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Abstract
The history of fascist intervention and rescue in support of Italian banks and firms (either through nationalisation or direct aid) in the inter-war years is well known. The case of Forlì adds an important piece of information to the broad literature on state-sponsored development. Benito Mussolini was born in Predappio, a small village in the Apennines in the province of Forlì. And Forlì was meant to become ‘la città del Duce’ (‘the Duce’s hometown’). The case of Forlì offers an original perspective: entrepreneurs who chose Mussolini’s hometown to obtain special concessions, a novel element in the crowded panorama of special relationships between government and industry in Italy. But on the other hand, this article will also underline the unsuitability of big business to local economic characteristics (and post-war challenges) and the return to a traditional growth path centred around the small-firm model specialising in traditional sectors and family-owned, centralised management. State-sponsored business failed and provided no stimulus to local growth: any talk of ‘industrial continuity’ in Forlì requires us to acknowledge that it is based on the steady presence and continuous regeneration of locally grown, small family businesses.
Acknowledgment
Francesca Fauri has written the whole article except for the paragraph on the artificial fibre industry which has been co-written with Matteo Troilo.
The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable and constructive comments that contributed to improve the final version of the manuscript.
Notes
1. Toniolo, L’economia dell’Italia fascista; Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro; and the six volumes on the history of IRI: Castronovo, Storia dell’IRI.
2. Cosulich from Trieste and Cantieri Orlando from Livorno. See dell’Orefice, “La politica industriale del fascismo,” 217.
3. In the post-war period growing dissatisfaction with state ownership culminated in a wave of privatisations in the early 1990s, which in turn caused increasing disillusionment with some of its outcomes and has kept alive the debate on the pro and cons of state enterprises. See Maraffi, “State/Economy Relationship,” 509; Toninelli, The Rise and Fall; Woods, “The Crisis (Collapse)”; Bortolotti and Siniscalco, The Challenges of Privatization; Roland, Privatization: Success and Failure; Barocci and Pierobon, Le privatizzazioniin Italia; Colli and Vasta, Forms of Enterprise; Amatori, Millward, and Toninelli, Reappraising State-Owned Enterprise.
4. It controlled 100% of Italian steel production for the war effort, 90% of shipyards, 80% of shipping and locomotive- building companies, 30% of electricity, most telephone companies, and several engineering firms (including Alfa Romeo). Zamagni, The Economic History of Italy, 300–1.
5. Toniolo, L’economia dell’Italia fascista, 268; Di Martino and Vasta, Ricchi per caso.
6. Amatori, Bulgamelli, and Colli, “Technology, Firm Size and Entrepreneurship,” 477–8. See also Harold and Tanner, Enterprise in the Period of Fascism, contributions of Franco Amatori and Luciano Segreto.
7. The case of Forlì is different but it is part of this large framework consistently studied by Petri, La frontiera industriale, 140–3 and 169–88.
8. In general, we should remember that in those years a perverse interaction between business and fascist general directors developed and brought about ‘a mentality of personal favors and incorrect behavior by the officials and the high bureaucrats … and of request for protection by industrialists, both large and small ones’. Segreto, “Industrial Capitalism and Political Constraints,” 234.
9. In the case of Italy, political intervention has traditionally performed an indirect and not wholly intentional role, restricting itself to creating favourable preconditions for local industrial development ‒ a sort of benign neglect allowing local systems to prosper and entailing loose fiscal and trade union control. Colli, I volti di Proteo Storia, 23.
10. Alaimo, “Le regole del gioco,” 702–3; Bagnasco, Tracce di Comunità, 101–2. An extensive literature exists on Italy’s industrial districts: see, for example, Brusco and Paba, “Per una storia dei distretti italiani”; Sabel and Zeitlin, Worlds of Possibilities.
11. Of firms based in Forlì 94% have fewer than 10 employees Find the relevant data: https://www.romagna.camcom.gov.it/.
12. Colli, Rinaldi, and Vasta, “The Only Way to Grow?,” 41; Perugini and Romei, “Small Firms and Local Production.”
13. Fauri, Lo sviluppo industriale.
14. Tarozzi, “Artigianato e industria a Forlì,” 204.
15. Fauri, “La politica doganale italiana.”
16. Archivio storico dell’industria italiana, Le condizioni industriali, 42–3. See also Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro, 154–8.
17. ISTAT, Censimento industriale e commerciale, 1937.
18. For reasons of international prestige, driven by the need to regain lost credibility, and the fear of losing the support of the middle class, Mussolini was pushed in this direction. See Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro; Sarti, “The Battle of the Lira,” 2; Castronovo, Storia economica d’Italia, 258–9; and Amatori and Colli, Impresa e industria in Italia, 172–3.
19. Censimento, Provincia di Forlì, Considerazioni generali.
20. See Perdisa, I redditi dell’agricoltura emiliana; Cazzola, “Lavoro agricolo”; Lodovici, “Il potere sull’aia”; and Cazzola, La ricchezza della terra, 53–123.
21. D’Attorre, “Una dimensione periferica”; and Balzani, Un comune imprenditore, 237–9.
22. Gualerni, Industria e fascismo; Castronovo, Storia economica d’Italia, 256–62; and Amatori and Colli, Impresa e industria in Italia, 171–82.
23. ‘They did not understand that an authoritarian regime could force a discipline on the markets which democratic systems could not impose’. Tortella, Origins of the Twenty-First Century, 181.
24. Keynes, “A Tract on Monetary Reform,” 119. See also Toniolo, L’economia dell’Italia fascista.
25. In 1914 Bonavita employed 250 workers (one-third of them women). War orders enabled it to grow constantly during the conflict to the extent that in 1918 it was one the few businesses in Forlì which was allowed to increase its credit from 94 to 500 lire with the local credit institution (Cassa dei Risparmi di Forlì). See Balzani, Il forziere della città, 188.
26. Safeguarding female workers’ health was not a priority at the time: women and young girls had to work in rooms filled with ‘hot and queasy fumes’ in the words of a doctor of the time; they stood for hours ‘with their clothes soaking wet from the continuous sprinkling’. These conditions caused various diseases: ‘from chloral-anaemia to dyspepsia and premature vascular diseases such as phlebitis and varicose veins’. See Il Risveglio, March 1, 1901. In Turin, for instance, specialised female workers in silk factories earned up to lira 1.30 a day. See: Spriano, Storia di Torino operai e socialista.
27. ASF (Archivio di Stato di Forlì – State Archive of Forlì), Prefect, Women and child labour. Dispensation for silk industry during silk cocoon processing. Prefect of Forlì to unions of Province of Forlì, May 24, 1907. See also Cattaneo, Cinquant’anni di tessitura serica nazionale.
28. ASF, Comune, Busta 68-VII-3, Diario di Guarini; ASF, Tribunale, Sezione Fallimenti Busta 104, fallimento Scanelli.
29. Federico, Il filo d’oro.
30. Bollettino mensile di statistica agraria e forestale del 1933.
31. CCIAA Forlì, Relazione sull’andamento economico della provincia, 57–8.
32. Mazzei, La lavorazione della seta a Forlì, 21–3.
33. ASF, bankruptcy court, Busta 362 Majani.
34. Ibid.
35. ASF, bankruptcy court, Busta 362. Report by liquidator Piero Bassetti to meeting of creditors, June 13, 1929.
36. He was sentenced to prison for three years. See ASB (Archivio di Stato di Bologna – State Archive of Bologna), Labour Inspectorate, Busta 18, Majani, “Informazioni dei carabinieri.”
37. It was reduced to 126% only in 1911. See Fauri, L’integrazione prematura, 73.
38. Istat, Annuario, various issues; and Bianchi-Tonizzi, “L’industria dello zucchero in Italia,” 271–2.
39. ASF, “Zuccherificio ex Eridania.”
40. Fauri, Lo sviluppo industriale, 97.
41. ASB, Ispettorato regionale del lavoro, Busta 41 Bartoletti.
42. Ibid.
43. Camera dei Deputati, Atti parlamentari, XVI legislatura allegato B ai resoconti seduta del 26 maggio 2004, 14386.
44. ACC (Archivio del Camera di Commercio di Forlì – Forlì Chamber of Commerce Archive), Busta Becchi. See also Caruso, Forlì città e cittadini.
45. For fuller details, see Conti, “Amministratori, tecnici, imprenditori,” 396 ff.; Comune di Forlì, Monografia industriale di Forlì, 207.
46. ACC, Busta Forlanini.
47. Balzani, La Romagna, 168–71.
48. D’Attorre, “Ceto padronale e classi lavoratrici.”
49. SNIA survived the risk of financial collapse in 1929 and in the post-war years was still one of the largest producers of artificial fibres, together with Montedison. See Zamagni, “The Rise and Fall,” 354.
50. The lack of large-scale financing and thus long-term research projects had generally condemned Italian chemical firms to fragmentation and small size. Da Rin, “Financial Systems and Corporate Strategy,” 91. On SNIA Viscosa see Cerretano, “The ‘Benefits of Moderate Inflation’.” See also Fauri, “The ‘Economic Miracle’.”
51. Falchero, “‘Quel filo serico impalpabile.”
52. D’Attorre, Le fabbriche del Duce, 38.
53. ASF, Fondo del Comune, Busta 135, letter dated April 30, 1925 from Mangelli to the Mayor of Forlì.
54. According to the 1929 SAOM employment contract, female workers under 15 years of age (the majority of the workforce) were earning 0.50 lire per hour, versus 1.40 lire per hour for older women and 1.95 lire per hour for male spinners. Bernabini, Storia di impresa e gestione aziendale, 114.
55. ASF, Fondo del Comune, Busta 137.
56. Ibid.
57. ACC, Busta “Orsi Mangelli.”
58. Ibid.
59. Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro, 378–80; Amatori, “Italy’s Futile Search for a Third Way,” 143–4.
60. Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Segreteria particolare del Duce, Corrispondenza ordinaria, Fascicolo Orsi-Mangelli, Letter of Paolo Orsi Mangelli to Mussolini, May 8, 1926. Also Bernabini, Storia d’impresa e gestione aziendale, 100.
61. In particular, the Forlì branch of the Bank of Italy extended his credit by 4.4 million lire and the decision was ultimately based on trust: ‘On the moral principles of the Orsi Mangelli family and on their laboriousness which make us hope for the best as to their active debts’. ASB, Ispettorato generale, pratica n. 245 Fascicolo 1, 1931.
62. ACS, Segreteria particolare del Duce, Corrispondenza ordinaria, Fascicolo Orsi-Mangelli, Letter of Paolo Orsi Mangelli to Mussolini, November 22, 1927.
63. ACS, Segreteria particolare del Duce, Corrispondenza ordinaria, Fascicolo Orsi-Mangelli, Note of November 23, 1927 and also ACS, Segreteria particolare del Duce, Corrispondenza ordinaria, Fascicolo Orsi-Mangelli Letter of Alexander Chiavolini, Secretary to the Prefect of Forlì of November 30, 1927.
64. ACC, Anagrafe, Registro denunce n. 5510.
65. ASB, Fondo Ispettorato del Lavoro, Busta 41.
66. ASB, Ispettorato generale, pratica n. 245, Fascicolo 1, 1931.
67. D’Attorre, Le fabbriche del Duce, 39.
68. The practice was common throughout Italy and endorsed by the regime since the 1926 revaluation of the lira. In February 1931 the Prefect of Forlì confirmed to the Duce that the anonymous letter he received from a SAOM worker denouncing the lowering of wages was reflecting a common practice based on ‘the fictional dismissal and immediate re-recruiting of the same workers within the minimum wage category’. ACS, Segreteria particolare del Duce, Corrispondenza ordinaria, Fascicolo Orsi-Mangelli, Letter to the Secretary of the Prefect of the Duce of May 7, 1931.
69. ACS, Segreteria particolare del Duce, Corrispondenza ordinaria, Fascicolo Orsi-Mangelli, Letter of Beneduce to Mussolini of February 3, 1934.
70. In 1929 Bank of Italy inspectors estimated his personal assets at 40 million lire and SAOM plants at 17 million. Archivio storico della Banca d’Italia (ASBI), Ispettorato generale, pratica n. 245 fascicolo 1. Visita di ispezione alla filiale di Forlì del 30 giugno 1929 – Rapporto sugli affari. And also Archivio di Stato di Bologna (ASB), Ispettorato generale, pratica n.245 fascicolo 1, 1931.
71. Zamagni, The Economic History of Italy, 181
72. Balzani, Il forziere della città, 203–4.
73. Lombardo, L’Istituto Mobiliare Italiano, 425.
74. Working conditions were terrible, especially for those workers who had to handle carbon sulphate: only in 1942 would a medical study conducted on SAOM workers demonstrate the infertility problems (and in some extreme cases madness) that it could cause. D’Attorre, Una dimensione periferica, 756.
75. ACS, Segreteria particolare del Duce, Corrispondenza ordinaria, Fascicolo Orsi-Mangelli, Letter of De Cesare to the Cabinet of the Minister of Corporations, July 30, 1942.
76. Chandler, The Visible Hand.
77. ASF, Fondo Prefettura, archivio Gabinetto, Busta 442.
78. ASB, Ispettorato del lavoro, Busta 41.
79. Bernabini, Storia d’impresa e gestione aziendale, 138.
80. ACC, Registro Bilanci, Fascicolo Orsi Mangelli, various years.
81. “Le vertenze Mangelli e Becchi,” Il Manifesto, April 12, 1949. See also “La verità sulla vertenza Mangelli,” published by the Associazione industriali di Forlì in 1949 (and only available at the Biblioteca Saffi in Forlì).
82. Bernabini, Storia d’impresa e gestione aziendale, 274–5.
83. Paolo Orsi Mangelli donated 10,000 lire for the purchase of a school training plane. See Sangiorgi and Tassinari, Tutti i colori del cielo, 45–50.
84. Occupied during the war and subsequently used for other purposes, the legacy of the college was taken up in 1968, when the government agreed to open the Istituto Tecnico Aeronautico (in just three cities: Forlì, Catania, and Rome). Nevertheless, in this case it would be more accurate to speak of a completely new institution than of its origin, the result of Gianluigi Testoni’s stubbornness in obtaining authorisation for this new school, the only one of its kind in northern Italy. See Istituto Tecnico Aeronautico Statale, “F. Baracca,” 18–20.
85. Proli, “Industrie in guerra,” 136.
86. Mencarelli, Gianni Caproni, 12–14.
87. Abate et al., Aeroplani Caproni.
88. Sangiorgi and Tassinari, Tutti i colori del cielo, 70.
89. Proli, “Industrie in guerra,” 136.
90. ASB, Ispettorato del Lavoro, Busta 41 “Aeronautica Predappio.”
91. ASB, Ispettorato regionale del Lavoro, Busta 18 anno 1933–1938.
92. ASB, Busta 19 anno 1939–1941.
93. D’Attorre, Piccola industria e classe operaia, 795.
94. D’Attorre, Una dimensione periferica, 742.
95. ASB, Busta 18 SASIB.
96. ASB Busta 18 anno 1933–1938.
97. ASB, Ispettorato, Busta 37.
98. Brini, SASIB (AMF) Story, 15–16.
99. He built the Mori‒Torbole tunnel after 1943, where innovative bombers and rockets were planned and constructed with the Nazis. Bianchessi, Gianni Caproni, 211.
100. In the case of Aereo Caproni Trento, the two owners, Mr and Mrs Caproni, had placed all of the share capital in the hands of the new public financial institution the FIM (Fondo Industria Meccanica), as collateral against its very high debts (182 million lire). Yet the FIM Committee, faced with three alternatives: nationalising the company, awarding a loan of 130 million lire, or closing the firm down, decided on the latter. Italy’s aircraft industry, which had probably developed beyond its means in the 1930s and which was producing up to 300 planes a month during the war, was no longer a priority in the new era. See Fauri, “From Financial Aid to Nationalization.” As to the Marshall Plan, the ERP dollar loan was denied because the Ministry of Defense stepped in and vetoed the loan: ‘Despite the fact that a four engine aircraft (BZ 308) has been built and it is suitable for intercontinental flights, we don’t think we can expect Caproni to produce the number of aircrafts we need in due time. Therefore this Ministry thinks we should face the current situation through imports of four-engine aircrafts from the USA with ERP loans’. Archivio IMI Rome (ASMI), Busta 8, Caproni.
101. Thanks to a large set of incentives which ranged from subsidies for infrastructures to tax exemption, by the end of 1942 20 industrial plants had been set up at Bolzano (6500 workers) and 24 in Ferrara (4200 workers). Petri, Storia di Bolzano, 287; Petri, Storia economica d’Italia, 369.
102. Besides autarky, the choice of Ferrara relates to other reasons, including the fact that Ferrara was the hometown of Italo Balbo, who joined the National Fascist Party in 1921 (before it came to power in 1922). In Ferrara he organised fascist gangs who violently attacked demonstrating agricultural labourers and left-wing opponents. In 1924 Mussolini nominated Balbo to the post of General Commander of the Fascist Militia, and Minister of Aviation in 1926. He was one of Mussolini’s closest collaborators.
103. Petri, Storia economica d’Italia.
104. Guiso, La “città del Duce.”
105. He surely was a ‘negotiatior’, in the definition of Amatori, placing himself ‘in a position of major bargaining force with the political power’. See Amatori, “Determinants and Typologies of Entrepreneurship,” 22–3.
106. Baumol, Entrepreneurship, Management, and the Structure of Payoffs, 10.
107. The Mayor of Forlì, Angelo Satanassi, was a fervent believer in state intervention. He presented and discussed at length a feasibility study with the state company ENI, which was already operating in the chemical sector through ANIC, one of its subsidiaries, in the nearby town of Ravenna. See Fauri, “La metamorfosi dell’economia forlivese.”
108. Colli, The History of Family Business, 63.
109. Some scholars, in order to avoid the excessively simplistic north‒south divide, have identified ‘three Italies’. The First Italy has traditionally included the regions which industrialised first (Piemonte, Lombardia, and Liguria), the Second Italy corresponds to the less developed south, while the Third Italy encompasses Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Friuli, and Trentino-Alto Adige. Bagnasco, Le Tre Italie; Bartolini, La Terza Italia.
110. CCIAA, L’economia della provincia di Forlì, 10–14.
111. Barbieri, “Relazioni virtuose.”
112. ‘Their competitive advantage’, in the words of Aurelio Alaimo, ‘became evident especially in the most difficult stages of the economic cycle, when the inevitable rigidities of the larger companies became an obstacle to the introduction of industrial and management innovations’. Alaimo, Un’altra industria?
113. The family firm has increasingly been interpreted as a network of trust as a response to external uncertainty. See Colli and Rose, “Families and Firms.” The shared values and attitudes of Italy’s small family firms provided a set of informal rules and networks which helped the birth of new enterprises within ‘a weak central state’; the latter’s laws on taxation, limited liability, and inheritance have undoubtedly reinforced the presence of small family business in Italy. See Colli, Fernandez Perez, and Rose, “National Determinates.”
114. Historical research has highlighted the importance of the long-term presence of small firms in the ongoing Italian economic development. Federico, Giannetti, and Toninelli, “Size and Strategy”; Colli, Il quarto capitalismo.