From Etelāʿāti to Eslāhtalabi: Saʿid Hajjarian, Political Theology and the Politics of Reform in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Abstract

This article examines the importance of the political thought and praxis of politico, ‘reformist’ strategist and intellectual, Saʿid Hajjarian, and his rethinking of the post-revolutionary Iranian state’s sources and bases of legitimacy in the 1990s and 2000s. It also provides an exposition and assessment of a number of his recommendations for the realisation of ‘political development’ (towseʿeh-ye siyāsi) in the post-revolutionary order and their contribution to the discourse of eslāhāt during the presidency of Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Moreover, it attempts to situate Hajjarian within a broader spectrum of reformist political opinion and its proponents within the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political class.

Keywords:

• Saʿid Hajjarian
• Political Theology
• Post-revolutionary Iran
• Reform
• Mohammad Khatami Administration
• 1997–2005

Notes

1. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 155.

2. Quoted in, Modonesi, Subalternity, Antagonism, Autonomy, Loc-535-of-4286.

3. This factional typology of the post-revolutionary political class is well-established and was originally formulated by members of the Mojahedin Organization of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in a series of articles published in their party political organ, ʿAsr-e mā. While not accepting this typology in its entirety it has been accepted and modified in fairly broad terms. Armin, “Negāhi kutāh beh barkhi.”

4. Tom Bottomore distinguishes the “political class” from the “political elite” or “governing elite.” The “political class” refers to all those groups which “exercise political power or influence, and are directly engaged in struggles for political leadership.” The “political elite” or “governing elite” consists of those individuals who in fact “exercise political power in a society any given time.” Bottomore, Elites and Society, 7:Loc-148-of-2470.

5. Hajjarian and Baqi, “Goftogu bā Saʿid Hajjāriān,” 20.

6. Hajjarian and Khojasteh-Rahimi, “Eslāhātchi, cheriki nemishavad,” 41.

7. Hajjarian and Baqi, “Goftogu bā Saʿid Hajjāriān,” 53–5.

8. Ibid., 45.

9. Bashiriyeh and Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, “Interview with Professor Hossein Bashiriyeh.”

10. Hajjarian, “Tallaqi-ye ākādemik az towse'eh-ye siyāsi,” 39–41.

11. See Hajjarian and Khojasteh-Rahimi, “Eslāhātchi, cheriki nemishavad,” 44. It seems that the remit of the research groups changed upon Rowhani's assuming charge at the Center for Strategic Research. “Mo'arefi-ye markaz-e tahqiqāt-e esterātezhik,” 230–32.

12. For an interesting essay on the beginnings of neoliberalization under Rafsanjani, and specifically the establishment of economic free zones in his home province of Kerman. See Forti, “Arg-e Jadid,” Loc-861-of-6624.

13. Hajjarian and Baqi, “Goftogu bā Sa'id Hajjāriān,” 46. Ansari summarizes many of the key principles which would guide the reformists after 1997 and many if not all of them can be traced in the writings of Hajjarian in ʿAsr-e ma. This is not to suggest that he was the sole architect of the reformist project by any means. If anything it should be stated explicitly that it was on the whole a collective endeavor. Hajjarian's role as both a theorist and organizer however cannot be underestimated. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, 114–16.

14. Hajjarian and Ehsani, “A Conversation with Sa'id Hajjarian,” 42.

15. Hajjarian and Salimi, “Suteh delān gerd-e ham āmadand,” 66.

16. Ganji, “Rowshanfekrān va goftemān-e 'ālijenāb,” 59.

17. Ravanbakhsh and Madadi-Ta'emeh, Andisheh va aqāyān-e khoshunat, 31.

18. Baqi, “Hadaf-e tarāhān-e terur,” 113.

19. Ganji et al., “Matn-e sokhanrāni-hā-ye ruz-e avval,” 73.

20. Hajjarian, “Farāyand-e 'orfi shodan-e feqh-e Shi'eh,” 84.

21. Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imām, 451–2.

22. Hajjarian, “Farāyand-e 'orfi shodan-e feqh-e Shi'eh,” 83.

23. Hajjarian is quoting Khomeini's historic fatwa of January 1988. Ibid., 83.

24. Piscatori, “Religion and Realpolitik,” 8.

25. Buchta, Who Rules Iran?, 52–3.

26. Kahn, Political Theology, 1.

27. It is questionable whether this is in fact the case following the constitutional revisions of July 1988, since the stipulation in article 5 of the constitution which stated that “the majority of the people recognize and accept [the vali-ye faqih] as leader” was scratched. Shams, Qānun-e asāsi, 105.

28. Hajjarian, “Imām Khomeini, faqih-ye dowrān-e gozār,” 92.

29. Hajjarian, “Farāyand-e 'orfi shodan-e feqh-e Shi'eh,” 84–5.

30. Ibid., 84.

31. Ibid., 85. He claims that his reading is supported by article 56 of the constitution.

32. Ibid., 88.

33. Ibid., 82.

34. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 155.

35. Hajjarian, “Farāyand-e 'orfi shodan-e feqh-e Shi'eh,” 83.

36. Khatami, “Din va siyāsat,” 36.

37. Khatami, “Rowhāniyat, bayad-hā va nabayad-hā,” 143.

38. Hajjarian, “Farāyand-e 'orfi shodan-e feqh-e Shi'eh,” 94.

39. Ibid., 94. For more details see Modarressi Tabataba'i, An Introduction to Shiʿi Law, 10

40. Hajjarian, “Farāyand-e 'orfi shodan-e feqh-e Shi'eh,” 94.

41. Ibid., 85. Interestingly enough, in May 1993 a controversy between the Guardian Council and Expediency Council would see the former attempt to restrict the powers of the latter, and circumscribe its powers within the limits of the secondary injunctions, as opposed to the primary injunctions of the shariʿa, as had been previously assumed on the basis of Khomeini's famous decree analyzed above. See Matsunaga, “The Secularization of a Faqih-Headed Revolutionary Islamic State of Iran,” 477.

42. Hajjarian, “Farāyand-e 'orfi shodan-e feqh-e Shi'eh,” 95. Mohsen Kadivar also repeats this argument verbatim in his interview with Khordād. The interview was amongst the chief reasons for his arrest and conviction by the Special Court for Clerics. Kadivar, “Mosāhebeh bā ruznāmeh-ye Khordād,” 162.

43. See Mesbah-Yazdi, “Hokumat va mashru'iyat,” 52; San'ati, Goftemān-e Mesbāh, 539–93; Hajjarian, “Falsafeh-ye entekhābāt,” 539. He wrote an explicit critique of Mesbah-Yazdi in ʿAsr-e mā in August 1998 referring to him as “Hojjat al-Islam” (640), and not Ayatollah. He compares Mesbah's political thought unfavorably with that of Motahhari and Beheshti, depicting him as a retrograde apologist for absolutism and even slavery (643). “Mesbāh-Yazdi dar kākh-e zojāji.”

44. Buchta, Who Rules Iran?, 8.

45. Hajjarian was amongst the earliest to introduce the theory which then became fodder for many future analyses of the Iranian political system. Hajjarian, “Sākht-e eqtedār-e soltāni”

46. Weber quoted in Chehabi and Linz, “A Theory of Sultanism 1,” 4. It is still not clear to what extent this is really an accurate analogy as far as Khamenei's style of statecraft is concerned simply because we still do not have an accurate picture of the modus operandi of the beit's bureaucracy, much of which has been predicated on hearsay transmitted to the foreign-based Farsi-language press. There are occasional indications as to its modus operandi in the domestic press as a result of leaks in the midst of factional infighting. One such instance was Hojjat al-Islam Mehdi Karubi's open letter to Khamenei, alleging that the latter's son, Mojtaba, had openly interfered in the 2005 presidential race and backed a rival candidate, namely Mahmud Ahmadinejad, though he is not mentioned by name. Karubi, “Matn-e kāmel-e nāmeh-ye Mehdi Karubi.”

A further glimpse into the economic power which undergirds the beit has recently been provided by a Reuters special report on the financial operations of an organization called the Headquarters for Executing the Order of the Imam (Setād-e ejrāʿi-ye farmān-e hazrat-e Imām), which is not only under the ultimate control of Khamenei's office, but devoid of parliamentary scrutiny, and has been estimated to control assets in the region of $95 billion, much of which has allegedly been accumulated as a result of asset seizures. Stecklow, Dehghanpisheh, and Torbati, “Khamenei Controls Massive Financial Empire.”

Though the analyses provided by the Islamic left in this regard can prove insightful and accurate in part, they all completely ignore the personalized clerical and familial networks which informed Khomeini's style of rule. Though Khomeini no doubt exhibited several characteristics of the Weberian archetype of the “charismatic leader,” empirical reality rarely, if ever fully approximates such idealizations. The role of Khomeini's beit or household and of his son, Ahmad, in particular and how they defined his style of statecraft demand further research; there is of course no doubt that during Khamenei's time as leader the beit has massively expanded and on some accounts become a state within a state. Nevertheless, the role of personalized, familial and clerical networks under Khomeini is undeniable. Mehdi Haʿeri-Yazdi in his memoir, amongst numerous other relevant accounts, quite clearly suggests that it was nearly impossible to speak to Khomeini directly without going through Ahmad or in Ahmad's presence. Hairi-Yazdi and Sedghi, “Mehdi Hairi-Yazdi,” Tape 4; 18.

47. In this essay first published in ʿAsr-e mā, Hajjarian highlights both the personalization of power and its transformation into a matter of proximity and familial ties to the “sultan.” Hajjarian, “Nahveh-ye bāz towlid-e saltanat dar andisheh-ye khelāfat va velāyat,” 581–3.

48. Hajjarian, “Mashruteh-talabi,” 123.

49. When in exile several years later in the United States Ganji undertook a frontal attack on Khamenei and what he saw as the former's personalization of political rule. In this article Ganji proclaims, “Formally or not, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government all operate under the absolute sovereignty of the supreme leader; Khamenei is the head of state, the commander-in-chief, and the top ideologue” (45). He was also adamant that Khamenei “has secured a complete stranglehold on power in Iran” (49). Ganji, “The Latter-Day Sultan,” 45.

A much earlier comment by Kadivar which provoked the ire of the Special Court for Clerics was when he averred, “in the method and nature of some it is observed that their interpretation of Islamic government bears no difference with a monarchical regime.” Kadivar, “Mosāhebeh bā ruznāmeh-ye Khordād,” 157.

50. In 2009 following the controversial re-election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad, a wheelchair-ridden Hajjarian was hauled before the Islamic Revolutionary Court so as to repudiate (allegedly under duress) the theory of sultanism and stated that it bore no relation to the doctrine and political order of velāyat-e faqih. He also resigned from the Moshārekat Party in what many reputable observers have compared to “Stalinist-style show trials.” In the course of his “confession” he was quoted as stating that the works of Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas and Talcott Parsons were responsible for jeopardizing the country's national security. “Hajjarian: bekhāter-e enherāfāt va khesārat-hā'i ke beh mardom zadim az hezb-e Moshārekat este'fā mikonam,” Fars News Agency 3/6/1388 [August 25, 2009].

Hajjarian's “confession” is symptomatic of a deep-seated hostility to the humanities and in particular critical social theory, which dates back at least to the early 1990s when the program Hoviyat (Identity) was broadcast on national television and systematically attempted to depict secular and even some religious intellectuals who drew on critical methods in the social sciences as subversive and dangerous. The program even used material originating in confessions extracted under duress when political prisoners such as ʿEzatollah Sahabi had been imprisoned years previously. Sahabi claims he was interrogated by Hossein Shariʿatmadari, the incumbent editor of Keyhān newspaper, while the latter was still working in the service of the Ministry of Intelligence. Sahabi, Nim-e qarn-e khātereh va tajrobeh, 209–12.

51. Hajjarian, “Dovvom-e Khordād,” 17.

52. Hajjarian, “Falsafeh-ye entekhābāt,” 538.

53. Hajjarian, “Dovvom-e Khordād,” 17.

54. Hajjarian and Ehsani, “A Conversation with Sa'id Hajjarian,” 41.

55. Hajjarian, “Falsafeh-ye entekhābāt,” 539.

56. Hajjarian, “‘Velāyat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih,’” 265.

57. Hajjarian, “Mashruteh-talabi,” 126.

58. Ibid., 123.

59. Hajjarian, “Pāsdāri az qānun-e āsāsi,” 483.

60. The issue of the Guardian Jurist's power of “executive order” or hokm-e hokumati which could putatively override the shariʿa in the name of the “preservation of the Islamic regime,” acted as an effective veto on unwelcome legislation and was used on occasion by Khamenei, most notably against a proposed press law in August 2000, and seems to still not have presented itself as a serious problem.

61. Hajjarian, “Pāsdāri az qānun-e āsāsi,” 485.

62. Mehrpur, Ra'is-e jomhur va ma'suliyat-e ejrā'i-ye qānun-e āsāsi, 13–15.

63. More on this issue below. Hajjarian, “Pāsdāri az qānun-e āsāsi,” 479.

64. Arjomand, After Khomeini, Loc-2055-of-6438.

65. Hajjarian, “Sharhi bar marāmnāmeh-ye jebheh-ye moshārekat-e Irān-e eslāmi,”

66. Hajjarian, “Pāsdāri az qānun-e āsāsi,” 479.

67. Hajjarian and Salimi, “Suteh delān gerd-e ham āmadand,” 64.

68. See for example, Nateq-Nuri and Mirdar, Khāterat-e Hojjat al-Islam 'Ali-Akbar Nāteq-Nuri, 74–5.

69. Hajjarian and Salimi, “Suteh delān gerd-e ham āmadand,” 65.

70. Hossein Bashiriyeh's writings on this score were an important point of departure, and the fact that he acted as a doctoral supervisor to some of Iran's main “reformist” strategists, e.g. Saʿid Hajjarian and Mostafa Tajzadeh, was by no means a coincidence. See Bashiriyeh, “Moshārekat-e siyāsi,” 581.

71. Ibid., 581.

72. See Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, 206.

73. This strategy was first properly formulated by Hajjarian in an interview with the periodical, Rāh-e now, edited by Akbar Ganji in May 1998 on the first anniversary of Khatami's election as president. Hajjarian, “Dovvom-e Khordād,” 16.

74. Khatami and Salimi, “Tasavor-e piruzi nemikardim,” 41.

75. Hajjarian and Salimi, “Suteh delān gerd-e ham āmadand,” 65.

76. Shadlu, “Hezb-e jebheh-ye moshārekat-e Irān-e eslāmi,” 370.

77. Hajjarian, “Sharhi bar marāmnāmeh-ye jebheh-ye moshārekat-e Irān-e eslāmi.”

78. Ibid.

79. Shadlu, “Hezb-e jebheh-ye moshārekat-e Irān-e eslāmi,” 380.

80. See Sorush, “Farbehtar az idi'olozhi.” This stance is curious seeing that Hajjarian had several years previously criticized Sorush in print, albeit under a pseudonym, on just this point. Hajjarian, “Naqdi bar nazariyeh-ye ‘Farbehtar az idi'olozhi.’”

81. “Sharhi bar marāmnāmeh-ye jebheh-ye moshārekat-e Irān-e eslāmi.”

82. Hajjarian and Salimi, “Suteh delān gerd-e ham āmadand,” 63.

83. Ibid., 66.

84. This term is explicitly used by Hajjarian vis-à-vis Moshārekat. Hajjarian, “Sharhi bar marāmnāmeh-ye jebheh-ye moshārekat-e Irān-e eslāmi.” Hashem Aqajari a veteran member of the SMEEI has claimed the organization was also explicitly founded as a political “cadre” and not intended to be a mass political organization. Aqajari, Khojasteh-Rahimi, and Bala'i, “Sharh-e zendegi-ye yek enqelābi-ye nāārām,” 42.

85. Hajjarian and Khojasteh-Rahimi, “Eslāhātchi, cheriki nemishavad,” 45.

86. Ibid., 45

87. Hajjarian, “Falsafeh-ye entekhābāt,” 539. For more general comments on this score by SMEEI member and Sixth Majles MP, Mohsen Armin, see Armin, “Nezārat-e estesvābi va moshārekat-e siyāsi,” 358.

88. Arjomand, After Khomeini, Loc-2035-of-6438

89. Hajjarian, “Sharhi bar marāmnāmeh-ye jebheh-ye moshārekat-e Irān-e eslāmi.”

90. Ibid.

91. Hajjarian and Ehsani, “A Conversation with Saʿid Hajjarian,” 41.

92. See Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, Chap. 8.

93. Bashiriyeh, “Moshārekat-e siyāsi,” 587.

94. I have thus far come across one such instance thus far in my reading of Hajjarian's voluminous writings. Hajjarian, “Bohrān-e dowgānegi dar qodrat,” 108.

95. Hajjarian and Ehsani, “A Conversation with Saʿid Hajjarian,” 41.

96. Hajjarian and Baqi, “Goftogu bā Saʿid Hajjāriān,” 25.

97. Pressure would initially come from “public opinion,” which would be least likely to provoke a backlash. Ibid., 26.

98. Hajjarian and Salimi, “Suteh delān gerd-e ham āmadand,” 63.