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ABSTRACT
What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterization of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal, because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities figure as powers in the causal profiles of these properties.
Notes
1 I will use italics for property names.
2 As also suggested, although without argument, by Baysan [Citation2016: 386].
3 Henceforth, I will drop this qualification in parentheses, but it remains implied.
4 See Contessa [Citation2015] for a recent example of the use of ‘confer’. Also, sometimes ‘bestow’ and ‘contribute’ are used to convey the same idea: see Shoemaker [Citation1980].
5 It might be proposed that we can modify BTV as follows: a property F has a causal power C if and only if either (i) bearers of F (that have C) have C in virtue of having F or (ii) bearers of F (that have C) have F in virtue of having C. The purpose of this disjunction is to accommodate both views about the direction of fundamentality considered above. However, this won't work, as there are views according to which properties are powers; and assuming that in-virtue-of relations are asymmetric, on such views, this modified version of BTV will not be adequate. Can we add yet another subclause to the right-hand side to accommodate this option? Perhaps we can, at the sacrifice of elegance. But this still wouldn't address the first problem that in-virtue-of claims explain only so much.
6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this example.
7 Assume that Fred is red but doesn't have any red proper parts.
8 In the case of this particular example, even if were to go outside the sphere of nomologically possible worlds, the result wouldn't change, as it is arguably necessary that all red objects have the power to look red. On an understanding whereby colour properties are nothing over and above dispositions to generate colour experiences, this point becomes very clear. As with other issues, I remain neutral on this.
9 Nomological coextension is a case of nomological necessitation. Other versions of this objection involve cases of nomological necessitation. If everything has mass as a matter of nomological necessity, then will the causal powers of having mass be included in any property's powers? I discuss a similar case at the end of section 6: the case of being nomologically possible, a property that is nomologically necessitated by any nomologically possible property.
10 I am not qualified to have an authoritative opinion on this matter, but, as far as I understand, this is actually not a law. I will assume otherwise for the sake of presenting this objection.
11 Admittedly, my reasons for finding BTV unsuccessful in section 4 weren't demonstratively conclusive against BTV. There, I argued that BTV is either not explanatory enough or controversial. This doesn't mean that BTV is false. At any rate, this objection is as powerful as the case for BTV, and I hope that the reader who finds BTV more promising than NBT can still find the latter sufficiently plausible to be worth examining for where it leads.
12 See Polger [Citation2004], Morris [Citation2010], Baysan [Citation2015], and Wilson [Citation2015] for discussions of theories of realization.
13 Thanks to Neil McDonnell for this example.
14 As an anonymous referee points out, the possibility of disjunctive constraints raises a difficulty here. Suppose that I authoritatively decree that anyone who is allowed in my house must wear either orange socks or a green hat. Call this rule ‘Socks-Hats’. Does imposing Socks-Hats guarantee any similarity among my guests (other than their guest-like features)? If not, the idea that constraints lead to similarities can be resisted. I think that this difficulty can be overcome, at least in the case of natural laws. Either (i) there are disjunctive similarities, or (ii) there are none. If (i), then there are reasons to think that there are disjunctive properties, so in the Socks-Hats case my guests will be similar with respect to being orange-socked or green-hatted. Likewise, if natural laws impose disjunctive constraints, then this can lead to similarities with respect to disjunctive properties. If (ii), then there will be reasons to think that there are no disjunctive properties, in which case we would expect natural laws not to impose disjunctive constraints. (On this option, any apparent disjunctive constraint in a law would have to be somehow explained away.) So, even if Socks-Hats imposes a disjunctive constraint, there are reasons to think that the analogy will not extend to the domain of natural laws.
15 RS has a noteworthy implication: it rules out the nomological possibility of epiphenomenal realizers—epiphenomenal properties that realize other properties. For those who think that determinable properties are realized by their determinates (e.g. Shoemaker [Citation2001]; Wilson [Citation2009]), this indicates that no determinate property is epiphenomenal. The two cited authors here shouldn't be worried about this, given their scepticism about epiphenomenal properties. But suppose we hold that there are epiphenomenal properties and that some of them are determinates of determinable properties. Then we have two options: either deny that determinables are realized by their determinates [Funkhouser Citation2006], or hold that determinables are realized by their determinates only when the determinates are not epiphenomenal. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this implication.
16 See also Clapp [Citation2001] and Antony [Citation2003] for arguments that disjunctive properties don't have to be wildly disjunctive.
17 Many thanks to Katherine Baysan, Jonas Christensen, John Donaldson, Stephan Leuenberger, James Miller, and two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. Discussions of various points with Alex Carruth, David Glick, David Mark Kovacs, Anna Marmodoro, Neil McDonnell, Martin Pickup, Matthew Tugby, and Nathan Wildman have been helpful. The work for this paper was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
