Effect of Motivational Goals on the Causal Realism of Counterfactual Thoughts

ABSTRACT

Counterfactual thinking refers to mental comparisons of reality with imagined alternatives of it. The “functional view” of counterfactual thinking suggests that upward counterfactuals (which improve on reality) serve a preparative function and downward counterfactuals (which worsen reality) serve an affective function. This view presumes that people generate counterfactuals that focus on cause(s) that have actually produced the negative outcomes. The two experiments reported here demonstrate that people spontaneously manipulate the causal content of their counterfactuals, depending on their motivational goals. Specifically, it was found that when people aim to feel better about a poor decision they generate less realistic (upward) counterfactuals, experience less negative affect and tend to attribute the outcome to less controllable causes than when they aim to learn from their experience. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords:

• attribution theory
• learning
• social interaction

Notes

¹These affective consequences of upward and downward counterfactuals are typically based on an “affective contrast” mechanism; an obtained outcome appears worse if a more desirable alternative outcome is salient and better if a less desirable outcome is salient (e.g., Markman et al., 1993; Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Roese, 1994). Under certain circumstances (e.g., under a reflective mode) an “affective assimilation” effect may occur, thereby reversing the affective consequences of upward and downward comparisons (Markman & McMullen, 2003; Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008; McMullen, 1997; McMullen & Markman, 2000).

²All analyses have been corrected for inequality of variances across groups on the basis of the Levene's test and, hence, fractional degrees of freedom (here and elsewhere in the article).