The Possibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers

ABSTRACT

Lewtas [2017] recently articulated an argument claiming that emergent conscious causal powers are impossible. In developing his argument, Lewtas makes several assumptions about emergence, phenomenal consciousness, categorical properties, and causation. We argue that there are plausible alternatives to these assumptions. Thus, the proponent of emergent conscious causal powers can escape Lewtas’s challenge.

KEYWORDS:

• emergentism
• laws of nature
• mental causation
• qualia
• categorical properties

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 For these formulations of physical realization, see, e.g., Aizawa and Gillett [2009] and Piccinini and Maley [2014].

2 We follow Lewtas [2017: 476] in setting aside Kim’s exclusion argument against emergentism.

3 For notable examples of naturalistic emergentist projects, see O’Connor [2000] and Balaguer [2004].

4 Lowe’s [2008] work on emergent mental causation involves a similar claim, albeit one that is differently motivated.

5 We thank Eran Asoulin, Duen-min Deng, Alexandre Erler, Graham Oppy, Luke Roelofs, and Wai-hung Wong for their feedback.

Additional information

Funding

Chan acknowledges the support from the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan (grant number: 108-2410-H-002-241-MY3). Latham acknowledges the support from the Ngāi Tai Ki Tāmaki Tribal Trust.