Labour repression and social justice in Franco's Spain: the political objectives of compulsory sickness insurance, 1942–1957

Abstract

This article analyzes the basic characteristics of the labor and social policies of the Franco dictatorship established in Spain after the Civil War (1936–1939), and the links which existed between them. The offer of support to working families was presented through a paternalistic discourse of ‘social justice’ which was combined with tough repressive measures in the labor market. Within this context, compulsory social insurances pursued a political end, as they served to mitigate social tensions in a context of worker repression and harsh living conditions. Sickness insurance was a key element in this strategy, and it turned out to be very economical for the dictatorship, as the burden of financing the system was placed on employers and, above all, the workers themselves. This led to financial and management problems within a system providing imperfect coverage, with low benefits and serious inequalities in protection. Consequently, Spain moved away from other advanced countries which, at this time, were establishing their welfare states on the basis of two pillars: the universalization of benefits, and the redistributive character of the system from a social point of view.

Notes

1. Bowen, Spaniards and Nazi Germany, 139; Bessel, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, 4–7.

2. The term ‘Catholic corporativism’ refers, in this article, to the utilization of the Catholic religion as an element of social cohesion and interaction in a context in which traditional values were defended and there was an educational intent (more propagandistic than real) aimed at achieving national harmony and solidarity. See Tusell, La dictadura de Franco.

3. Data calculated on the basis of Prados de la Escosura, El progreso económico, 177. European average of 12 countries. The economic recovery of the country only started in 1959 with the approval of the Stabilization Plan.

4. Barciela, Autarquía y mercado negro; Catalan, ‘La reconstrucción franquista’; Barciela et al., La España de Franco; Prados de la Escosura, El progreso económico.

5. Real industrial wages per hour worked fell in the post-Civil War period, on average, to 60% of their level in the prewar period. See Vilar Rodríguez, ‘La ruptura postbélica’; Vilar Rodríguez, Los salarios del miedo.

6. Richards, Un tiempo de silencio.

7. See Vilar Rodríguez, ‘La distribución funcional’.

8. Catalan, La economía española; Sánchez and Tascón Fernández, Los empresarios de Franco.

9. Two institutions played a key role in the advances of social policy in Spain at the beginning of the twentieth century: the Institute for Social Reform (Instituto de Reformas Sociales [IRS]), and the National Welfare Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión [INP]). See Palacio Morena, La construcción.

10. According to Nicolau, the infant mortality rate in 1935 was 115.3 per thousand and in 1941 it was 148.6 per thousand. Nicolau, ‘Población’, 131. The deaths from sickness were obtained from the annual statistical yearbook Anuario Estadístico de España (1955), 751.

11. Barciela et al., La España de Franco, 27.

12. Molinero, ‘Mujer, franquismo, fascismo’; Bernabeu-Mestre, ‘Madres y enfermeras’.

13. The term ‘social justice’, widely used by the authorities of the Franco regime, responded not to goals of redistribution and equity, but rather to a propaganda discourse aimed at winning over the masses. See Molinero, La captación de las masas, 37.

14. Data proceeding from Nicolau, ‘Población’. In the depressed economy of the Spanish post-war period many families returned to the countryside, where they still had family ties and could cover their food requirements more easily.

15. A similar model had already been applied in Mussolini's Italy, from where some aspects had been copied by Franco. See Molinero, La captación de las masas, 126.

16. Zamagni, Economic History; Owen Smith, German Economy.

17. Decree of 25 September 1936, no. 131 (Official State Gazette Boletín Oficial del Estado [BOE], 28/09/1936). Order of 10 January 1937 (BOE 11/01/1937) and Decree of 19 April 1937, no. 255 (BOE 20/04/1937).

18. Sarasúa and Gálvez, ¿Privilegios o eficiencia?, 39. Although, in practice, economic necessity forced women to continue working in secrecy without guarantees or labor rights.

19. The single vertical trade union was an organization integrated into the state itself and comprising both workers and employers. See Aparicio, ‘Sobre los comienzos’.

20. Ley de Unidad Sindical (Law of Unification of Unions) of 26 January 1940 (BOE 31/01/1940).

21. To describe this role, Babiano Mora uses the term caudillo-empresario (‘caudillo-businessman’); see Babiano Mora, Paternalismo industrial. The Fuero del Trabajo reinforces the figure of the jefe de empresa (‘company boss’), who wielded the real power when it came to controlling the workers within the company.

22. Preston, Franco, 971. The Ley de Seguridad del Estado (Law of State Security) of 29 March 1941 (BOE 11/04/1941) also contributed its dose of terror by punishing subversive and anti-patriotic behavior with the death penalty.

23. For more on this issue, see Vilar Rodríguez, Los salarios del miedo.

24. The National Welfare Institute was reorganized on 15 June 1938. See Montero, Orígenes y antecedents; Castillo, Solidaridad.

25. Moreover, in 1944 the Franco regime repealed the legislation in force dealing with unemployment insurance. This area was neglected by the state until the creation of the National Unemployment Insurance in 1961. See Benjumea Pino, ‘Sanidad y desempleo’, 466.

26. According to the principles of the Italian Labor Charter passed in 1927, the state should not concern itself with anything more than coordinating and unifying the welfare system and its institutions. See Bertini, ‘Il fascismo’, 190.

27. The ‘collaborating bodies’ included companies, employers’ industrial accident insurance mutuals, and social insurance mutuals which reached special agreements of collaboration with the National Welfare Institute to manage the sickness insurance. The first agreements were signed in 1944.

28. Before the Civil War it was agreed that, provisionally, contributions would be paid by the state and employers, with the workers being exempted from payment due to their precarious situation; Hermida, ‘El retiro obrero’.

29. Workers’ friendly societies and montepíos started to appear from 1946 onwards and were integrated into the so-called Servicio de Mutualidades y Montepíos Laborales as an autonomous body within the Ministry of Labor. The benefits that the workers’ mutuals offered supplemented the insufficient income coming from social insurances. See González Murillo, ‘El mutualismo laboral’; Redecillas, El mutualismo laboral.

30. Data corresponding to 1954. ABC newspaper, 15 June 1954 and CSCCIN, Comercio, Industria y Navegación de España, 1955, no. 85.

31. BOE 18/01/1949, no. 18.

32. By a decree of 23 March 1956, 4.5% of wages was set as a limit for workers’ social contributions; see BOE 27/03/1956, no. 87. Another 4.5% of wages was paid by the company, but the employers’ percentage increased, in general, to 14.50% a few months later; see BOE 30/10/1956, no. 304.

33. BOE 01/04/1958, no. 78.

34. Pereda Mateos and Desdentado Bonete, ‘La política de salarios’.

35. See the law of 26 December 1957 by which the state granted an extraordinary credit of 375 million pesetas to maintain social provisions; BOE 28/12/1957, no. 324.

36. The Basic Law (Ley de Bases) of 30 December 1963 authorized the change from a fragmented system of social insurances to an integrated social security system; see Blanco, Planificación; Serrano Guirado and Malo de Molina, Salarios y Mercado de Trabajo.

37. See, for example, the contributions of Marcelino Pascual at the head of the Directorate General for Health Care (Dirección General de Sanidad), which increased its budget significantly; see Bernabeu-Mestre, ‘La utopía reformadora’; and for the social policy during the first two years of the Second Republic, see González Murillo, ‘La política social’. For the advances in sickness insurance during the Second Republic, see Porras, ‘El seguro de enfermedad’; Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘La asistencia médica’.

38. Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘Politics of Public Health’; Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘Los servicios de salud pública’.

39. BOE 27/12/1942, no. 361 and BOE 01/07/1944, no. 183. For the development of sickness insurance in the context of the Franco regime's social policy, see García Padilla, ‘Historia de la acción social’; Benjumea, ‘Sanidad y desempleo’; González Murillo, ‘La política social’; González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social’.

40. Marset Campos, ‘Estructura político-administrativas’.

41. Pons Pons and Vilar Rodríguez, ‘Friendly Societies’ and the bibliography listed therein.

42. Comín Comín, Hacienda y economía.

43. In general, the professional medical associations opposed the introduction of a compulsory sickness insurance because they were afraid that it would lead to a reduction in their incomes. However, there were also doctors who supported social medicine, above all during the Republican period (1931–1936). See Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘The Politics’.

44. For this period, see Álvarez Rosete, ‘Elaborados con calma’; Molinero, La captación.

45. Molero Mesa, ‘Enfermedad y previsión social’; Álvarez Roseta, ‘¡Bienvenido, Mister Beveridge!’

46. Criado del Rey, Problemas Sanitarios.

47. The maternity insurance had been created by decree on 22 March 1929 and was linked to the system of pensions (known as retiro obrero) from its introduction until its absorption by the compulsory health insurance by a decree of 9 July 1948; González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social’, 108. For the maternity insurance before the Civil War, see Cuesta Bustillo, ‘Hacia el seguro’.

48. Regulation for the application of the compulsory health insurance, BOE 28/11/1943. The upper limit for salaries was very low and excluded a substantial number of workers from the system. The situation was so scandalous that the dictatorship raised the legal upper limit for salaries several times; see Bikkal, ‘La Seguridad Social’, 438.

49. Bikkal, ‘La Seguridad Social’, 437.

50. For more about the beneficiaries, see Benjumea, ‘Sanidad y desempleo’.

51. Alberti López, ‘La asistencia sanitaria’ 308–12.

52. Comín Comín, Hacienda y economía.

53. However, in 1947, the contribution increased to 6.25%, and later, from 1 January 1954, the contributions for compulsory health insurance were now 10% of the basic wage, with 7% corresponding to the employer and 3% paid by the insured. See Bikkal, ‘La Seguridad Social’, 438.

54. Compendio del seguro de Enfermedad, Madrid, 1949.

55. González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social’, 61.

56. For the initial problems, see the work of Bernal Martín, El seguro obligatorio; Serrano Guirado, El seguro de enfermedad; INP, El seguro de Enfermedad.

57. INP, Plan Nacional de Instalaciones Sanitarias.

58. Rull Sabater, ‘Consecuencias fiscales’, 42.

59. Very few friendly societies that had covered sickness insurance among their workers up until 1944 signed special agreements in order to become collaborating bodies. They did not have the capacity to manage the insurance on a provincial scale, and nor did they have the financial capacity to pay the deposit required by the National Welfare Institute. In the majority of cases they wound up their business or they became cultural associations or leisure institutions.

60. Pons Pons, ‘El seguro obligatorio’.

61. Pons Pons, ‘El seguro obligatorio’; González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social’, 108.

62. Gil Carretero, ‘El Seguro Obligatorio’, 64.

63. Jordana de Pozas, Los seguros sociales, 161, attributes the deficit of 1949 and 1950 to a 25% increase in pharmaceutical costs and medical fees.

64. Gil Carretero, ‘El Seguro Obligatorio’. The National Welfare Institute itself had committed a serious error, as at the time the compulsory sickness insurance was introduced, the Institute's actuarial service calculated a monthly pharmaceutical cost per insured of 4.38 pesetas, when in reality it was set almost from the beginning at 13 pesetas a month; González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social’, 108.

65. Jordana de Pozas, Los seguros sociales, 161.

66. González Murillo, ‘La política social’, 71.

67. The volume of premiums collected by this entity was 203.3 million pesetas; Pons Pons, ‘El seguro obligatorio’.

68. In 1950 the agricultural population comprised 47.6% of Spain's active population; data in Nicolau, ‘Población’, 150.

69. INP, Servicio de Prestaciones Sanitarias.

70. Hernando de Larramendi, Así se hizo Mapfre, 233.

71. González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social’, 97–8.

72. INP, Hojas divulgadoras.

73. Jordana de Pozas, Los seguros sociales, 128.

74. INP, Diversos problemas actuales.

75. INP, Servicio de Prestaciones Sanitarias.

76. Barcelona had 28 large hospitals (residencias sanitarias) in 1957, but only one was public; the other 27 belonged to collaborating bodies. Of the 3094 beds available, 2352 were beds of the collaborating bodies; INP, Servicio de Prestaciones Sanitarias, no. 2.

77. Statement included in INP, Plan Nacional de Instalaciones Sanitarias.

78. González Murillo, ‘El franquismo social’, 98–9.

79. For this new stage, see Martínez Quinteiro, ‘El INP entre 1957–1978’.

80. ABC newspaper, 15 June 1954, 39.