Properties of learning models in collective action: Rationality of backward-looking players

Abstract

This article intends to clarify properties of learning models in simulation studies and to conduct a comparison of preceding learning models. Learning models are often used in many simulation studies, but there is no uniform rule of learning. We introduce three technical properties (monotonicity, condition of probability, neutrality) and three rational properties (rationality is fixed situations, rationality in first order stochastic domination, rationality with risk preference in stocahstic situations). We examine Michael Macy's model, the Erev & Roth model, and some others. We find that these models have different properties. Though learning is treated as one of the solutions of social dilemma from the results of Macy's model (Kollock, 1998), Macy's model is peculiar learning model. Learning is not always a solution of social dilemma. A comparison of learning models from a uniform point of view clarifies the properties of each model, and helps to probe conformity of a learning model and human behavior.