Abstract
Co‐operative sugar factories in western India are economically successful even though rife with factional politics. Since they are not heavily subsidised, what makes them operate efficiently? Political competition between elected leaders of neighbouring factories drives them to compete economically. This in turn drives them to expand, innovate and diversify production. Nothing in the standard rhetoric of co‐operation explains this tendency toward competitive risk‐taking. Likewise, standard economic theories of competition overlook the political forces which drive these industrial leaders.
Notes
Associate Professor of Anthropology, McGill University. Many thanks are due the International Development Research Centre (Ottawa), les Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l'Aide à la Recherche (Quebec), and McGill University for supporting this research. Thanks also to M. Moore, J. and M. Sharma, J. Tendier, and especially D.P. Apte, B.S. Baviskar, M.S. Marathe and C.S. Mujgule for their information and comments on earlier versions of this article. Likewise, thanks to participants in the conference on ‘Cooperative Enterprises and Rural Development in India’ and to seminar participants at the Center for International Studies, MIT, and the East‐West Center, University of Hawaii.