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Abstract
Hayek's and Mises's argument for the impossibility of socialist planning is once again popular. Their case against socialism is predicated on an account of the nature of knowledge and social interaction. Hayek refined Mises's original argument by developing a philosophical anthropology which depicts individuals as tacitly knowledgeable rule‐followers embedded in a ‘spontaneous order’ of systems of rules. Giddens, whose social theory is informed by his reading of Wittgenstein, has recently added his sociological support to Hayek's ‘epistemological argument’ against socialism. With the aid of an interpretation of Wittgenstein which emphasizes his philosophy of praxis, I attempt to ‘deconstruct’ Giddens's and Hayek's ‘picture’ of tacit knowledge and rule‐following on which their argument against socialism is predicated.
Notes
This essay develops at greater length and detail ideas contained in a paper presented to the 19th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Austria, August 1996. I am extremely grateful to The British Academy, Hughes Hall and the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences for their financial support. I would like to thank Patrick Baert, Steve Fleetwood, Gavin Kitching, Mike Lynch, John Milbank, Veronique Mottier, Jenifer Nias, Steve Pratten, Mark Peacock and Adrian Tanner for their comments and advice. Special thanks are due to Mark Peacock and Terrell Carver.