https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0675-4789
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ABSTRACT
Drawing and expanding on the literature on discourses and intervention, this article investigates how the relationship between the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) and external actors (the UN, EU and France) came about. To understand the dynamics between the joint force and these external actors, I critically analyse the external actors’ discourse on the security situation in the Sahel and examine how G5 member states have related to this discourse. The relationship has manifested in various ways, including military capacity building and resource distribution, where external actors hold significant influence over the joint force. Although the G5S-JF and the G5 member states exert agency through managing and to some extent controlling their dependency on external actors, such a dynamic has implications for the G5S-JF’s sub-regional ownership and sustainability.
RÉSUMÉ
En s’inspirant de la littérature sur les discours et l’intervention, et en l’approfondissant, cet article examine comment la relation entre la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel (FCG5S) et les acteurs extérieurs (l’ONU, l’UE et la France) a pris forme. Pour comprendre la dynamique entre la Force conjointe et ces acteurs extérieurs, j’analyse de manière critique le discours des acteurs extérieurs sur la situation sécuritaire au Sahel, et j’examine comment les États membres du G5 se sont reliés à ce discours. Cette relation s’est manifestée de diverses manières, notamment par le renforcement des capacités militaires et la distribution des ressources, où les acteurs extérieurs exercent une influence importante sur la Force conjointe. Bien que la FCG5S et les États-membres du G5 exercent une influence en gérant et en contrôlant quelque peu leur dépendance à l’égard des acteurs extérieurs, cette dynamique a des répercussions sur l’appropriation et la durabilité de la FCG5S au niveau sous régional.
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Notes
1 For research conducted on the G5S-JF, see for instance Dieng (Citation2019) and Degrais (Citation2018).
2 The Tuareg secessionist movement in 2012 led to a coup d’état in Mali. This coup, alongside an influx of soldiers, formerly under Ghaddafi in Libya, to Mali, caused the conflict in Mali to break out, and further enabled violent extremist groups to spread. External actors were politically and militarily engaged in the Sahel before 2012, but their engagement has increased since 2012.
3 Ethics approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data, case number 877186.
4 The anonymous interviews have been divided into five categories: (1) external security personnel (in the Sahel, but outside the G5 structure), (2) external political personnel (in the Sahel, but outside the G5 structure), (3) internal security personnel (within the G5 structure), (4) internal political personnel (within the G5 structure), and (5) observers (organisational, academic or others operating in the Sahel).
7 The EU has placed itself as an important actor on the African continent through the migration discourse also, claiming that migration from Africa constitutes a threat to Europe. The migration discourse is important to keep in mind for this research, but will not constitute a focal point in the analysis.
8 Interview 11 with observer, 4 February 2020, Mali.
9 In summer 2020, the EU alongside France launched Task Force Takuba: special operation forces from European states deployed to fight violent extremist groups in the Sahel.
10 Interview 8 with external political personnel, 14 January 2020, France.
11 Interview 28 with internal security personnel, 22 February 2020, Mali; Interview 29 with internal security personnel, 23 February 2020, Mali.
12 Interview 11; Interview 27 with external security personnel, 22 February 2020, Mali; Interview 29.
13 Interview 6 with external political personnel, 10 January 2020, France; Interview 27.
14 In addition to the G5 Sahel states contributing $10 million each, the EU pledged a total of $143 million, France and Germany contributed $21.7 million collectively, Saudi Arabia pledged $100 million, the United Arab Emirates pledged $30 million, and the US pledged $60 million, with additional contributions from Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, Japan, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic and Slovenia (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies Citation2018).
15 Interview 1 with external security personnel, 30 September 2019, Nigeria.
16 Interview 11; Interview 13; Interview 22 with external political personnel, 15 February 2020, Mali; Interview 23 with external political personnel, 18 February 2020, Mali.
17 Interview 11; Interview 20 with external political personnel, 13 February 2020, Mali; Interview 23.
18 Interview 2 with external political personnel, 2 October 2020, Nigeria; Interview 11; Interview 13; Interview 26.
19 Interview 26 with observer, 19 February 2020, Mali.
20 Ibid.
21 Interview 11; Interview 15 with observer, 9 February 2020, Mali; Interview 26.
22 As part of the joint command, the G5S-JF’s area of operation was extended to 100 km on each side of the border instead of 50 km.
23 Interview 27.
24 Interview 11; Interview 19; Interview 20.
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Marie Sandnes
Marie Sandnes is a doctoral researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the University of Oslo. Her research focuses on topics of regional security cooperation, military cooperation, organised violence and counter-terrorism, particularly in Africa. Currently, she is writing her doctoral dissertation on the G5 Sahel Joint Force.