Tact: Sense, sensitivity, and virtue∗

I am grateful to John Landau, who first introduced me to the subject of tact, to Immanuel Linder, who directed my attention to some important references, and to Gilead Bar‐elli, whose incisive critical comments forced me to rethink and to revise some of my views.

Abstract

The concept of tact has so far received only little theoretical attention. The present article suggests three levels on which the idea of tact may be approached: (1) The epistemological problem: the etymology of the term ‘tact’ is taken seriously, namely its relation to the sense of touch and tactility. An analysis of the position of touch in the ranking of the five senses according to various parameters is shown to be highly relevant to the understanding of the idea of tact. (2) The logical problem: tact is described as a skill which cannot be exhausted in the knowledge of principles or general rules. Like ‘judgment’ it is concerned with the particular, with sensitivity (analogical to that of the sense of touch) to the uniqueness of a human situation. (3) The ethical problem: tact is shown to lie between ethics and etiquette, that is to say it is more than just a rule of politeness or good manners, but it is ‘less’ than a fully fledged moral duty or principle. Its position between the obligatory and the merely conventional opens the way to characterize it as supererogatory.

Notes

I am grateful to John Landau, who first introduced me to the subject of tact, to Immanuel Linder, who directed my attention to some important references, and to Gilead Bar‐elli, whose incisive critical comments forced me to rethink and to revise some of my views.