The epistemology of understanding¹

This is a revised version of my oral address at the Dundee Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in 1994. It is distinct from the printed Inaugural Address and presents a development of some of the thoughts set out there (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. LXVIII, 1994, pp. 1–26).

Abstract

My principal aims are to question the conventional wisdom on two points. First, it argues that cognitive understanding is neither identical with nor reducible to knowledge‐why, and that it is a multiform capacity which adds value to knowledge, true belief, and human creative activity. Essential to understanding is epistemic ascent, the rising above bare knowledge, to assess, appraise, compare, contrast, emphasize, connect and so on. Different modes of understanding are distinguished and an accompanying vocabulary of mode‐indicators (expressing Fregean ‘colour'). Second, I argue for the unity and continuity of understanding and reject any Diltheyesque idea of a great divide between so‐called ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’, a divide which has sometimes been used to make a sharp demarcation between the natural sciences and the humane studies and sciences. A connection between humane and natural‐scientific understanding is established through the Linkage Principle. The idea that there is in every case a uniquely right understanding is rejected and the role of multiple descriptions in both the natural sciences and humane understanding is emphasized.

Notes

This is a revised version of my oral address at the Dundee Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in 1994. It is distinct from the printed Inaugural Address and presents a development of some of the thoughts set out there (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. LXVIII, 1994, pp. 1–26).