The Intentions and Heritage of Descartes and Locke: Toward a Recognition of the Moral Basis of Modern Psychology

Summary

Given the recent discussions about the proper stance of the American Psychological Association vis-à-vis a wide range of moral issues, it might be useful to reflect upon the historical foundations of contemporary psychology. This article reviews this history from the seventeenth century to the present, placing special emphasis upon the role that moral concerns played in the development of all the modern sciences of man, including psychology. It presents evidence in support of the thesis that the intentions or concerns of Descartes and Locke were largely moral and that similar intentions underlay the work of virtually all of the subsequent proponents of “the science of Man” up to the turn of the twentieth century. It then discusses the twentieth-century conflict between this heritage of moral concern and the ideal of a “value-free,” logically “justified,” and “pure” science of psychology. While acknowledging the lively debate surrounding this conflict, it argues that the conflict itself is more apparent than real and that modern psychologists continue to share the Cartesian/Lockian heritage of moral concern. Finally, it suggests why the debate has occurred in this century and some preliminary steps towards its resolution.