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Abstract
The aim of this article is to analyse the trajectory of FASA-Renault during the stagflation crisis. In late 1972, the Spanish government enacted the so-called Ford decrees. The intention was to stimulate specialisation in the European arena by inserting the Spanish subsidiaries within the international strategies of large transnational corporations. In doing so, the effects of the economic crisis were compounded by the restructuring of the sector. The goal is to understand how, in the midst of this situation, FASA-Renault was able to increase production and the size of its workforce, ultimately becoming the leading firm in the sector in terms of production and sales in Spain. This is remarkable, due to the fact that labour force participation in Spain fell by nearly 3 million people from 1974 to 1985. The article argues that FASA-Renault, albeit with nuances, kept its commitment to diversification, neither adopting practices inspired by the production systems of the large Japanese manufacturers nor following the model put forward by the US giants based on large-scale production of a single low- to mid-range car for export.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to anonymous referees and the editors of this issue. Financial support from project HAR201564769-P (Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad, Gobierno de España, and ERDF, European Union) is gratefully acknowledged.
Notes
1. Key analyses of the stagflation crisis can be found in Rowthorn and Glynn, “The Diversity”; Woodward, “The Search”; Brenner The Economics; Eichengreen, The European Economy; and Catalan “From the Great.”
2. Key analyses on the structural changes in the automotive industry can be found in Womack, Jones and Roos, The Machine; Freyssenet, Mair, Shimizu and Volpato, One Best Way?; Boyer, Charron, Jürgens and Tolliday, Between Imitation; Boyer and Freyssenet, Les modèles productifs.
3. Key analyses of the stagflation crisis in Spain can be found in Rojo, “La Crisis”; Catalan “Spain, 1939–96”; Carreras and Tafunell, Historia económica; Catalan and Sánchez “Cinco cisnes negros”; Sudrià “Ajuste económico.”
4. See Guillen, The Limits.
5. Catalan, “Strategic Policy Revisited”; Catalan and Fernández-de-Sevilla “Die staatliche”; Fernandez-de-Sevilla, “Inside the Dynamics.” An in-depth analyse of the industrial policy applied in Spain is offered in De la Torre and García-Zuñiga, “Was it a Spanish Miracle?”
6. De la Torre and García-Zuñiga, “El impacto.”
7. Fernández-de-Sevilla “Industrializando la España interior” and “La emergencia.”
8. See, among others, Haggard, Pathways.
9. The shift in automobile policy is highlighted in Catalan, “La creación”; García Ruiz “La evolución.”
10. Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE), 7/12/1972. The Ford’s global strategy is explained in Studer-Noguez, Ford and the Global Strategies. An indispensable analysis of the Ford strategy in Europe is offered in Bonin, Lung and Tolliday, Ford, 1903–2003.
11. BOE, 29/1/1973.
12. ANFAC (Citation2003), 1977–2002, and DGT, Anuario Estadístico General.
13. FASA-Renault, Minutes of the Board (thereafter FRMB), 12/04/1973. The minister set the new goals in the Barcelona International Motor Show.
14. The origins of FASA are analysed in Fernández-de-Sevilla, “Industrializando la España interior.”
15. The transition from assembly to manufacture can be found in Fernández-de-Sevilla, “Renault in Spain.”
16. FRMB, 22/11/1973. Burgos, Palencia and Salamanca were the provinces analyzed in the study.
17. Rojo, “La Crisis,” 192.
18. Catalan, “Spain, 1939–96,” 369.
19. Developmentalism is the common term used to refer to the economic growth model adopted in Spain during the 1960s.
20. Charron, “FASA-Renault,” 259.
21. FASA-Renault, Minutes of the Shareholders’ Meeting (thereafter FRMSM) 14/06/1972.
22. FRMB, 22/03/1974.
23. FRMB, 29/11/1974. Three of the people dead were employees of FASA-Renault and the rest were workers of El Sol, a cleaning company to which FASA-Renault had hired cleaning services.
24. FRMSM, 26/06/1975. Recently, Juan A. Moral “Les années 70,” 75 has explained that the direction of FASA-Renault received a blackmail demanding 50 million pesetas to be left in a certain park in Valladolid, otherwise the assembly factory II would be burned. A camouflage police officer attended the meeting and nobody else showed up. The fire took place just a few hours later.
25. FRMSM, 26/06/1975.
26. FRMB, 31/01/1975. Pierre Séméréna, manager of the company, stated that these measures represented a wage cost increase of more than 30%.
27. FRMSM, 26/06/1975.
28. FASA-Renault, Annual Report (thereafter FRAR), 1975.
29. FRMB, 4/12/1975.
30. FRMB, 27/1/1976.
31. FRMB, 27/04/1976.
32. FRMB, 27/04/1976. The Board estimated a decrease of 20,840 vehicles in 1976, meaning a reduction in turnover of 3000 million pesetas and a loss of 700 million pesetas.
33. FRMB, 26/06/1975.
34. FRMB, 17/05/1974.
35. FRMSM, 20/06/1974. The corporate capital amounted to 3.240 million pesetas.
36. FRMB, 27/09/1974.
37. FRMSM, 26/06/1975.
38. FRMSM, 27/04/1976.
39. FRMB, 14/12/1976.
40. FRMB, 3/10/1975.
41. Trullen, Fundamentos Económicos, 71–82.
42. Carreras and Tafunell, Historia económica, 367. In six years, between 1977 and 1985, investments had negative growth rates, reducing the employed population from 12.8 to 10.6 million, with an unemployment rate of 21.9%.
43. Carreras and Tafunell, Historia económica, 367. The imbalance in the balance of payments forced a devaluation of 10% of the peseta over the dollar in 1976 and of 20% in 1977.
44. Freyssenet, “Renault,” 366–371; Loubet, Histoire de l’automobile française, 277–342.
45. FRMSM, 22/06/1976.
46. FRMSM, 22/06/1978. In 1977, inversions amounted to 7.180 million pesetas, from which around 60% was allocated to Palencia, whereas amortized assets amounted to 3.076 million pesetas.
47. Fernández-de-Sevilla “La emergencia del capitalismo industrial en España”.
48. The BCI was constituted at the end of the WWI as the institution of the large Spanish bankers to provide long-term industrial financing. It was nationalised by the Franco’s regime in 1962 and reconverted in its tool for the promotion of the indicative planning.
49. FRMB, 26/01/1977.
50. FRMSM, 22/06/1977.
51. FRMB, 23/11/1977.
52. FRMSM, 22/06/1978.
53. FRMSM, 19/06/1979.
54. FRMB, 29/09/1980.
55. FRMB, 9/09/1979.
56. Loubet, Renault, 175–176.
57. The R-18, a three-box saloon with a 1.7-litre engine, was the only model introduced from 1977 to 1981. Launched in September 1978, its sales were placed at 30,000 units over the next seven years, thus becoming the second best selling model for Renault in the Spanish market.
58. Dirección General de Tráfico, Anuario Estadístico General. Only 458 Renault cars were imported in 1980.
59. FRMB, 20/02/1979.
60. FRMB, 9/10/1979.
61. Among other measures, Spain’s sales to manufacturers installed in Spain after 1972 were limited by decree to a maximum of 10% out of the total registered units in the previous year. This restriction disappeared in 1983, first full year of GM Spain production.
62. FRMB, 30/04/1979.
63. ANFAC, 1977–2002, 294–295. In 1985, exportations accounted for 63% of total production in the sector, 62% in Germany, 56% in France, 36% in Italy and 22% in the UK.
64. FRMB, 9/10/1979.
65. The crisis of Renault in the early 1980s is detailed in Freyssenet, “Renault,” 380–383; Loubet, Renault, 284–299.
66. FRAR, 1974 and 1986. FASA-Renault had a staff of 16,357 workers in 1974 and its sales network employed 9513 workers.
67. As Charron, “FASA-Renault,” 263–267 has pointed out, the transfer of surplus workers from Valladolid to Palencia was the basis on which work stability was based.
68. FRAR, 1985 and 1986. In 1985 temporary work adjustments affected 10,135 people for an average of 32 days, representing a cost of 1.430 million pesetas for the company. One year later, the reduction of working time affected 5000 people for an average of 14 days and at a cost of 380 million pesetas.
69. FRAR, 1985.
70. FRAR, 1980 and 82. In 1982, 150 computers had been installed on production and business network.
71. Key analyses on Japanese production systems can be found in Ohno, “How the Toyota Production”; Womack et al., The Machine; Mair, “Honda’s Global Flexifactory”; Sako, “Suppliers’ Associations”; Shimizu, Le toyotisme; Boyer and Freyssenet, Les modèles productifs.