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Abstract
Although most of the blame for the disaster at Yorktown fell on the generals, the role of the navy was equally crucial. Had the fleet converged on Chesapeake Bay in sufficient numbers, the army of Lord Cornwallis would have been rescued and the war perhaps ended differently. Responsibility for this failure has never been adequately explained though the station officers across the Atlantic, Admirals Rodney, Parker and Graves, have all been criticised along with their political masters. This article suggests that the fleet commanders did their best to deal with a difficult situation, lacking as they did sufficient ships and information. It was these factors that permitted the French to assemble a much superior force in the summer of 1781 at a critical moment in the American war. For this situation the first Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, and the prime minister, Lord North, must bear primary responsibility, having allowed a dangerous inferiority to develop in the size of the fleet due to a lack of new construction, especially of ships of the line. This article suggests, accordingly, that Yorktown was a disaster waiting to happen, given the inadequate resources deployed by Britain between 1775 and 1782.
Notes
1 A list of the two fleets and their armament can be found in Lapeyrouse Bonfils, Histoire de La Marine Française, III, 208–10. The mean average for both fleets was approximately 74 guns per ship.
2 Only vessels of 60 guns and more, i.e. First, Second and Third rates, are classified as ships of the line in this article.
3 Germain to Clinton, 4 Apr. 1781, Davies, Documents of the American Revolution, XX, 99.
4 Clinton to Germain, 29 Oct. 1781, Ibid., 253. However, Clinton soon began blaming Cornwallis for the disaster, Middleton, ‘The Clinton–Cornwallis Controversy’, 370–89.
5 Rodney to George Jackson, 19 Oct. 1781, Hannay, Letters Written by Sir Samuel Hood (hereafter Hood Letters), 44–7.
6 Observations . . . in consequence of the Several Orders for Papers to be laid before the House of Commons', 6 Feb 1782, Barnes and Owen, The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, (hereafter Sandwich Papers), IV, 343–2.
7 Hannay, Rodney. Rodger, The Insatiable Earl. Although the editors of the Sandwich Papers, IV, 125–44, provide detail on the condition of the Royal Navy's ships across the Atlantic, they refrain from any firm conclusion why the fleet was inferior during the Yorktown campaign itself, except for mild criticism of Parker, ibid., 136–7.
8 Syrett, The Royal Navy in American Waters, 218.
9 Mackesy, War for America, 429–30. For a more recent assessment of the military and naval campaign, see Middleton, The War of American Independence, 270–92.
10 Hood to Jackson, 10 Sep. 1781, Hood Letters, 31. Ibid., 16 Sep. 1781, 28–34.
11 Mackesy, War for America, 429–30.
12 Admiralty to Rodney, 8 Dec. 1779, Syrett, Rodney Papers, II, 261–3.
13 Stephens to Rodney, 23 Sep. 1780, National Archives (hereafter NA), PRO/20/11.
14 Rodney to Stephens, 15 Sep. 1780, NA, PRO/30/20/9.
15 Dull, French Navy, 187, 189.
16 Stephens to Rodney, 2 Apr. 1781, NA, Adm 2/570.
17 Germain to Clinton, 4 Apr. 1781, Documents of the American Revolution, XX, 99.
18 Stephens to Rodney, 31 Mar. 1781, NA, Adm 2/570. Rodney's conduct at St Eustatius incurred much criticism, not least because his deployment of the Leeward Islands fleet was clearly motivated by personal interest. However, the two ships of the line that accompanied the homeward bound convoys carrying the spoils from St Eustatius, the Vengeance (74) and the Vigilant (64), both needed refitting and their hulls coppered. Their departure, hence, did not reduce the ships available for subsequent service in North America, Sandwich Papers, IV, 126. For a recent assessment of Rodney and the St Eustatius episode, see O'Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, 289–319.
19 An Exact List of King's Ships at the Havana, 1 Jan. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242.
20 Rodney to Parker, 9 Jul. 1781, Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, V, 253. Two of the French ships were armed ‘en flûte’, meaning they were lightly equipped as troop carriers.
21 Rodney to Graves, 7 Jul. 1781, Chadwick, Graves Papers, 39. Most of the originals in this collection are in NA, Adm 1/489.
22 Rodney to Hood, 9 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 46–7.
23 Quoted in the Sandwich Papers, IV, 135.
24 Hood to Commissioner Laforey, 11 Jul. 1781, National Maritime Museum (hereafter NMM), Hood Papers, HOO/11.
25 Rodney to Hood, 24 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 47–9.
26 Rodney to Parker, 26 Jul. 1781, NA, PRO/30/20/12.
27 Hood to Drake, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. The Russell remained in dock from 5 Sep. 1781 to 11 Dec. 1781, Russell logbook, NA, Adm 51/94. Other repairs were also carried out.
28 Sandwich Papers, IV, 135.
29 Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. The movements of these ships can be tracked in the Alcide's logbook, NA, Adm 51/33.
30 Rodney to Gidoin, 30 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 51.
31 Rodney to Parker, 30 Jul. 1781, Correspondence of George III, V, 259.
32 Hood to Drake, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11.
33 Copy of Intelligence, 1 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 50–1.
34 Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 57.
35 Intelligence from St Thomas, 31 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 50.
36 Rodney to Arbuthnot, 13 Aug. 1781, Correspondence of George III, V, 264–5. It is not clear why Rodney wrote to Arbuthnot rather than Graves other than confusion because of ill health.
37 Hood to Graves, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, Hood Letters, 24–5.
38 Hood to Drake, 2 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood to Clinton, 4 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11.
39 Line of Battle, 10 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11. Hood Journal, 10 Aug. 1781, NA, Adm 50/11.
40 Hood to Clinton, 25 Aug. 1781, NMM, HOO/11.
41 Dull, The French Navy, 216–23. Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France, IV, 548.
42 Dull, French Navy, 243–4. Doniol, Participation de la France, IV, 649–51. Doniol mostly credits de Grasse for sending the entire French fleet, while acknowledging the support of Solano.
43 Suggestions have been made that the Gibraltar needed refitting, based on Rodney's comments that her iron work was likely to corrode in so humid a climate, Rodney to Sandwich, 27 Apr. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 152. However the Gibraltar had only arrived from England in January 1781 and was still sufficiently seaworthy after re-crossing the Atlantic for Rodney to volunteer its deployment with the Channel squadron, Rodney to Stephens, 17 Sep. 1781, NA, Adm 1/314.
44 De Grasse had four more ships of the line blockading the York and James Rivers which took no part in the battle, Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de La France, 405.
45 Rodney to Gidoin, 30 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 51. The suggestion has been made that Parker may have detained the ships through ‘pique’ because Rodney had sequestrated stores destined for the Jamaica squadron, Breen, ‘Divided Command’, 198–99.
46 Parker to Stephens, 20 Aug. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242.
47 Parker to Sandwich, 1 Sep. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 165–6.
48 Parker to Stephens, 13 Jul. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242.
49 Parker to Stephens, 20 Aug. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242. In reality de Grasse was heading for the old Bahamas Channel, a little used route, to avoid detection on his way northwards.
50 Parker to Stephens, 1 Sep. 1781, NA, Adm 1/242.
51 Graves to Stephens, 16 Oct. 1781, Graves Papers, 119–21. The progress of the two ships can be tracked in the Torbay's logbook, NA, Adm 51/1003.
52 Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 97, 295–9.
53 All three ships were described on arrival in England as being in a ‘very bad condition’, Memorandum, 6 Feb. 1782, Sandwich Papers, IV, 325–6.
54 Sandwich Papers, IV, 126.
55 Rodney to Jackson, 19 Oct. 1781, Hood Letters, 44–7.
56 Rodney to Graves, 7 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 39.
57 Rodney may have mistakenly included two 50-gun ships in his calculations. However these vessels had long been considered unfit for a line of battle.
58 Graves to Rodney, 2 Jul. 1781, Graves Papers, 18–19.
59 Disposition of H.M's Ships in North America, 4 July 1781, Documents of the American Revolution, XX, 173–4.
60 Graves to Stephens, 19 Jul. 1781, NA, Adm 1/489.
61 Admiralty to Graves, 22 May 1781, Graves Papers, 24–5.
62 Graves to Stephens , 20 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 32–4.
63 Hood to Graves, 1 Aug. 1781, NMM HOO/11.
64 Graves to Hood, 28 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, lxvii.
65 Graves to Stephens, 20 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 32–5.
66 Graves to Sandwich, 4 Jul. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 174.
67 Graves to Sandwich, 21 Aug., Sandwich Papers, IV, 179–81. Graves to Stephens, 30 Aug. 1781, Graves Papers, 52–3.
68 Willcox, The American Rebellion, 559–61.
69 Sandwich Papers, IV, 126–7.
70 Squadron commanders often added their own flags, as Rodney had done in the West Indies and Arbuthnot in North America prior to Yorktown, Sandwich Papers, IV, 142–3. See also Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 345; and Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 239, 290–1.
71 The French usually attempted to disable opponents by firing at the rigging, thus preserving their fleet for other objectives. The British in contrast preferred fighting at close quarters to batter opponents into submission, a tactic which suited their sturdier ships and better disciplined crews.
72 Hood to Sandwich, 16 Sep. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 188.
73 For the condition of the British ships after the battle, see Graves to Stephens, 14 Sep. 1781, Graves Papers, 61–76.
74 Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 290–1. Graves's squadron had been reduced to 18 by the scuttling of the Terrible.
75 Syrett, Navy in American Waters, 180–1.
76 Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 319–30.
77 Sandwich to North, 10 Sep. 1772, Sandwich Papers, I, 23–6; Naval Estimate for Building, Rebuilding and Repair, 20 Dec. 1774, Journals of the House of Commons, XXXV, 55–6.
78 Baugh, ‘The Politics of British Naval Failure’, 22–46. See also Baugh, ‘Why did Britain lose command’, 153–5; Jan Glete, Navies and Nations, II, 275; Dull, French Navy, 16–88; and Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 129–30.
79 Naval Estimate, Commons' Journal, 15 Nov. 1776, XXXVI, 37–9 and 8 Dec. 1778, XXXVII, 33–4; Baugh, ‘Command of the Sea’, 155.
80 Paper read in the Cabinet by Lord Sandwich, [14] Sep. 1779, Sandwich Papers, III, 170. There is another copy of this paper in the Correspondence of George III, IV, 440.
81 For Anson's achievements during the previous war, see Middleton, The Bells of Victory, 58, 66, 108–9, 214. See also Monthly List Book and Navy Progress from Dec. 1754 to Jan. 1806, NA Adm/7/567. The Admiralty compiled this list to correct discrepancies in the Navy Board's method of returning ships under its care.
82 Paper read in the Cabinet, [14] Sep. 1779, Sandwich Papers, III, 170.
83 Middleton to Sandwich, 15 Sep. 1779, Sandwich Papers, III, 180.
84 Naval Estimate, 2 Feb. 1780, Commons' Journal, XXXVII, 549–50 and 21 Jan 1782, XXXVIII, 632–3.
85 List of ships building at the several periods, 26 Dec. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 301–2. The estimates given to the Commons give a slightly smaller figure of 35 line of battle ships, of which four were 50 gun vessels, 21 Jan. 1782, Commons' Journal, XXXVIII, 633.
86 Baugh, British Naval Administration, 254–61.
87 Ships in Sea Pay, 1 Jan. 1783, Monthly List and Navy Progress, NA Adm/7/567.
88 Monthly List and Navy Progress, 1 Jan. 1781–1 Jan. 1782, Adm 7/567.
89 Dull, French Navy, 369–71. The superiority of the French and Spanish fleets was commented on by Commodore Keith Stewart in a paper for Sandwich, 29 Sep. 1781, Sandwich Papers, IV, 408–13. He especially noted the discrepancy in the construction of new three deck 100+ gun battleships.
90 Hood to Jackson, 30 Apr. 1782, Hood Letters, 135–7.
91 See especially Baugh, ‘Command of the Sea’, 152–3, and Rodger, Insatiable Earl, 292.
92 In 1784 the ministry set a new record of £1,105,000 for building and repair, 9 Feb. 1784, Commons' Journal, XXXIX, 897–8. However, by 1790 the figure had declined to £398.010, of which a mere £2,890 was for merchant construction, Commons' Journal, XLV, 40.
93 Remarkably, the ministry informed Parliament as late as 31 Jan. 1792 that the continued tranquillity of Europe meant ‘some immediate reduction’ could ‘be safely made in our naval and military establishments’, Commons Journal, XLVII, 3–4. For an overview of British naval policy during these years, see Webb, ‘The Rebuilding and Repair of the Fleet’, 194–209. For French and Spanish construction between 1783 and 1793, see Glete, Navies and Nations, II, 275–7, 369 (footnote 45).
94 For the respective strengths of the British, French and Spanish fleets after 1793, see Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 608.
Additional information
Dr Richard Middleton was for many years a lecturer and reader in American History at Queen's University, Belfast. Among his publications are: The Bells of Victory: The Pitt–Newcastle ministry and the conduct of the Seven Years' War, 1757–1762 (Cambridge, 1985 and 2002), Colonial America: A history (Oxford, 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2011 (with Anne Lombard); Pontiac's War: Its causes, course and consequences (New York, 2007); and The War of American Independence, 1775–1783 (Harlow, 2012).