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Abstract
According to the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ and ‘Law and Finance’ approaches, legal institutions regulating corporate finance and governance shape specific national varieties of capitalism. This article analyses legal debates and practices of corporate control in post-war Germany from the perspective of business history. It argues that the stock corporation law did not have a significant impact on control practices. The law only roughly outlined rights of the supervisory boards and defined minimum standards. There was considerable room for manoeuvre within the corporations, and various effective and some ineffective control arrangements were possible. The article indicates that not only legal institutions but external political and economic factors were important for Germany’s coordinated market economy and for the development of greater capital market control.
Notes
1. Hall/Soskice, ‘Introduction’, 8–9.
2. For example, Fohlin, Finance Capitalism; Gelman and Burhop, Taxation; Fear and Kobrak, ‘Banks on Board’.
3. Exceptions are Fohlin, ‘Corporate Ownership and Control’; Ahrens, Gehlen, and Reckendrees, ‘Deutschland AG’.
4. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer. ‘Corporate Ownership‘; La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny. ‘Law and Finance’.
5. Morck and Steier, Corporate Governance, 57–58; Fohlin, ‘Corporate Ownership and Control’, 224, 268–269; for a more general analysis see Musacchio and Turner, ‘Law and Finance’.
6. Streeck and Höpner, ‘Alle Macht dem Markt?’, 11; with a broader perspective Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism.
7. Among others: Beyer, ‘Strukturen der Deutschland AG’.
8. For examples of the broader interdisciplinary discourse between sociology and history see Berghahn and Vitols (eds), Gibt es einen deutschen Kapitalismus; Windolf (ed.), Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus; Dyson (ed.), Politics of Regulation.
9. Among many others, Dutzi, Aufsichtsrat, 15–25.
10. Noteboom, ‘Voice and Exit-based forms’, 846.
11. For example, Streeck and Höpner, ‘Alle Macht dem Markt’, 11; Hall and Soskice, ‘Introduction’, 22–27; Abelshauser, Dynamics of German Industry, 18–19.
12. Gehlen, ‘Aktienrecht und Unternehmenskontrolle’, 166; Bähr, ‘Corporate Governance’; however, the legal history is comprehensively analysed in Bayer and Habersack (eds), Aktienrecht im Wandel.
13. Ahrens, Gehlen, and Reckendrees, ‘Deutschland AG‘,16–24.
14. De Jong et al., ‘Evolving Role of Shareholders’, 64–66, for similar developments in Switzerland David et al., De la ‘Forteresse des Alpes‘.
15. Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (ed), 50 Jahre Deutsche Mark.
16. Fohlin, ‘Corporate ownership and Corporate Control‘, 233–237.
17. Hofer, ‘Aktiengesetz von 1884’, 406–408; Hannah, ‘“Divorce” of Ownership’, 407.
18. Hannah, ‘“Divorce” of Ownership’, Burhop, Chambers, and Cheffins, ‘Regulation‘.
19. Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, Reform, 27–28.
20. With a comparative view see: Michie, ‘Different in Name only?’, 52–55.
21. Bähr, ‘Errichtung von Investmentgesellschaften’, 363–367.
22. A good indicator is the data presented by Rajan and Zingales ‘Great reversals’, 15 (Table ). Compared with 23 countries, the ratio of German stock corporations’ market value to GDP remained at a low level throughout the twentieth century (especially after 1918).
23. Rudolph, ‘Effekten- und Wertpapierbörsen’, 322–325; Fohlin ‘Corporate Ownership and Corporate Control’, 230–234.
24. Spindler, ‘Satzungsfreiheit’, 521–542; Kropff, Reformbestrebungen, 684–687.
25. Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, Reform, 17.
26. See Dietrich, Eigentum für jeden; Schulz, ‘Sparkassen’, 348–350.
27. See Köhler, ‘Havarie‘.
28. Cioffi, ‘Restructuring “Germany Inc”’.
29. Streeck and Höpner, ‘Alle Macht dem Markt?’; Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism; for a ‘long duree’ see Schröter, Americanization.
30. Although increasing numbers of mergers and acquisitions or less influence of banks indicate undisputed changes in German capital markets, empirical studies still underline the persistence of ‘traditional elements’ with regard to corporate governance. For example, Weber, ‘Empirical Analysis’; Fliaster, Marr, ‘Change of the insider-oriented corporate governance’; Jackson, Miyajima, ‘Varieties of Capitalism’; Goergen, Manjon, Rennebog, ‘Recent Developments’.
31. For a comprehensive overview see Lutter, ‘Aufsichtsrat‘.
32. Bähr, ‘Corporate Governance’, 72–73.
33. For example, Gehlen, Paul Silverberg, 156–157.
34. Gemeinsame Denkschrift, 59–63.
35. Plenty of evidence is, for example, presented by Jungkind, Risikokultur.
36. Abelshauser, Dynamics of German Industry, 114–115.
37. For details see Kropff, ‘Reformbestrebungen’; Fohlin, ‘Corporate Ownership and Control’, 266–68.
38. For a recent summary of the rise and decline of the ‘Germany Inc.’ network see Windolf, ‘Corporate Network’, especially chapter 4.
39. The small but rather influential ‘minority investor’s movement’ is illustrated by Anzinger et al., ‘Aktive Minderheiten’; Schanetzky, ‘Charme’; Sattler, ‘Napoleon’.
40. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism; Albert, Captialism against Capitalism.
41. For example, Fohlin, Finance Capitalism; Fear and Kobrak, ‘Banks on Board’; Burhop, Chambers, and Cheffins, ‘Regulation’.
42. Werth, Vorstand, 69; Vogel, Aktienrecht, 158, 234–235.
43. Werth, Vorstand, 15–17.
44. Vogel, Aktienrecht, 260f. Bleicher, Aufsichtsrat, 48.
45. Vogel, Aktienrecht, 163f.
46. Fengler, Entwickelt, 134–142, 259.
47. Wiethölter, Interessen und Organisation, 302–303; Pross, Manager und Aktionäre, 102–120.
48. Vogel, Aktienrecht, 234–235.
49. For details see Gall, Hermann-Josef Abs; Ahrens and Bähr, Jürgen Ponto.
50. Tilly, ‘Trust and Mistrust’.
51. Vogel, Aktienrecht, 217–274.
52. For example, Bähr and Erker, Bosch, 301–311.
53. Reichel, Metallgesellschaft, 112–113, 154–164, 211–285; Ahrens and Bähr, Jürgen Ponto, 141–149; for a less abrupt transition from a family dominated firm to a rather public one see Flemming, ‘MAN Gruppe’, 375, 404–408, 429, 445–449.
54. Tilly, ‘Trust and Mistrust’, 128–131.
55. Frei et al., Flick, 651–653.
56. Tilly, Schlieker, 143–161.
57. Freye, Führungswechsel, 169–176; Hartmann, ‘Kontinuität oder Wandel’, 74–75.
58. For example, Sattler, ‘Bewusste Stabilisierung’, 227–234; see also Köhler, ‘Havarie’.
59. Raphael and Doering-Manteuffel, Nach dem Boom; Ahrens, Reckendrees, and Gehlen (eds.), Deutschland AG; Kopper ‘Abschied’.
60. Bleicher, Aufsichtsrat, 19, 31; Gall, Hermann-Josef Abs, 335; Börsig, ‘Role’, 110; Hartmann, ‘Homogenität’, 45–49.
61. Kronenberg and Gehlen, ‘Versager des Jahres’, 332–339.
62. Triebel and Grunert, ‘Krisenerfahrung’, 24–27; Seidl, Motorenwerke (2002), 149–51, 200–230, 244, 250–2; Knoll, ‘BMW Hauptversammlung’ (1995).
63. For Daimler, see Freye, Führungswechsel, 129–166; for the Iron and Steel industry, Lauschke, Halbe Macht, 231–330.
64. Typical conflicts within (semi-public) enterprises are discussed by Stier, ‘Wiederaufbau’, 461–466, 514–516; for the perspective of public banks see Seikel, Kampf um öffentlich-rechtliche Banken, 103–129.
65. Hannah and Kasuya, ‘Twentieth Century Enterprise Forms’, 106–107.