Dispositions, explanation, and behavior¹

Earlier versions of this paper were read at the University of Minnesota‐Minneapolis, Mankato State University, State University of New York at Binghamton, Drake University, and the University of Iowa. I received constructive criticisms from people at all these places. I would mention especially the written comments of Peter Arneson (1978) which engendered significant revision of some of the arguments on my part.

According to the theory of dispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non‐dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account of dispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of ‘reduction sentences’. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering‐law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To construct a potential explanation of the covering‐law type. The theory can also be applied fruitfully to human behavior, especially with respect to the issues of reasons and causes and of’ rational’ explanation. The success of the applicability of this theory of dispositions is further evidence of its adequacy.

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper were read at the University of Minnesota‐Minneapolis, Mankato State University, State University of New York at Binghamton, Drake University, and the University of Iowa. I received constructive criticisms from people at all these places. I would mention especially the written comments of Peter Arneson (1978) which engendered significant revision of some of the arguments on my part.