Australian perceptions of the nuclear arms race: A conflict of interests or a misunderstanding?

Abstract

A common game theory model of decision making by the United States and the Soviet Union to increase or reduce their nuclear armaments is the Prisoner's Dilemma. Under this model each nation most prefers its own nuclear armament together with nuclear disarmament by the other. Pious (1985) has challenged the Prisoner's Dilemma model and presented data consistent with a perceptual dilemma in which both nations have mutual nuclear disarmament as their first preference, but misperceive unilateral nuclear armament as the first preference of the other side. Australian data presented in this study were collected from federal parliamentarians, the Chamber of Commerce, army and peace groups. Australian respondents more frequently perceive the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as a Prisoner's Dilemma than as a perceptual dilemma. Though there are group differences, respondents often perceive both nations as aggressive and see a nuclear war as not unlikely.