Liberty of expression its grounds and limits (I)∗

In this paper I am concerned to elaborate upon arguments and issues discussed in my ‘Some Arguments for a Liberal Society’, Philosophy, Vol. XLIII (1968), No. 166.

The problem posed in this paper is ‘Can those interferences with liberty of expression which are necessary and desirable be indicated in some simple, general way, e.g. in terms of some principle or principles of the kinds with which J. S. Mill sought to delimit the interferences with freedom of action?’ It is argued that although J. S. Mill sought to defend ‘the fullest freedom of expression’, he in fact allowed important interferences of kinds which render the formulation of a principle covering them difficult. Further, it is maintained that the important liberal arguments advanced by the great exponents of liberalism are such that they admit as being necessary, legitimate, and desirable, a wide range and variety of interferences, where these interferences are such that they must be determined in the light of the facts in the concrete situation and not on the basis of some general principle.

Notes

In this paper I am concerned to elaborate upon arguments and issues discussed in my ‘Some Arguments for a Liberal Society’, Philosophy, Vol. XLIII (1968), No. 166.