The Letter and the Witness: Agamben, Heidegger, and Derrida

Abstract

In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben introduces a particular conception of bearing witness to overcome the problems contained in an account of language that depends on the voice or the letter. From his earlier work, it is clear that his critique of the voice and the letter is not only directed to ancient and medieval metaphysics, but also concerns Heidegger's account of the voice and Derrida's account of the letter and writing. Yet, if Agamben is correct in claiming that bearing witness offers an alternative to Heidegger's voice and Derrida's letter, it is remarkable – a fact unnoticed in the available literature – that Agamben does not discuss how these conceptions of the voice and the letter are intrinsically connected to the problem of testimony for Heidegger as well as Derrida. To show how this lack of attention to bearing witness in Heidegger and Derrida affects Agamben's critique, this article proceeds as follows. First, we interpret Agamben's critique of Heidegger's conception of the voice and Derrida's conception of writing in terms of the presuppositional constitution of metaphysics. Second, we describe Agamben's concept of the witness and indicate how it offers an alternative to this presuppositional constitution of metaphysics. Finally, we show which role bearing witness plays in Heidegger's voice and Derrida's letter, and how our analysis presents a more precise version of Agamben's critique.

Notes

1 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 130.

2 As developed in Agamben, Language and Death; Potentialities; and The End of the Poem.

3 For the reference to this sentence, see Librett, “From the Sacrifice of the Letter”, at 32; Ojakangas, “Conscience, the Remnant and the Witness”, at 707. For the critique of Heidegger and Derrida, see Thurschwell, “Cutting the Branches for Akiba”; Vogt, “S/Citing the Camp”.

4 See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 267–301; Heidegger, Erläuterungen zur Hölderlins Dichtung, 36; Derrida, Demeure; Derrida, “Poétique et politique du témoignage”.

5 Agamben, Language and Death, 39.

6 Derrida, L’écriture et la différence. As Critchley describes closure: “Now it is precisely this situation, in which the space of philosophy is criss-crossed by the crab-like traversals of the non-philosophical, which describes the problem of closure” (Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, 70).

7 Agamben, Language and Death, 40. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem, 240.

8 Agamben, Potentialities, 37.

9 Heidegger, Kant und das Problem, 240.

10 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 202.

11 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 5. Heidegger, Being and Time, 4.

12 Agamben, Language and Death, 58.

13 Agamben, Language and Death, 59. See also Agamben, Potentialities, 42; Agamben, The End of the Poem, 64–65.

14 Agamben, Potentialities, 44. Note that Agamben continues to argue that it is the work of Derrida that draws the ultimate conclusion of this position. Derrida does posit language in the beginning and does think this beginning, but does so as writing and gramma, thus presupposing the negative structure of language. That is to say, language in the beginning is negativity and self-presupposition.

15 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 272. Heidegger, Being and Time, 252.

16 Derrida, Marges de la philosophie, 148–149.

17 Derrida, L’écriture et la différence, 111. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 90.

18 Derrida, L’écriture et la différence, 265. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 223–24.

19 Derrida, L’écriture et la différence, 314. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 266.

20 Derrida, L’écriture et la différence, 411. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 353.

21 Agamben, Potentialities, 113.

22 Agamben, Language and Death, 38–39. See also Agamben, Infancy and History, 8.

23 Agamben, Language and Death, 39.

24 Agamben, Potentialities, 37. On this page, Agamben brings Aristotle's to ti en einai, prote ousia and gramma together in one, dense passage on the structure of presuppositionality.

25 Agamben, Potentialities, 45.

26 Agamben, Potentialities, 43–44. In the essay from which these comments on theology stem, Agamben criticizes especially Gadamer's hermeneutics; cf. van der Heiden, “The Absolute Presupposition of Language”, 92–109.

27 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 129–30. In the quote, I replaced “Verb” by “Word” because Agamben is referring here to the theological idea of Jesus as the incarnation of the Word.

28 In fact, he treats the distinction between nomos and phusis as parallel to the one between phone and logos, see Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8.

29 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 39, 158.

30 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 34.

31 I refer here to the concept of Bezeugung or attestation which is also at stake in Heidegger's account of the voice of conscience; see Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 267. I will return to this concept in the third section of this essay.

32 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 34. My italics.

33 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 36–39.

34 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 39.

35 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 34.

36 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 34.

37 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 120.

38 On this point, I agree with Librett, “From the Sacrifice of the Letter” that Agamben places his reading of the testimonial literature of Primo Levi and others in light of the problematic of metaphysics, but I reject his suggestion that this would lead to a Theodicy (30–32): at no point Agamben claims that the production of bare life is necessary to overcome this problematic of metaphysics; rather, bare life and the testimonial literature are phenomena that cannot be thought within the presupposition of language and testimonial literature shows that even when there is no bearing witness by the complete witness, their existence is nevertheless attested to.

39 See Agamben, Potentialities, 177–84; Agamben, Homo Sacer, 44–48.

40 This argument runs parallel Agamben's reflections in “Bartleby, or On Contingency”, in Potentialities, 243–71: the onto-theological affirmation of being and the nihilistic affirmation both obscure the primacy of potentiality to be and not to be (259).

41 This restoring of potentiality is also a major theme in “Bartleby, or On Contingency”: “Remembrance restores possibility to the past” (Agamben, Potentialities, 267).

42 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 77.

43 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 267; Heidegger, Being and Time, 246.

44 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 73–76.

45 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 277. Heidegger, Being and Time, 255.

46 Therefore, it will come as no surprise that Agamben's analysis of Heidegger's Stimmung and Angst, where all beings lose their meaning, is more favourable than his analysis of the voice of conscience; see Agamben, Language and Death, 54–58.

47 Derrida, “Poétique et politique du témoignage”, 530. Cf. also van der Heiden, “Who Bears Witness for the Witness?”.

48 Derrida, Demeure, 33.

49 Derrida, Demeure, 36–37.

50 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 34.

51 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 134.

52 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 77.