The inertia of social structure: Affirmative action or seniority in layoffs?*

The research reported here was supported by a grant from the Taft Faculty Fund and initiated in response to an invitation from Mark LaGory, Kevin Fitzpatrick, and their colleagues to present a colloquium at the University of Alabama in Birmingham. I want to thank them and Jonathan Entin, John Goering, Arthur Hinman, and Edmund Kitch for helpful suggestions and encouragement Karen Fein‐berg, Norris Johnson, and an anonymous reviewer contributed in especially significant ways to this paper, a revision of one presented at the 1987 meetings of the Southern Sociological Society in Atlanta. I retain responsibility for any errors. Direct correspondence to William E. Feinberg, Department of Sociology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221–0378.

This paper argues that social structure provides an inherent inertia that necessarily circumscribes the effects of certain kinds of social policies. The argument is illustrated by a study of how much advantage affirmative‐action guidelines for layoffs provide over seniority‐based plans in hastening the attainment of increased minority representation. The research uses a computer simulation model of a hypothetical work force; hiring to fill subsequent vacancies in the work force is governed by an affirmative‐action program, except when layoffs necessitated by a permanent reduction in force (RIF) intervene. Dimensions for contrasting the effects of layoff schemes include the size and timing of RIFs, the age distribution of the initial work force, and the bases (affirmative action or seniority) for layoffs. The results indicate that affirmative‐action guidelines for layoffs enjoy no or only a very small advantage over seniority bases in the time to reach program goals. This result, which many find counterintuitive, is explained primarily with an appeal to the statistical concept of “weighted proportions.” The possible consequences of the findings are explored briefly, as are the implications of weighted proportions for the analysis of structural change.

Notes

The research reported here was supported by a grant from the Taft Faculty Fund and initiated in response to an invitation from Mark LaGory, Kevin Fitzpatrick, and their colleagues to present a colloquium at the University of Alabama in Birmingham. I want to thank them and Jonathan Entin, John Goering, Arthur Hinman, and Edmund Kitch for helpful suggestions and encouragement Karen Fein‐berg, Norris Johnson, and an anonymous reviewer contributed in especially significant ways to this paper, a revision of one presented at the 1987 meetings of the Southern Sociological Society in Atlanta. I retain responsibility for any errors. Direct correspondence to William E. Feinberg, Department of Sociology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221–0378.