Pitching for each others' team: the North American Free Trade Agreement and labor transnationalism

Abstract

The North American Free Trade Agreement's side accord – the 1994 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation – has been portrayed as providing an ineffective, bureaucratic procedure for dealing with labor complaints about infringements of national labor legislation. This paper reviews two decades of experience. It argues that after an initial period of formal activity, which did indeed expose the accord's severe limitations, a new era of intensified international links at grassroots level commenced. Despite its limitations, the accord initiated positive learning processes and intensified exchanges between the trade union movements in the USA, Canada and Mexico.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Richard Croucher and John McIlroy for their encouragement and for extensively reviewing the initial versions of the manuscript.

Notes

^1.Tilly, Contentious French.

^2.Wise, North American Free Trade Agreement, 1.

^3. This was designed to prevent a government from judging its own alleged violations.

^4.Graubart, “Legalization of Transnational Political Opportunity Structures,” 179 and MacDonald, “NAFTA and the Emergence of Continental Labor Cooperation,” 181.

^5.Kay, “Labor Transnationalism,” 717.

^6. For examples, see Alexander and Gilmore, “Emergence of Cross-Border Solidarity,” 42–8 and Adams and Singh, “Early Experiences,” 161–81.

^7. Adams and Singh, “Early Experiences,” 164.

^8.Crow and Albo, “Neo-Liberalism, NAFTA,” 19.

^9.García, “Evolution of United States-Mexico Labor Cooperation,” 91–117.

^10.Davis, “Cross Border Organizing Comes Home,” 23–9 and Graubart, “Legalization of Transnational Political Opportunity Structures,” 177–94.

^11.Nuñez, “Maquila Workers in Mexico,” 439–50.

^12. MacDonald, “NAFTA and the Emergence of Continental Labor Cooperation,” 173–6.

^13. Ibid.

^14.Dreiling and Silvaggio, “NAFTA and Transnational Contention,” 211–29.

^15. Adams and Singh, “Early Experiences,” 163.

^16. Crow and Albo, ‘Neo-Liberalism, NAFTA,” 12–22.

^17.Hathaway, Allies Across the Border.

^18. MacDonald, “NAFTA and the Emergence of Continental Labor Cooperation,” 185.

^19.Tarrow, New Transnational Activism.

^20. García, “Evolution of United States-Mexico Labor Cooperation,” 94.

^21.French, “Towards Effective Transnational Labor Solidarity,” 454–5 and see note 17 above.

^22. Ibid.

^23. García, “Evolution of United States-Mexico Labor Cooperation,” 95.

^24. MacDonald, “NAFTA and the Emergence of Continental Labor Cooperation,” 188.

^25. Alexander and Gilmore, “Emergence of Cross-Border Solidarity,” 42–8.

^26.Fox, “Assessing Binational Civil Society Coalitions,” 478.

^27. See note 25 above.

^28. Davis, “Cross Border Organizing Comes Home,” 26.

^29. Wise, North American Free Trade Agreement.

^30. See note 16 above.

^31. IMF Data and Statistics. http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm and INEGI http://www.inegi.org.mx

^32. MacDonald, “NAFTA and the Emergence of Continental Labor Cooperation,” 175.

^33. Ibid., 188.

^34. See note 31 above.

^35. See note 29 above.

^36. See note 12 above.

^37. ILO. http://www.ilo.org/stat/lang-en/index.htm

^38. Nuñez, “Maquila Workers in Mexico,” 447.

^39. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).

^40. Kay, “Labor Transnationalism,” 715–56.

^41. Adams and Singh, “Early Experiences,” 161–81.

^42. Graubart, “Legalization of Transnational Political Opportunity Structures,” 177–94.

^43. See note 40 above.

^44. See note 12 above.

^45. See note 17 above.

^46. See note 9 above.

^47. MacDonald, “NAFTA and the Emergence of Continental Labor Cooperation,” 179–90.

^48. See note 17 above.

^49. See note 40 above.

^50.Fligstein, “Spread of the Multidivisional Form,” 77–91 and Voss and Sherman, “Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy,” 303–49.

^51.Goldstone and Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity),” 179–94.

^52.FAT. http://www.fatmexico.org.mx/index.php/sector-sindical/cetlac.html

^53. Kay, “Labor Transnationalism,” 731.

^54. Wise, North American Free Trade Agreement, 5.

^55. Although the PRI had long repressed independent trade union activity, it created some of the most pro-worker laws in the world and see note 42 above.

^56. See note 9 above.

^57. Nuñez, “Maquila Workers in Mexico,” 445.

^58. Occasional NAALC petitions are still submitted that involve tri-national union collaboration such as the 2011 complaint about President Calderon's despatching of the army to fire 44,000 electrical workers at the state-owned Light and Power Company.

^59. Wise, North American Free Trade Agreement, 7.

^60.Velásquez, “La política exterior.”

^61.Huxley, “Transnational Union Cooperation and Union Renewal.”

^62. See http://www.trinationalsolidarity.org

^63. IndustriALL Global Union. http://www.industriall-union.org

^64. See note 25 above.

^65.Croucher and Cotton, Global Unions, Global Business.

^66.Chavez and Nuñez-García, “Introduction,” 11.

^67. French, “Towards Effective Transnational Labor Solidarity,” 451–9.

^68. Davis, “Cross Border Organizing Comes Home,” 29.

^69. Ibid.

^70. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. http://www.coha.org/the-trans-pacific-partnership-free-trade-at-what-costs

^71. An independent and ideologically pluralist trade union confederation of which the FAT is a member.

^72. Joint Statement by AFL–CIO, CLC and UNT, 11 July 2012.

^73.Klandermans, “Linking the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’,” 122–36.

^74. OECD. http://www.stats.oecd.org and Crow and Albo, “Neo-Liberalism, NAFTA,” 12–22.

^75.Tarrow, Power in Movement, 208.

^76. García, “Evolution of United States-Mexico Labor Cooperation,” 107.

^77.Graubart, “Review of NAFTA,” 673.

Additional information

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Daniel Ozarow

Daniel Ozarow is a Lecturer in the Department of Leadership, Work and Organisation at Middlesex University, London. He was awarded his doctorate in 2013 and he co-chairs the Argentina Research Network UK.