The concept of time in Bion's “A Theory of Thinking”^*

* Translated by Philip Slotkin MA Cantab.

ABSTRACT

A complex and subtle theory of time is at the heart of Bion’s 1962 text “A Theory of Thinking.” The central point is the differentiation of “conception” and “thought,” psychic elements that in the infant are born respectively from experiences of satisfaction and frustration. These mnestic inscriptions should be understood as in dialectic relation with each other. From this matrix, within which originary temporality is established, lived time derives, but only when it is inserted in the symbolic order through the function of language, which gives access to the “concept.” Our feeling of time is therefore based on the rhythm of presentation of the breast and thus on the primary relationship with the object, as well as on a broader symbolic network. The meeting of a preconception of the breast with the mere absence of the breast is not able to generate a “thought” and establish time. That is why Bion distinguishes between absence of breast or non-breast and nothing (noughtness), a state of nameless dread. Bion’s concept of time provides an empirical idea, i.e. based on clinical cases where the destruction of time is observed, both of the origin of time and of what Heidegger called—as opposed to “linear” or objective conceptions of time—the ontological structure of temporality. An accurate and orderly critical reading of Bion’s article is essential to reach these conclusions.

On trouve au cœur du texte de Bion (1962), « Une théorie de l'activité de pensée », une théorie du temps aussi complexe que subtile. Le point central qui s’en dégage a trait à la différenciation entre « conception » et « pensée », des éléments psychiques qui, chez le nourrisson, sont respectivement issus des expériences de satisfaction et de frustration. Ces inscriptions mnésiques doivent être envisagées sous l'angle de la relation dialectique qu'elles entretiennent les unes avec les autres. C'est de cette matrice, au sein de laquelle s’établit la temporalité originaire, que dérive l'expérience vécue du temps, mais seulement à partir du moment où celle-ci est intégrée à l'ordre symbolique via la fonction du langage, qui donne accès au « concept ». Notre sentiment du temps est basé par conséquent sur le rythme de la présentation du sein et donc sur la relation primaire à l'objet, ainsi que sur un réseau symbolique plus étendu. La rencontre d'une préconception du sein avec la simple absence du sein n'est pas à même de produire une « pensée » et d'établir le temps. C'est la raison pour laquelle Bion introduit une distinction entre un sein absent ou un non-sein et une non-chose, un état de terreur sans nom. Le concept de temps de Bion fournit une idée empirique, c'est-à-dire qu'il est fondé sur des cas cliniques où l'on observe une destruction du temps, à la fois de l'origine du temps et de ce que Heidegger a appelé – par opposition à une conception « linéaire » ou objective du temps – la structure ontologique de la temporalité. Seule une lecture critique, précise et systématique, du texte de Bion, peut nous permettre d'aboutir à ces conclusions.

Eine komplexe und subtile Theorie der Zeit bildet das Herzstück von Bions 1962 verfasstem Text „Eine Theorie des Denkens.“ Von zentraler Bedeutung ist die Unterscheidung zwischen „Konzeption“ und „Gedanke,“ psychischen Elementen, die im Säugling durch Befriedigungs- bzw. Frustrationserfahrungen hervorgebracht werden. Diese Erinnerungsspuren, die vermutlich in einer dialektischen Beziehung zueinander stehen, bilden die Matrix, in der die originäre Zeitlichkeit gründet und von der sich die gelebte Zeit herleitet – jedoch nur dann, wenn sie durch die Funktion der Sprache, die Zugang zum „Konzept“ gibt, in die symbolische Ordnung eingefügt wird. Unser Zeitgefühl beruht also auf dem Rhythmus des Erscheinens der Brust und somit auf der primären Beziehung zum Objekt, darüber hinaus aber auch auf einem breiteren symbolischen Netzwerk. Das Aufeinandertreffen einer Präkonzeption der Brust mit der Abwesenheit der Brust kann keinen „Gedanken“ generieren und Zeit etablieren. Dies ist der Grund, weshalb Bion zwischen Abwesenheit der Brust oder „keine Brust“ und Nichts („Nullheit“), einem Zustand namenloser Angst, unterscheidet. Bions Konzept der Zeit ist ein empirisches, denn es beruht auf klinischen Fällen, in denen sich die Zerstörung der Zeit beobachten lässt – d.h. sowohl die Zerstörung ihres Ursprungs als auch die der ontologischen Struktur der Zeitlichkeit, um es mit Heidegger auszudrücken, der die ontologische Struktur von „linearen“ oder objektiven Zeitkonzepten unterschied. Eine präzise und kritische Lektüre von Bions Aufsatz bildet die Grundlage dieser Schlussfolgerungen.

Lo scritto di Bion “Una teoria del pensiero” (1962) si fonda su una complessa e raffinata teoria del tempo. Il punto centrale è la differenziazione tra “concezione” e “pensiero,” elementi psichici che nell’infante sorgono da esperienze rispettivamente di soddisfazione e di frustrazione. Queste iscrizioni mnestiche vanno pensate in relazione dialettica tra loro. Da questa matrice, all’interno della quale prende forma il nocciolo originario della temporalità, trae origine il tempo vissuto – ma ciò avviene soltanto quando esso viene inserito nell’ordine simbolico attraverso la funzione del linguaggio, che dà accesso al ‘concetto’. Il nostro sentimento del tempo si basa quindi sul ritmo con cui il seno si presenta a noi, e dunque sulla relazione primaria con l’oggetto, oltre che su una più ampia rete simbolica. L’incontro di una preconcezione del seno con la sua pura assenza non può tuttavia dar luogo a un ‘pensiero’ e stabilire la temporalità, ed è per questa ragione che Bion distingue tra assenza del seno (o non-seno) e niente (noughtness), uno stato di terrore senza nome. Attraverso il suo modo di intendere la temporalità, Bion ci propone un’idea empirica – basata cioè su casi clinici in cui si osserva la distruzione del tempo – sia dell’origine del tempo sia di ciò che Heidegger chiamava, contrapponendola a concezioni ‘lineari’ o magari oggettive del tempo, la struttura ontologica della temporalità. Per raggiungere queste conclusioni è essenziale procedere a una lettura critica dettagliata e puntuale dell’articolo di Bion.

En el fondo del texto de 1962 de Bion, “Una teoría del pensamiento,” hay una teoría compleja y sutil sobre el tiempo. La cuestión central es la diferenciación entre “concepción” y “pensamiento,” elementos psíquicos que nacen en el bebé a partir de experiencias de satisfacción y frustración, respectivamente. Estas inscripciones mnémicas deben ser entendidas en una relación dialéctica mutua. Desde esta matriz, dentro de la cual se establece la temporalidad originaria, se deriva el tiempo vivido, pero solo cuando es insertado en el orden simbólico a través de la función del lenguaje, que da acceso al “concepto.” Por ello, nuestro sentimiento del tiempo se basa en el ritmo de la presentación del pecho y, por tanto, en la relación primaria con el objeto, así como en una red simbólica más amplia. El encuentro de una preconcepción del pecho con la mera ausencia del pecho no puede generar un “pensamiento” y establecer el tiempo. Por eso Bion distingue entre la ausencia del pecho o no pecho y la nada (noughtness), un estado de terror sin nombre. El concepto de tiempo de Bion aporta una idea empírica, es decir, una idea basada en casos clínicos donde se observa la destrucción del tiempo, tanto del origen del tiempo como de lo que Heidegger denominó —como opuesto a concepciones “lineales” u objetivas del tiempo— la estructura ontológica de la temporalidad. Para llegar a estas conclusiones es esencial una lectura crítica ordenada y precisa del artículo de Bion.

KEYWORDS:

• Bion
• time
• temporality theory of thinking
• no-breast
• noughtness

Notes

* Translated by Philip Slotkin MA Cantab.

1 [Translator's note: For convenience, the masculine form is used for both sexes throughout this translation.]

2 Here I can mention only a few of the contributions on this subject, and in particular those which, in contrast to Kant and to Freud's essentially “neo-Kantian” vision—neo-Kantian in the sense of monadic and “physiologistic”, because intrinsic to consciousness—centre on the non-aprioristic nature of time, i.e. the view that it is already given and precedes experience): Sabbadini (1989), Priel (1997), Butler (1999), Noel-Smith (2002), Birksted-Breen (2009).

3 As to the value of a dialogue with philosophy, see Bergson (2002, xix f.): “Without denying to psychology, any more than to metaphysics, the right to make itself into an independent science, we believe that each of these two sciences should set problems to the other and can, in a measure, help it to solve them.”

4 In the jargon of Heidegger (1927), which I borrow while adapting it to my own context, this term denotes the primal structure of time (Zeitlichkeit), from which there stem both the sense of lived time (Zeit) and the abstract representation of linear, measurable time.

5 The essential significance of the concept of a function is that it compels one to consider the pair of terms it connects rather than each term individually.

6 I thank L. Zanni for letting me know that here Bion misquotes from L. Carroll’s novel, as the Hatter says: ‘It's always six o'clock now' (2003, p. 64).

7 [Translator's note: Suggested rendering of a line from a poem by Giacomo Leopardi (1798–1837).]

8 In the Romance languages, the notion of a wish is rendered by a word cognate with English “desire” (e.g. Italian desiderio).

9 The term occurs for the first time in “A Theory of Thinking.”

10 [Translator's note: That is, as the opposite of après-coup, or of Freud's Nachträglichkeit.]

11 However, see Heidegger's concept of Bewandtnis, for which a possible Italian translation is appagatività, or the potential quality of giving satisfaction. [Translator's note: The term is often rendered in English by “involvement.”]

12 Heidegger uses the concept of ecstatic time (ékstasis, from ἐξίστημι, meaning to put outside or to go out of oneself) to emphasize primal time's nature as non-presence or non-substance, but instead as essentially off-centred. The quality of meaningfulness afforded by the possibility of temporalizing experience stems from the fact of being a subject always outside itself, of ex-tending oneself from the past into the future and vice versa. Opening a window onto the world signifies running the risk of leaning out into the void of nothingness and alienation from the Other.

13 In order for time not to be out of joint, as Hamlet complains, these three actors must deliver their hidden lines in harmony with each other. Time falls ill if one of the three takes over the entire stage.

14 It may be postulated that, in objective terms—i.e. external to the subject's experience—the ultimate origin of this unceasing movement can only be the conception proposed by physics of the matter of the universe and the principle of entropy (Rovelli 2017). Subjectively, however, what the hypothesis of this primal “movement” suggests (Bergson [1896] describes it as “vibrations”), although understood in a more general sense as change, is that it would be difficult to conceive of time other than within a concept of space.

15 Cf. Bergson (1896, 25): “However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, and involves consequently an effort of memory which prolongs one into another a plurality of moments.”