https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3875-592X
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ABSTRACT
Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic’s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal offers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Derek Baker, Michael Cholbi, Guy Fletcher, Sebastian Köhler, James Laing, James Lewis, Barry Maguire, Christine Tiefensee, and audiences at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, the University of Edinburgh, and the University of Sheffield for feedback on various earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to the anonymous reviewers and editors for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 While ordinary language seems to lack a name for this concept, Ridge (Citation2014: 20) points out that we more ordinarily talk of what we really, truly, or genuinely ought to do. See Wodak Citation2019: 830–32, for discussion.
2 For this reason, arguments that challenge the coherence of an un-relativized ‘ought’ (e.g., Copp Citation2021: 422–24) should not pose a serious threat to the unified view.
3 For further examples, see Tiffany Citation2007, Baker Citation2018, and Copp Citation2021.
4 Compare Wolf Citation2015 and Cocking and Kennett Citation2000.
5 But see Harman Citation2021 for dissent.
6 Taking each question in turn, talk of (say) the moral standpoint might mean how things are according to morality, or it might be understood as a psychological perspective we inhabit when we engage in moral deliberation (compare Killoren Citation2019: 147). Second, Copp (Citation2009) individuates normative standpoints by the role they play in ameliorating problems of normative governance, whereas Tiffany (Citation2007) and Baker (Citation2018) offer a deflationary pluralism in which we can individuate normative standpoints more or less however we like. Third, Copp (Citation2007) maintains a distinction between standpoints that intuitively matter and those that do not, for which he provides principled criteria (Copp Citation2009); by contrast Tiffany (Citation2007) and Baker (Citation2018) maintain that all standpoints are equal in providing reasons that are authoritative from their own perspective but not from others.
7 While Tiffany (Citation2007) is a prominent sceptic of unity, he does not argue directly against unity. Rather, he argues that pluralism provides the best explanation of conflict situations. I examine his argument in §4.1.
8 But see Shafer Citation2016 for the view that morality might not recommend itself as a guide to practical reason.
9 Although one might complain that the concept of a normative standpoint is no less metaphorical or ambiguous.
10 Compare Dorsey (Citation2013), who defends unity by claiming that the standpoint of ought simpliciter is the only authoritative standpoint. However, whereas Dorsey simply stipulates this in order to reject scepticism, the account proposed below aims to provide an explanation of this fact that is independently motivated. I discuss some further differences to Dorsey’s account below (§3.3).
11 This is a central theme of Nussbaum 1986.
12 For more details, see Wedgwood Citation2007, Williams Citation2018, Sud Citation2019, and Brown Citation2022.
13 For an expressivist view roughly along these lines, see Gibbard Citation1990; for a realist view, see Wedgwood Citation2007.
14 Elsewhere, Dorsey argues that ‘whether a considered judgment has moral content or not should be determined by its capacity to survive whatever proper epistemic procedure is appropriate for first-order moral inquiry’ (Citation2016: 772). However, this has the absurd consequence that false moral judgment is impossible.
15 Some possible candidates: perhaps morality is concerned with when to feel guilt and anger (Gibbard Citation1990), with a distinctive kind of interpersonal accountability (Darwall Citation2013), or with impersonal practical reasons for action (Crisp Citation1996).
16 Baker attributes the suggestion to Tristram McPherson and Michael Smith. But the basic idea can be found at least as far back as Williams Citation1985: 6. I respond to Baker’s criticisms of this proposal below (§4.2). Compare also Harman Citation2021.
17 An anonymous reviewer worries that once we follow Baker’s suggestion, it becomes unclear why we should care so much about moral judgments, since the condition will almost always be false. It seems to me that the force of the worry depends on how we unpack the notion of ‘moral considerations’. The account offered here is neutral with respect to the nature of moral considerations. But it seems plausible that moral considerations, whatever they are, hold a distinctive importance for us. For instance, consider Strawson’s (Citation1962) suggestion that we cannot enter into engaged interpersonal relationships without holding each other accountable in a way that requires the employment of certain concepts relating to moral responsibility. If morality is in some way distinctively important to us, then we might have a number of reasons to deliberate about morality abstracted from other practical concerns. Further, if one thinks that moral reasons are often or always overriding, as many do, then moral considerations will be especially important.
18 Compare Woods’ (Citation2018) notion of a standard’s being in force for us. For an alternative way of understanding the apparent normativity of merely formal normative standards, see Wodak Citation2019.