Selfishness and capitalism¹

The concept ‘selfish’ is more often used than defined by philosophers and others interested in human motives. Its common use would indicate that it means ‘yielding, in one's conduct, to one's immediate wishes, desires, preferences, obsessions, etc., without concern for right and wrong’. Thus selfish motives are those which cannot, in principle, contain elements of virtue. Yet when we understand by ‘selfish’ a concern for oneself, as in egoism in ethics, it no longer makes sense to use the term in this way. That is because a concern with oneself may prompt one to resist yielding to one's immediate wishes, etc. In fact, to go just a step further, a careful concern for oneself could not manifest itself without an answer to the question ‘What is right for me?’ This, in turn, invites the further question, ‘What am I, what kind of being am I, so that I can identify what is right for me?’ Yet these considerations are rarely if ever involved when philosophers talk about selfishness, egoism and, as we shall see in the present note, a concern for private gain.

Abstract

Richard Schmitt's case against the psychological defense of capitalism (Inquiry, Vol. 16, No. 2) has merit, but in stating it he attributes to a defender of capitalism the argument that capitalism suits people's innate selfishness. The position more plausibly attributed to the author in question is not only resistant to Schmitt's own arguments but is worth consideration in itself.

Notes

The concept ‘selfish’ is more often used than defined by philosophers and others interested in human motives. Its common use would indicate that it means ‘yielding, in one's conduct, to one's immediate wishes, desires, preferences, obsessions, etc., without concern for right and wrong’. Thus selfish motives are those which cannot, in principle, contain elements of virtue. Yet when we understand by ‘selfish’ a concern for oneself, as in egoism in ethics, it no longer makes sense to use the term in this way. That is because a concern with oneself may prompt one to resist yielding to one's immediate wishes, etc. In fact, to go just a step further, a careful concern for oneself could not manifest itself without an answer to the question ‘What is right for me?’ This, in turn, invites the further question, ‘What am I, what kind of being am I, so that I can identify what is right for me?’ Yet these considerations are rarely if ever involved when philosophers talk about selfishness, egoism and, as we shall see in the present note, a concern for private gain.