Education for autonomy and open-mindedness in diverse societies

Abstract

In recent years, democracies across the globe have seen an increase in the popularity and power of authoritarian, nationalist politicians, groups, and policies. In this climate, the proper role of education in liberal democratic society, and in particular its role in promoting characteristics like autonomy and open-mindedness, is contested. This paper engages this debate by exploring the concept of autonomy and the obligations of liberal democratic societies to promote it. Presenting the conditions for the exercise and development of autonomy, I argue that the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness is necessary (though not sufficient) for possession of the capacity for autonomy and the motivation to exercise this capacity. In considering the importance of autonomy in liberal democratic societies, I argue that education for autonomy and open-mindedness can be justified by appealing to several liberal democratic aims: ensuring fair opportunity in the pursuit of the good life and preparing students for citizenship in diverse society. My analysis of the relationship between autonomy and open-mindedness aims to contribute to the literature by identifying a conception of autonomy that explicitly acknowledges its connections to intellectual virtue, thus clarifying one aspect of its value and identifying an important component of education that supports autonomy.

Keywords:

• Autonomy
• open-mindedness
• liberalism
• virtue
• citizenship

Acknowledgments

For valuable comments on previous drafts, I am indebted to Eamonn Callan and Rob Reich. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the California Association of Philosophers of Education Annual Meeting in November 2013 and at the Philosophy of Education Society (PES) Annual Conference in March 2014. I am grateful to the participants in these sessions for their feedback and in particular to Matthew Hayden, who provided a valuable response to the paper at PES. Thanks also to David Labaree and Denis Phillips for previous discussion of this project.

Notes

1. Liberal supporters of autonomy include: Raz (1986); Kymlicka (1995); Callan (1997); Brighouse (1998); Reich (2002). Liberal theorists who oppose strong support of autonomy include: Galston (1995); Kukathas (2003).

2. Here, I refer to personal autonomy, which is often considered distinct from political autonomy or moral autonomy. For accounts of personal autonomy, see: Dworkin (1988); Raz (1986); Reich (2002). A strong account of moral autonomy dates back to Kant in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, whereas Rawls seeks to limit autonomy to the political domain in Political Liberalism.

3. Ebels-Duggan (2015) also investigates the relationship between autonomy and intellectual virtue. She argues that autonomy should be reconceptualized as intellectual humility and intellectual charity, concluding that nothing beyond these intellectual virtues is captured by the term. My argument here is distinct in identifying OM as a necessary but not sufficient condition of autonomy.

4. In my discussion of OM, I draw on recent work in virtue epistemology, the philosophical study of intellectual virtues (see, for example: Annas, 2011; Baehr, 2011; Montmarquet, 1987; Roberts & Wood, 2007; Zagzebski, 1996).

5. The open-minded agent may also reflect on his epistemic commitments and seek out evidence independently of other agents (e.g. the arm chair philosopher), but an important sense of OM concerns our interactions with others.

6. The epistemic good may come in a number of forms, including knowledge and understanding. Knowledge requires true belief, in addition to something more that gives the agent credit for the true belief. Whereas knowledge is concerned with the truth and justification of discrete beliefs, understanding involves entire subject matters. To understand a subject, the agent must grasp its structure and the relationships between the discrete beliefs that it contains.

7. In their chapter on intellectual autonomy, Roberts and Wood (2007, pp. 257–285) argue that seeking understanding fosters autonomy.

8. See, for example: Baehr (2013); Marin and Halpern (2011); Ritchhart (2002); Tishman, Jay, and Perkins (1993); Stanovich and West (1997).

9. See Rawls (2005, pp. 191–195) for a differentiation between procedural neutrality, neutrality of aim, and neutrality of effect.

10. My interpretation of this argument is based on Arneson and Shapiro (1996); Brighouse (1998); and Callan (2002).

11. Autonomy-facilitating education of this kind is endorsed by Brighouse (1998).

12. For discussion of the roles of moral and political autonomy and personal autonomy in modern philosophy, see Waldron (2005).

13. See Reich (2002, pp. 42–51) for discussion of the non-neutrality of the educational demands of political liberalism.