Transformative experiences, rational decisions and shark attacks

ABSTRACT

How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul ([2014]. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks is rational. Paul has tried to explain why decisions involving ‘sharky’ outcomes are an exception to the rule. However, her putative explanation has been criticized by Campbell and Mosquera ([2020]. ‘Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem.’ Philosophical Studies 177: 3549–3565.). In this paper, I offer a different solution to this problem. Roughly, I argue that transformative experiences give rise a problem for rational decision-making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. I also argue that agents can partially project what traumatic transformative experiences are like.

KEYWORDS:

• Transformative experience
• rational choice
• expected value maximization
• preferences
• the Shark Problem

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (grant #756-2019-0133).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See Paul (2014) on transformative experiences. See Pettigrew (2019) for an overview of decision-theoretic principles for changing selves. See also Ullmann-Margalit (2006) for an earlier take on the rationality of transformative decisions. See Bykvist (2006) on the prudential ought and changing selves.

2 See Paul (2014). See Pettigrew (2019, chap. 10) and Talbott (2016) for replies to Paul. See Campbell and Mosquera (2020) on the shark problem for Paul’s view. Dougherty, Horowitz, and Sliwa (2015) argue that decisions involving transformative experiences can be rational, because transformative experiences are not an obstacle to knowing how valuable an experience is. Paul’s view concerning transformative experiences also matter for a host of related debates. See, e.g., Paul (2017) and Cappelen and Dever (2017) on indexicality and the first personal point of view.

3 Paul also refers to Weirich (2004), who is concerned with realistic requirements of decision theory (i.e., requirements of decision theory that can be useful and relevant for imperfect agents like us).

4 Paul (2014, 38–40) discusses how decisions involving transformative experiences can have revelatory value, (i.e., the value of having new experiences). Some decisions involving transformative experiences can be rational because we want to have new experiences. But the problem remains if one does not prefer having new experiences.

5 See Pettigrew (2019, chap. 10) and Dougherty, Horowitz, and Sliwa (2015) for discussion of this point.

6 Of course, there is a remote chance that swimming with hungry white sharks will be perfectly safe. I will come back to this complication in section 3.

7 Or at least: We cannot fully project this. I will come back to this point in section 3 (this is part of my solution to the problem).

8 There are worries for Paul’s claim. See, e.g., Dougherty, Horowitz, and Sliwa (2015) and Pettigrew (2019, chap. 10). However, I wish to remain neutral on whether Paul is right. So, I am trying to find a solution to the problem of sharky outcomes that is compatible with Paul’s thesis.

9 See section 1.2.

10 This possibility is briefly mentioned, but not really explored, in Paul (2017, 199). See Dougherty, Horowitz, and Sliwa (2015) on a related notion of partial knowledge.

11 See DeTurk (2001) on definitions of empathy, and on the relationship between intercultural dialogue and the ability to “put yourself in the shoes” of members of other cultures. For DeTurk, there are serious obstacles to thinking that “members of one social group [can] understand the experiences of another, particularly across divisions of power” (ibid., 377). However, she mentions various studies and examples in which these obstacles are not unsurmountable (ibid., 377-81). Compare with Bailey (2018) and B. J. Broome (2017). See Paul (2017) on empathy and the metaphysics of first personal perspectives, and Cappelen and Dever (2017) for a reply.

12 I thank a referee for inviting me to discuss this objection.

13 These putative new core preferences are inspired by the testimonies of shark attack survivors. See, e.g., Adolph (2019) and Carlsen, (2012).

14 Also, one knows that being attacked by sharks will not contribute to the satisfaction of one’s other preferences (e.g., it will not help one advocate for the rights of people with disabilities, it will not help one lobby against the protection of white sharks, etc.).

15 Another formulation of the worry could be this: There is a discontinuity between the outcomes for which partial cognitive modeling is sufficient for rational evaluation, and other outcomes for which partial cognitive modeling is insufficient for rational evaluation. I also address this possibility in the next paragraphs.

16 This is Campbell and Mosquera’s objection. Suppose that O₅₀₀₀ is a normal outcome while O₅₀₀₁ is a sharky outcome. Then, the crux of Campbell and Mosquera’s discontinuity objection is this: Agents cannot compare O₁ with O₅₀₀₀, because they cannot grasp what these lives are like unless they experience them. However, agents can conclude that O₅₀₀₀ is better than O₅₀₀₁. This discontinuity in the evaluations agents can make is odd.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by SSHRC: [Grant Number 756-2019-0133].