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Articles and commentaries

The framing of knowledge and practice in psychology: A response to john

Pages 31-37 | Published online: 28 Sep 2007
 

Abstract

It is now indisputable that psychologists' traditional reliance on a narrow empiricist view of science has excessively constrained psychological discourse and, paradoxically, hindered empirical research. Related to this, it is increasingly apparent that the scientist-practitioner model has been predicated on a constitutive tension which has generated a range of problems in the practice domain. Increasing recognition of these issues has given impetus to sociologically oriented and “postmodern” critiques. However, there are particular problems with many of the alternative strategies developed on the basis of these critiques that tend to undermine their viability. Moreover, a current reconfiguring of the clinical science-practice relationship mitigates some of the objections that have been raised. Additionally, emergent practice demands in key jurisdictions necessitate adoption of something like a scientist-practitioner model. It is argued that the tensions symbolised in the composite of “scientist” and “practitioner” reflect underlying cultural and philosophical issues which need to be worked through within their own terms, and thus the model cannot be dismissed as a mere rhetorical device. Overall, it is concluded that a modified form of the scientist-practitioner model needs to be retained — primarily because there is as yet no suitable alternative.

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