The politics of ‘active neutrality’ on the eve of a new world order: The case of Turkish chrome sales during the Second World War

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Notes

The author would like to thank her colleagues Michael J.K. Walsh and Soli Ozel for their useful comments.

1. S. Deringil, ‘Turkey's General Attitude to the War’, Panel On the 55th Anniversary of the Cairo Conference Minutes (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 1999), p.65.

2. S. Özel, Intermedia Almanac 2004 (Istanbul: Western Policy Center, 2003). In his work Özel briefly summarizes the situation of 2003 as follows: ‘The new and inexperienced AKP [Justice and Development Party] government led by Abdullah Gül held tough negotiations with Washington on the nature, scope and extent of Turkish cooperation for the war. The American demand consisted of the use of airbases in Turkey including those near Istanbul and the Black Sea Shore; permission to deploy up to 60,000 American troops on Turkish territory on the way to Iraq, which also meant the opening of a northern front. In return, the United States would agree to the establishment of a 20-km security zone in northern Iraq. Up to 50,000 Turkish troops would go into this zone, some 30,000 of which would be under US operational command. The United States also promised that the Kurdish parties in northern Iraq would not be allowed to send their forces to the major multicultural city of Kirkuk. The city has a majority of Turcomans. Other promises were that the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] fighters located in Iraq would be eliminated, and that Turkey would receive a $6 billion in grants or $24 billion in long-term loans. A final matter of utmost importance for Turkey was the protection of the Turcoman minority in northern Iraq. As the negotiations for this final agreement were taking place, the government already allowed, with the approval of the Parliament, US technical personnel to upgrade several bases and send personnel, vehicles and material to the port city of Iskenderun. These developments indicated a willingness on the part of the government to satisfy Washington's demands. But the task itself proved harder to accomplish. … The decision of the Turkish Parliament not to support the government's decree came as a great shock to the Americans. Although there was great disappointment, the official position was one of respect for Turkey's democratic will. Despite the fact that the decision would keep the 4^th infantry out of the war, Washington did not choose to punish Turkey. The next item of negotiations was whether Turkey would allow the use of its airspace. Before a final agreement was reached on that, the war started’.

3. Ş. Yılmaz, ‘The Thorny Path: Turkey–EU Relations in Perspective’, Journal of Cyprus Studies, Vol.8/9 (2004), pp.126–34.

4. There are only two studies which concentrate exclusively on Turkish–American Relations during the Second World War. H. Ülman, Türk Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri 1939–1947 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasi Bilimler Facultesi Yayinlari, 1961); G. Barkay, ABD Diplomasisinde Türkiye 1940–1943 (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2001).

5. S. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (London: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.4.

6. J. Glasneck, Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propogandası, trans. A. Gelen (Ankara: Onur Yayinlari, 1978), pp.132–3.

7. C. Koçak, Türk–Alman İlişkileri 1923–1939 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), p.224.

8. Archives of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ING-B139, 16/7, A.2 V.2.N.124. (Hereafter AMFA.)

9. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, p.129.

10. Foreign Relation of United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, Vol.III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p.944. (Hereafter FRUS, DP.)

11. AMFA, A2, V.2, No.3267.

12. R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform 1914–1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), pp.945–57.

13. FRUS, DP, 1940, Vol.III, p.941.

14. C. Koçak, Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938–1945, Vol.I (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), pp.596–7.

15. FRUS, DP, 1941,Vol.III, p.941.

16. FRUS, DP, 1941,Vol.II, p.958.

17. FRUS, DP, 1941, Vol.III, pp.952–3.

18. FRUS, DP, 1941,Vol.III, pp.958–9.

19. FRUS, DP, 1941, Vol.III, pp.960–2.

20. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, p.85.

21. FRUS, DP, 1941, Vol.III, pp.956–7.

22. FRUS, DP, 1941,Vol.III, pp.962–3.

23. Glasneck, Alman Propogandası, p.181.

24. FRUS, DP, 1941, Vol.III, p.974.

25. FRUS, DP, 1942, Vol.IV, p.742.

26. FRUS, DP, 1942,Vol.IV, pp.746–8.

27. FRUS, DP, 1942,Vol.IV, p.749.

28. Glasneck, Alman Propogandası, p.181.

29. FRUS, DP, 1942, Vol.IV, pp.775–6.

30. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, p.129.

31. FRUS, DP, 1942, Vol.IV, p.781.

32. FRUS, DP, 1942, Vol.IV, p.782.

33. R. Denniston, Churchill'in Gizli Savaşı, trans. S. Gürtunca (İstanbul, 1997), pp.148–9.

34. FRUS, DP, 1943, Vol.IV, p.1167.

35. Kocak, Türk–Alman İlişkileri, p.208.

36. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, p.168.

37. Barkay, ABD Diplomasisinde Türkiye, pp.78–9.

38. On March 1941, President Roosevelt implemented the Lend–Lease Act by declaring that the defence of Britain and Greece was in the national interest of the US, beginning the allocation of Lend–Lease military assistance to those countries.

39. Selim Deringil discusses Turkey's general attitude to the Second World War as follows: ‘As far as Turkish leadership was concerned, the War was a monster that Europe itself had created as a result of the unfair Treaty of Versailles. Nor was there any love lost for Europe on the part of the Turkish leaders. The experience of World War I still rankled. Britain had been the bitter enemy and many of the leading elite had recent memories of internment in Malta. Britain had also been the major backer of the Greek invasion of Asia Minor. As to Turkey's ally of that war, Germany, there existed equally unpleasant memories of overbearing and arrogant German behavior towards Turkey. Nonetheless, there was nothing particularly shocking for Turkey in Hitler's unilateral rejection of the Versailles Treaty. This was, after all, precisely what they had done to the Treaty of Sèvres. Turkey's main worry in the years leading up to World War II was Italy, which had strongly fortified islands just off the Turkish coast and made no secret of the fact that she nourished hopes for expansion into Anatolia. In this context Turkey's main consideration was to keep out of any European conflagration. There was nothing contradictory from Turkey's viewpoint in having a Treaty of Alliance with Britain and a Treaty of Non-aggression with Germany’. Deringil, Panel On the 55th Anniversary of the Cairo Conference Minutes, p.63.

40. G. Barkay and Ş. Yılmaz, ‘Savaş Sonrası ABD'nin ve Türkiye'nin Irak Politikaları’, Foreign Policy, Vol.9 (2003), pp.23–8.