The Ordinality of Duration: A Reply to John Bagby

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Notes

1 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 3, 71–72.

2 Deleuze, 239.

3 Husson.

4 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 217.

5 Péguy, 49 (my translation); Husson, 105 (my translation).

6 I examine Bergson’s relation towards Kant and the Kantian concept of intensity in “Bergson and the Kantian Conception of Intensive Magnitude”.

7 See Difference and Repetition ch. 5.

8 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 102.

9 Deleuze, 232–33.

10 For a discussion of Deleuze’s Leibnizian theory of space, extension and intensive magnitude, see Vermeiren, “The Leibnizian Lineage in Deleuze’s Theory of the Spatium”.

11 Deleuze and Guattari, 389.

12 Miquel, 476.

13 The fundamental role of ordinals in Leibniz’s philosophy of mathematics is examined in Belaval, ch. 3.

14 “The essential ordering of individuals, that is, their relation to time and place, must be understood from the relation they bear to those things contained in time and place, both nearby and far, a relation which must necessarily be expressed by every individual, so that a reader can read the universe in it, if he were infinitely sharp-sighted” (Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 183). “To be in a place seems, abstractly at any rate, to imply nothing but position. But in actuality, that which has a place must express place in itself; so that distance and the degree of distance involves also a degree of expressing in the thing itself a remote thing, either of affecting it or of receiving an affection from it. So, in fact situation really involves a degree of expression” (Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, 133).

15 For Deleuze’s notion of ordinality see Difference and Repetition, ch. 4 & 5.