Dynamics and comparative statics of Coleman's exchange model*

This paper is a revised summary of a chapter of my thesis “Kollektive Entscheidungen in einer Theorie korporativer Akteure”. I would like to thank James Coleman (University of Chicago), Werner Raub (University of Utrecht), Jeroen Weesie (University of Utrecht) and an anonymous referee for suggestions on earlier drafts.

Abstract

Social exchange is modeled by Coleman in analogy to the theory of competitive equilibrium. Using this analogy, a dynamic stability analysis of the equilibrium is presented. Also, a comparative static analysis is provided with respect to the effects of a variation of certain exogenous variables. It is shown that the equilibrium is stable under weak conditions. A partial variation of exogenous conditions has the expected effects on endogenous parameters.

Notes

This paper is a revised summary of a chapter of my thesis “Kollektive Entscheidungen in einer Theorie korporativer Akteure”. I would like to thank James Coleman (University of Chicago), Werner Raub (University of Utrecht), Jeroen Weesie (University of Utrecht) and an anonymous referee for suggestions on earlier drafts.