MacIntyre, managerialism and universities^*

Abstract

MacIntyre’s earlier work and concern with social science enquiry not only exposes its limits, but also provides an insight into how its knowledge claims have been put to ideological use. He maintains that the institutional embodiment of these ideological ideas is the bureaucratic manager who has had a negative role to play in social structures because managerialism revolves around a notable absence, or at least marginalisation of conflict since the nature of rational debate and conflict is unpredictable and unmanageable, and hence would seriously undermine the perception trying to be projected of a competent technocrat in control of their organisation. MacIntyre, in lamenting the place of contemporary universities in society, highlights how most universities have become business corporations and irremediably fragmented and now serve purposes so alien and foreign from their initial conception as sites of constrained mutual rational debate and conflict. As a result, MacIntyre’s account of how managerial authority is justified in bureaucratic institutions and its social role and character is scathing and particularly apt for explaining the malaise of contemporary universities. In order to overcome this malaise, I want to struggle against the corporatisation of universities by revitalising and extending upon MacIntyre’s argument that a university is set up for constrained disagreement and imposed participation in conflict, and also highlight the importance of reason or wisdom and its development because it enables us to see the interconnectedness and interrelationship between different forms of knowledge that can lead us to truth and of the good.

Keywords:

• MacIntyre
• managerialism
• social science
• universities
• wisdom
• knowledge

Notes

1. I intentionally use the terms ‘managerialism’ and ‘bureaucratic managers’ interchangeably throughout this article. Although, MacIntyre consistently uses the terms ‘bureaucratic managers’, ‘bureaucratic theory’, ‘bureaucratic authority’ and ‘managers’ in various sources, its similarities with the term ‘managerialism’ predominately used in contemporary literature is worth noting. Clearly, the usage of the term ‘managerialism’ denotes more that the work of managers in organisations. Certainly within the present climate of globalisation, marketisation, economic rationalism, neoliberalism and so on, it is hard not to see the central role played by managers and the work which they are engaged in, such as: increasing productivity and efficiency, planning for, implementing, and measuring necessary improvements in productivity and efficiency, vigorously executing corporate or institutional aims, and proactively managing resources (material and human). What is striking about this approach is the disproportionate emphasis upon economic principles and the language of business organisations that are directive, controlling and most importantly sees humans as resources for its defined ends. Not only has this way of thinking and approach permeated educational institutions in various guises, but what concerns me the most is the unquestioning ways in which we now take it for granted. Further discussion of this point would take us too far afield. For some interesting works in this area, see: Bottery (2000), Furlong (2013), Giroux (2014), Bridges and McLaughlin (1994), Marginson (2014), Natale and Doran (2012), Schrecker (2010), and Teixeira and Dill (2011).

2. For an interesting article that outlines MacIntyre’s (1972) thinking at this time on his theory of the explanation of action a bit further, see his review of Bernstein’s Praxis and Action.

3. MacIntyre’s (1977a) essay titled ‘Utilitarianism and the presuppositions of cost-benefit analysis’ is worth a mention at this juncture because it brings to our attention how the corporate executive in the form of ‘cost benefit analysis’ employs classical utilitarianism in their decision-making.

4. No-where is this more evident than in the case of ‘J’ in MacIntyre’s (1999b) critique of social structures and their threats to moral agency. The argument that it was not my position or role to question my superiors or managers is not an excuse for ignoring morally questionable situations or practices. Maybe we should all heed MacIntyre’s advice and struggle against the morally questionable practices found in contemporary universities. Clearly, the concealment or marginalisation— where possible— of both institutional conflict and the unpredictable nature of rational argument are noticeable instances.

5. MacIntyre (1987) sets out three conditions necessary for an educated public. These being: (1) shared forums of intellectual and political debate; (2) shared standards used to judge an argument for victory, defeat and progress in enquiry; and, (3) shared canonical texts. Part of the reason why there no longer exists an educated public in contemporary society is complex, but in a nutshell, has much to do with the contestability of certain social concepts (MacIntyre, 1973b) such as education, that has led to rival traditions of education (see for example Stolz, 2015). Whether this is actually the case, is an open question and worthy of further debate.

6. MacIntyre’s account of a liberal university owes much to John Henry Newman’s (1852/2009) account of a university found in The Idea of a University. Indeed, MacIntyre (2009) in God, Philosophy, Universities acknowledges Newman as someone who has influenced his thinking (see Chapter 16 titled ‘Newman: God, philosophy, universities’). Accordingly, Newman saw a liberal education as being: (1) pursuing knowledge for its own sake; (2) broadly based student experiences (rather than narrowly specialised); and, (3) the development of autonomous individuals. Of course, I too am being selective, as is MacIntyre in terms of those thinkers who influenced his thinking. Indeed, it is prudent of me to mention that Aquinas is another significant figure who has shaped his thinking (see Chapter 11 titled ‘Aquinas: God, philosophy, universities’ and other key works), but this article is not a genealogical analysis of MacIntyre’s thinking and so would distract from my central theses.

7. MacIntyre (2009) in God, Philosophy, Universities highlights the role philosophy and theology should play in a university curriculum. In a sense, MacIntyre makes a strong point that although philosophy has become a highly specialised form of activity for those who have already been initiated, and as a result this has contributed to its marginalisation within the contemporary university as it is perceived to be irrelevant. In fact, MacIntyre, challenges this claim, and argues that ‘human beings need philosophy’ more so than any other period because it still has some relevancy, in that it can teach (or maybe train) agents to both think rationally and come to the realisation that there are alternative views about truth (see Chapter 19: Now: Universities, philosophy, God). In another sense, MacIntyre sees philosophy’s role as placing the various secular disciplines and how they contribute to a unique way of viewing the world under sustained and systematic critical scrutiny. Whatever ones views about philosophy, particularly within universities, MacIntyre’s notion of practical rationality has some traction.

8. In a sense, MacIntyre and Ozolins’ views about a university education share many affinities. For instance, each agrees that a university education is more than the preparation of students for this or that profession or career. Rather, it should transform minds so that the student becomes a different kind of person. It could be argued that each aim to argue for the same end, but come at it from different perspectives according to the literature engaged with. In saying this, Ozolins’ account of an intellectual life is interesting on a number of different levels, more so because it brings to our attention that the intellectual life is not meant for everyone. Although this may be stating the obvious, it does seem to go counter to the current rhetoric that everyone should be allowed to study at university. Clearly, there is a significant difference between access rights to a university education and ability (or lack of).