Stackelberg game for two-level supply chain with price markdown option

Abstract

Vendor–retailer collaboration has an important role in supply chain management. Although vendor–retailer collaboration results in better supply chain profit, collaboration is difficult to realize. This is because most vendors and retailers try to optimize their own profit. This paper applies the Stackelberg game with stochastic demand for the vendor–retailer system. The vendor as a leader determines the product price, and the retailer decides order quantity and frequency of price markdown. This study develops example and sensitivity analyses to illustrate the theory. Results show that the price markdown option has a better total supply chain profit than without a price markdown policy, and the vendor receives more benefit. For different demand variances, the retailer profit is more sensitive than the vendor profit.

Keywords:

• two-level supply chain
• supply chain management
• newsboy problem
• stackleberg game
• genetic algorithm

2010 AMS Subject Classifications:

• 97M40
• 93A30
• 68W32
• 91B28
• 62C86

Acknowledgements

The authors sincerely thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable and constructive suggestions.