Abstract
PRESENT is a hardware-optimized 64-bit lightweight block cipher which supports 80- and 128-bit secret keys. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis (DFA) on PRESENT-80/128. The proposed attack is based on a 2-byte random fault model. In detail, by inducing several 2-byte random faults in input registers after 28 rounds, our attack recovers the secret key of the target algorithm. From simulation results, our attacks on PRESENT-80/128 can recover the secret key by inducing only two and three 2-byte random faults, respectively. These are superior to known DFA results on them.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the 2011 Research Fund of the University of Seoul for Jaechul Sung. Also this research was supported by the MKE (the Ministry of Knowledge Economy), Korea, under the ITRC (Information Technology Research Center) support programme (NIPA-2012-H0301-12-3007) supervised by the NIPA (National IT Industry Promotion Agency) for Kitae Jeong, Yuseop Lee and Seokhie Hong.