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ABSTRACT
On 9 March 2018, Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga shook hands in a symbolic gesture that ended months of tensions following the disputed election in 2017 that gave Kenyatta a second term. Popularised as the “handshake,” the agreement has caused major rifts within the ruling party since it ushered in the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI). Those allied to Deputy President William Ruto accuse Odinga of “hijacking” Jubilee for political interests, while proponents of the “handshake” and the BBI fault Ruto’s allies for curtailing Kenyatta’s initiative to unite Kenyans. This commentary discusses the potential implications of the BBI for the 2022 elections and the principal–agent problem surrounding the initiative, arguing that BBI’s stability as a political settlement rests on a shaky foundation. I develop these arguments by assessing Kenya’s political history, complemented by the BBI report and recent media reports about the initiative.
RÉSUMÉ
Le 9 mars 2018, le Président du Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, et le leader de l’opposition, Raila Odinga, se sont serré la main en un geste symbolique qui a mis fin à des mois de tensions à la suite des élections contestées en 2017 ayant permis à Kenyatta d’obtenir un second mandat. Popularisé sous le nom de « poignée de main », l’accord a provoqué de profondes dissensions au sein du parti au pouvoir depuis son lancement de l’Initiative « Construire des Ponts » (ICP). Les alliés du vice-président William Ruto ont accusé Odinga de « détourner » le Jubilé pour des intérêts politiques, tandis que les partisans de la « poignée de main » et de l’ICP reprochaient aux alliés de Ruto d’avoir freiné l’initiative de Kenyatta visant à unir les Kenyans. Ce commentaire explore les implications potentielles de l’ICP pour les élections de 2022 et le problème mandant-mandataire entourant l’initiative, en faisant valoir que la stabilité de l’ICP en tant que règlement politique repose sur des bases instables. Je développe ces arguments en évaluant l’histoire politique du Kenya, complétée par le rapport sur l’ICP et les récents reportages sur l’initiative.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Dianne Matson, Philippe M. Frowd, and anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous versions of this commentary. The author also acknowledges the support from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) toward a project conducted in Kenya between 2017 and 2019 that provided additional insights for this commentary.
Notes
1. See “What You Need to Know about BBI.” The Standard, 27 November 2019, Citation2019, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001351033/what-you-need-to-know-about-bbi (accessed 21 February 2020).
2. The term Tanga-Tanga is a Swahili word that can loosely be translated as wandering about or roaming (e.g. a vagabond). The term gained prominence in 2018 when President Kenyatta used it at a political rally in Nairobi in reference to his deputy William Ruto. The term has since gained popularity as a political movement and a faction of the Jubilee legislators affiliated with Ruto.
3. In response to the formation of the Tanga-Tanga faction, Jubilee legislators affiliated to president Kenyatta coalesced around another movement within the Jubilee party, Kieleweke, another Swahili word, which can be loosely translated as the quest for truth.
4. See “Reconciliation in Kenya: Partisan Differences and Common Ground,” Afrobarometer, 27 April 2018, https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno201_partisan_differences_and_common_ground_in_kenya.pdf (accessed 3 March 2020).
5. Ibid.
6. Kenya Go: The Constitution of Kenya 2010. 2010, Nairobi: Attorney General. Available online via http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken127322.pdf (accessed 12 July 2020).
7. See “Why Uhuru’s Axe Had to Land on Duale,” The Standard, 23 June 2020, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001376058/why-uhuru-s-axe-had-to-land-on-duale (accessed 9 July 2020).
8. See “Registrar Refuses to List Jubilee Asili,” The Standard, 26 June 2020, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001376559/registrar-refuses-to-list-jubilee-asili (accessed 9 July 2020).
9. See “Ruto Cornered as Uhuru Moves to Appease New Allies,” The Star, 21 June 2020, https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-06-21-ruto-cornered-as-uhuru-moves-to-appease-new-allies/ (accessed 9 July 2020).
10. See The Independent Review Commission (IREC), Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27th December 2007, 2008, https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/7912310 (accessed 18 February 2020).
11. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), 2008, https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/7911942 (accessed 18 February 2020).
12. See Ndung’u Report on Land Grabbing in Kenya: Legal and Economic Analysis, 2010, https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/10325107 (accessed 18 February 2020).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Philip Onguny
Philip Onguny is an assistant professor at the School of Conflict Studies at Saint Paul University in Ottawa. His research focuses on ethnopolitical violence in sub-Saharan Africa and the role of media in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. His work in line with these topics has appeared in the Journal of Contemporary African Studies; Global Change, Peace & Security; East African Review; and Canadian Journal of Political Science. He is the co-editor of La Lutte Contre le Terrorisme en Afrique: Acte de Bienveillance ou Prétexte Géostratégique? (Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2019).