal for the History of Science, 45 (2012), 591–608.
21 William L. Laurence, ‘Exhibit to Realize Alchemy’s Dream’, New York Times, 22 Aug. 1948. See also Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 296; Lindsey A. Freeman, Longing for the Bomb: Oak Ridge and Atomic Nostalgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), p. 121; Michael Scheibach, Atomic Narratives and American Youth: Coming of Age with the Atom, 1945–1955 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015), p. 48.
22 ‘Many to Take Part in Atomic Exhibition’, New York Times, 19 July 1948, 24.
23 William J. Wilcox, Jr., ‘The Day They Opened the Gates of the Secret City’, 2008 <https://doczz.net/doc/8595127/the-opening-of-the-gates-to-the-secret-city> [accessed 12 October 2022].
24 United States House of Representatives, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1959: Additional Hearings Before Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives. Eighty-Fifth Congress. Second Session. National Radio Astronomy Facility, National Science Foundation (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), 1095.
25 Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies, ‘Commission’s New Travelling Exhibits Are Now Ready for Public Showing’, ORINS Newsletter 9.1 (1956), 1.
26 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955–1957, Foreign Economic Policy; Foreign Information Program, vol. IX (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 505.
27 Qtd. in United States Department of State, 512. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 made a direct reference to the AEC’s policy to control information; see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1327/ML13274A489.pdf#page=23.
28 Progress Report, National Security Council, 21 December 1955, Disaster Files Series, Box 5, NARA. For the case of West Germany see Frank Schumacher, ‘The Symbolic Confrontation: Visual Power and American Opinion Management in West-Germany, 1949–1955’, Cahiers Charles V, 28 (2000), 125-48. For the case of Greece see Maria Rentetzi, ‘Gender, Science, and Politics: Queen Frederika and Nuclear Science in Postwar Greece’, Centaurus, 51 (2009), 63-87. For the case of Japan see Peter Kuznick, ‘Japan’s Nuclear History in Perspective: Eisenhower and Atoms for War and Peace’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 13 Apr. 2011; Ron Zwigenberg, ‘“The Coming of a Second Sun”: The 1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s Embrace of Nuclear Power’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 10 (2012), 1–16.
29 United States Information Agency, First Report to Congress, August–December 1953 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1954), 4-5.
30 Martin Manning, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2004), 19; Osgood, p. 176.
31 Laura Fermi, Atoms for the World: United States Participation in the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 124–27; James T. Andrews, Science for the Masses: The Bolshevik State, Public Science, and the Popular Imagination in Soviet Russia, 1917–1934 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003); Sonja D. Schmid, ‘Celebrating Tomorrow Today: The Peaceful Atom on Display in the Soviet Union’, Social Studies of Science, 36 (2006), 331-65. The Soviet Union launched its first mobile atomic exhibition in 1964; see Schmid, p. 345.
32 Gisela Mateos and Edna Suárez-Díaz, ‘We are Not a Rich Country to Waste Our Resources on Expensive Toys: The Mexican Version of Atoms for Peace’, History and Technology, 31 (2015), 243-58; ‘Technical Assistance in Movement: Nuclear Knowledge Crosses Latin American Borders’, in How Knowledge Moves: Writing the Transnational History of Science and Technology, ed. by John Krige (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), pp. 345-67; ‘Creating the Need in Mexico: The IAEA’s Technical Assistance Programs for Less Developed Countries (1958–68)’, History and Technology, 36 (2020), 418–36.
33 See also Cathleen M. Guistino, ‘Industrial Design and the Czechoslovak Pavilion at Expo ‘58: Artistic Autonomy, Party Control and Cold War Common Ground’, Journal of Contemporary History, 47 (2012), 185–212; Robert L. Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation & Conflict (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Mateos and Suárez-Díaz, ‘Creating the Need’; Elisabetta Bini, ‘Atoms for Peace (and War): US Forms of Influence on Italy’s Civilian Nuclear Energy Programs (1946–1964)’, in Nuclear Italy: An International History of Italian Nuclear Policies during the Cold War, ed. by Elisabetta Bini and Igor Londero (Trieste: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2017), pp. 23–40; Simone Turchetti, ‘A Most Active Customer: How the U.S. Administration Helped the Italian Atomic Energy Project to “De-Develop”’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 44 (2014), 470-502.