Heidegger on Existentiality, Constancy, and the Self

Abstract

In Being and Time, Heidegger develops an account of the self in terms of his existential ontology. He contrasts his view to Cartesian and Kantian accounts, and seems to reject features that we take to be fundamental for a self, such as diachronic unity and being the subject of one's experiences. His positive account is obscured by the difficult vocabulary of authenticity and temporality. This paper traces Heidegger's argument, outlines his existential conception of the self, and shows how it fits the basic criteria for a self.

Notes

1. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, here cited as SZ. Translations of Heidegger's works throughout this paper are my own.

2. Heidegger does reject the claim that the self must be self-conscious, which some may take to be criterial. This is a topic for another paper.

3. Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1998), here cited as either ‘A’ (A edition) or ‘B’ (B edition).

4. “Wholeheartedly”, and this way of putting the putative change come from Carman (2003, pp. 271–76).

5. In SZ, pp. 373, 387, and 390f, Heidegger returns explicitly to the question of the “connected of life” (Zusammenhang des Lebens) in terms of the extension between birth and death. There would be no need for him to return to this characterization of wholeness, if in talking about wholeheartedness or authenticity Heidegger had changed the topic entirely.

6. See SZ, p. 204: “At first it seems as if Kant gave up the Cartesian starting point of an isolated, present subject. But it just seems that way. […] Even if he had given up the ontic priority of an isolated subject and inner experience, ontologically Descartes’ position would still be preserved.”

7. Heidegger refers back to his criticisms of the Refutation of Idealism in his discussion of the Paralogism (SZ, p. 321, fn1).

8. Heidegger argues in Section 62 that resoluteness, which constitutes the ability to be guiltily, can only do so if it is forerunning, i.e., as the ability-to-be-wholly.

9. Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 214). Merleau-Ponty quotes this passage from Werner (1930, p. 158).

10. I am grateful to members of the American Society for Existential Phenomenology, who heard a much earlier version of this paper, and to an anonymous referee.