Nasser's Dilemma: Egypt's Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967–69

Abstract

The article examines the American political efforts to bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1969 and analyses the reasons for their failure. But it does not focus exclusively on the Americans; it also outlines the alternatives for Egyptian action during the period in question and looks at the political and military steps taken by Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid and the rebuilding of the decimated Egyptian army, Nasser knew that the only route to a political process to regain Sinai ran through the United States. His diplomatic efforts were all derived from this insight. At the same time, the Egyptian president's attempts to exploit American pressure to his benefit, as he had done in 1957, was undercut by his overestimation of his bargaining chips, a mistake that was one factor in the collapse of the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement in the region.

Notes

1. Syria received a proposal similar in nature to that offered to Egypt, including demilitarization of the Golan Heights and a commitment not to restrict the flow of the Jordan tributaries into Israel. Note that the discussion of a peace proposal to Jordan was deferred to some future date. Regarding the deliberations by the Israeli government, Dayan's suggestions, and the counter-proposals, see M. Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem: Adanim, 1976), pp.488–92 [in Hebrew]; R. Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment: Israel and the Territories after the Six-Day War (Tel Aviv: Bitan, 1996), pp.54–6 [in Hebrew].

2. Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment, pp.55–6; A. Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), pp.435–36.

3. Al-Ahram, 25 July 1968; D. Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt's Post-War Political Strategy, 1967–1970 (Tel Aviv: MOD, 1989), p.43 [in Hebrew].

4. ‘Impressions of Prof. Morroe Berger's Visit to Egypt’, 17 May 1968, Foreign Ministry (hereafter FM) 4158/5, Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA).

5. ‘Conversation with McCloy’, 15 May 1968, FM 4156/1, ISA.

6. ‘Impressions of Prof. Morroe Berger's Visit’, 17 May 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA.

7. A.M. Farid, Nasser: The Final Years (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 1994), pp.132–5.

8. S. el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp.7–12.

9. M.A.G. al-Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal al-Gamasy of Egypt (Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p.97.

10. For the speech by War Minister Fawzi, see ‘Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, the White House, Assessment of the Rabat Arab Conference, from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Executive Secretary’, 7 Jan. 1970, RG 59, Box 2042, Political Affair and Relations Arab, National Archives (hereafter NA).

11. M.B. Oren, Six Days of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.170–78.

12. Al Gomhuria, 7 June 1967; Al-Ahram, 7 June 1967; L.B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p.299.

13. ‘Renewal of Egypt–US Ties’, No.75, 9 Feb. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA [in Hebrew]; ‘Renewal of Egypt–US Ties’, No.262, 20 March 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA [in Hebrew].

14. Middle East News Agency (MENA), 3 March 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; No.20, 4 March 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; ‘Propaganda’, No.65, 5 March 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; No.143, 20 March 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; ‘Memorandum of Conversation, Resumption of Relations’, 7 May 1969, RG 59, Box 2557 Pol, 17 UAR–US, NA.

15. ‘Renewal of Egypt–US Tie’, No.75, 9 Feb. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; ‘Egypt’, 14 Feb. 1968, FM 4157/5, ISA; ‘Propaganda’, No.65, 5 March 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA.

16. On Revolution Day, 23 July, Nasser said: ‘We are not advocates of war for the sake of war – not at all. If we can obtain our rights through political action, as happened in 1957, fine; if not, we have no alternative but to struggle for our rights and to liberate our land.’ See BBC, 25 July 1968.

17. ‘US Attitude towards Nasser’, 16 June 1969, FM 4158/6, ISA. For more on Johnson's view, see Johnson, The Vantage Point, p.303.

18. ‘Egypt’, 14 Feb. 1968, FM 4157/5, ISA.

19. ‘Periodic Summary, 3 April–10 July’, 10 July 1968, FM 4157/5, ISA.

20. ‘Conversation with McCloy’, 15 May 1968, FM 4156/1, ISA.

21. Ibid.; ‘Renewal of Egypt–US Ties’, No.262, 20 March 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; ‘No. 120’, 18 Dec. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA.

22. Oren, Six Days of War, pp.323–7; H. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), pp.345–6.

23. Jarring's mission was divided into two parts: a round of talks that lasted from late 1967 until mid-1968, and a second round that began in summer 1970 and ended in failure in early 1972.

24. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp.345–6.

25. ‘Middle East: Jarring Mission’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 Arab–ISR (hereafter A/I), NA.

26. ‘Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State’, 2 Oct. 1968, No.269, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1967–68, Vol.XX, Foreign Relation of United States (hereafter FRUS), pp.534–8; ‘No. 76’, 10 Oct. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; M. Gazit, ‘Egypt and Israel: Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971?’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.32, No.1 (Jan. 1997), pp.98–9; M. Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books, 1981), pp.90–91.

27. ‘Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State’, 2 Oct. 1968, No.269, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1967–68, Vol.XX, FRUS, pp.534–8; ‘No.76’, 10 Oct. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA.

28. ‘Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State’, 2 Oct. 1968, No.269, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1967–68, Vol.XX, FRUS, pp.534–8; ‘No.76’, 10 Oct. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp.90–91.

29. Ephraim Evron, the deputy director general of the Israel Foreign Ministry, heard this on two separate occasions. The first was during a conversation with Rusk on 23 April 1971, and the second in his meeting with Sisco on 30 July 1971. Rostow maintained that ‘no importance should be attached to it [the Seven-Point Plan]’. Sisco added that ‘he himself thought the plan was extremely poor’. See ‘Rusk's Seven-Point Plan’, 13 Feb. 1972, FM 5294/8, ISA.

30. ‘Middle East: Jarring Mission’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

31. Rusk emphasized the American disappointment with Nasser's decision by saying: US kicked (by Egypt) in the shin.

32. ‘Middle East: Jarring Mission’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

33. Ibid.

34. The United Arab Republic was a sovereign union between Egypt and Syria, established in February 1958. The union was dissolved in September 1961, when Syria seceded. Egypt continued to be known officially as the United Arab Republic until 1971. 

35. Despite Egypt's desire to continue to display responsibility for ‘its Arab sister states’, in the very same discussion, when Secretary of State Rusk agreed to provide details of how the United States interpreted Resolution 242, but only for the Egyptians, Foreign Minister Riad retracted his words and said that he was not the spokesperson for all the Arabs and not even for the Palestinians, only for Egypt. See ‘Middle East: Jarring Mission’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

36. Ibid.; Gazit, ‘Egypt and Israel’, pp.98–9; Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp.90–91. Israel saw the Rusk plan as a ‘rather pathetic maneuver’. For details of the plan and the Israeli reaction, see ‘Egypt's Answer to the US Seven-Point Plan’, 11 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA; ‘The Seven-Point Plan’, 8 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA.

37. ‘Middle East: Jarring Mission’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

38. According to the American document, ‘Secretary [of State] said he hoped Riad would understand that US could not exert 100 percent influence in Israel when UAR did not give US any influence in UAR’ (ibid.). For Riad's version, see Riad, The Struggle for Peace, p.92.

39. ‘The Seven-Point Plan’, 8 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA; Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment, pp.69–76; G. Yaacobi, On the Razor's Edge (Tel Aviv: Adanim, 1989), p.160 [in Hebrew]

40. Nasser attacked the American approach of separate agreements in his speech to the Arab Socialist Union on 4 December 1968l; see ‘Memorandum of Conversation, Arab–Israel Conflict’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; D. Dishon (ed.), Middle East Record (hereafter MER), Vol.4 (1968) (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), p.207; Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp.90–91. Ignoring the American request, Foreign Minister Abba Eban gave instructions to have the Israeli embassy in Paris or London leak the Egyptian response to the Rusk proposal, in order to expose Cairo's true face for all to see. See ‘Egypt's Answer to the US Seven-Point Plan’, 11 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA.

41. It is important to note that two versions of the interview were published, one by the Americans and one by the Egyptians. Of course Nasser's ‘concessions’ and his ‘conciliatory approach’ were omitted from the Egyptian version. For comparison of the two versions, see ‘Carry Water on Both Shoulders: Cairo's Version of Nasser's Newsweek Interview’, 6 Feb. 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

42. Ibid.

43. On Johnson's last full day in office, a headline in al-Ahram reported that ‘Johnson ended his days in power with extreme offense to Arabs and UN’. According to the article, for Egypt the situation could only get better (Al-Ahram, 19 Jan. 1969).

44. ‘No.120’, 18 Dec. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA; ‘US Reply to Soviet Note’, 27 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Call of Jordanian Ambassador’, 25 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

45. ‘REF: State 294347’, 1 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 USNA, NA.

46. ‘UAR: Nasser Ponders Relations with the US’, 31 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

47. Ibid.

48. ‘REF: Beirut's 3’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 USNA, NA.

49. ‘Secret Cairo 239’, 1 Feb. 1969, RG 59, Box 1818 USNA, NA.

50. G.A. al-Nasr, Al-Majmoua al-Kamila lakhtab vatasrihat al-Rais Gamal Abd al-Nasr, Vol.2, 1969–70 (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Akadamiyya, 2001), pp.1–22.

51. Dishon, MER, Vol.4, p.79.

52. ‘Memorandum for the Secretary, Presidential Response to Nasser Letter’, 23 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

53. Ibid.

54. ‘Scranton’, No.220, 11 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA; ‘Scranton’, No.856, 18 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA. The call for a ‘balanced’ American policy set off a serious storm in Israel. The Israeli Foreign Ministry saw his views as ‘problematic’, while the United States ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, tried to soften Scranton's words and called the statement ‘unfortunate’. However, Scranton came to the Middle East with positions that were already on the public record. On 20 November 1968 (the article reached the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem in early December), the American media reported his criticism of the Johnson administration. Scranton asserted that the NATO and US policy towards the Middle East was ‘not uniform and not clear’ and said that the ceasefire between Israel and the Arabs as ‘extremely volcanic and the most important problem today in the world’. See ‘William Scranton’, 5 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA. On the Scranton mission and the Israeli reaction, see ‘Scranton’, No.220, 11 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA; ‘Scranton’, No.856, 18 Dec. 1968, FM 4155/11, ISA.

55. For example, in his first news conference Nixon said, ‘I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast. I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused. I am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid’. See The American Presidency Project, ‘Richard Nixon (1969–1974), The President's News Conference’, 27 Jan. 1969, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1942

56. ‘Memorandum for the Secretary, Presidential Response to Nasser Letter’, 23 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

57. ‘Memorandum for the President, Nasser Letter of January 5, 1969’, 25 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

58. ‘Memorandum for the Secretary, Presidential Response to Nasser Letter’, 23 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

59. Note that this was a self-serving presentation, which left out the many crises that had erupted in the Middle East before and after 1956 and had generated suspicion and led to estrangement between Washington and Cairo.

60. ‘Memorandum for the Secretary, Presidential Response to Nasser Letter’, 23 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. With this comment, Nasser effectively rejected the Israeli peace proposal of 19 June 1967. According to him, the Israeli proposal came from a position of superiority and the government of Israel was in fact seeking to impose a peace agreement on Egypt and subdue it once again, this time in the diplomatic arena.

65. ‘Memorandum for the Secretary, Presidential Response to Nasser Letter’, 23 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

66. Ibid.

67. For Rogers’ analysis, see ‘Memorandum for the President, Nasser Letter of January 5, 1969’, 25 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA. With regard to Nasser's attempt to explain the origin of the allegations regarding the American attack, Rogers wrote that on 8 June, President Johnson gave Kosygin a note to pass on to Egypt; but the note related to reconnaissance flights carried out by American planes 15 miles off the Egyptian coast, in order to investigate the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty. See ‘Memorandum for the Secretary, Presidential Response to Nasser Letter’, 23 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

68. ‘Memorandum for the President, Nasser Letter of January 5, 1969’, 25 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

69. Ibid.

70. ‘Memorandum for the Secretary, Presidential Response to Nasser Letter’, 23 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

71. Ibid.

72. ‘Nasser's Present Attitude Toward a Political Settlement: How to Get Over the Hump’, 24 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘UAR President Nasser Bends an Ear to Catch ‘Sweet Nothings’ from the US’, 19 Feb. 1969, RG 59, Box 1818 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Formin Riad's Talk with President Helou’, 21 Feb. 1969, RG 59, Box 1818 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

73. ‘Formin Riad's Talk with President Helou’, 21 Feb. 1969, RG 59, Box 1818 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

74. ‘Carry Water on Both Shoulders: Cairo's Version of Nasser's Newsweek Interview’, 6 Feb. 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

75. Ibid.

76. ‘Memorandum of Conversation, US–UAR Relations: Settlement Prospects’, 27 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1817 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; Arab–ISR: ‘Memorandum of Conversation, Tour d’Horizon Re Middle East’, 5 Feb. 1969, RG 59, Box 1818 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

77. ‘According to Bobis, State Department’, No.15, 4 Feb. 1969, FM 4158/6, ISA.

78. ‘Spanish Ambassador December 26’, 26 Dec. 1968, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

79. Al-Ahram, 4 April 1969; ‘Sitrep April 11–17’, 19 April 1969, RG 59, Box 2553 Pol, 2 UAR, NA; Kissinger, The White House Years, p.360.

80. ‘Fawzi Visit Post Mortem’, 15 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘No.82’, 17 April 1969, FM 4156/2, ISA; Al-Ahram, 5 April 1969.

81. Kissinger, The White House Years, p.361.

82. Ibid.; Al-Ahram, 4 April 1969; ‘Fawzi Visit’, 4 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Fawzi–Yost Luncheon April 7’, 7 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Memorandum for the President, Your Meeting with Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi’, 10 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1834 Pol, 27–14 A/I, NA.

83. Besides expressing a desire to renew relations, the Egyptians continued to demand that the American come up with ‘something substantive to justify resumption’. See ‘REF: State's 078782’, 17 May 1969, RG 59, Box 1820 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

84. ‘Department of State for the Press, Statement by the Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 27, 1969’, 27 March 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

85. ‘Fawzi–Yost Luncheon April 7’, 7 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Fawzi Call on under Secretary’, 11 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Memorandum for the President, Your Meeting with Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi’, 10 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1834 Pol, 27–14 A/I, NA; ‘Memorandum of Conversation, April 11, 1969, at 3:45 p.m., in the Oval Office’, 15 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1834 Pol, 27–14 A/I, NA.

86. ‘Fawzi Visit Post Mortem’, 15 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Fawzi Visit’, 4 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1819 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Memorandum for the President, Your Meeting with Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi’, 10 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1834 Pol, 27–14 A/I, NA; Kissinger, The White House Years, pp.360–61.

87. Farid, Nasser: The Final Years, p.139.

88. Ibid.; ‘Fawzi at Airport’, 19 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1820 Pol, 27 A/I, NA; ‘Presidency Adviser’, 25 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1820 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.

89. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp.360–61.

90. ‘Memorandum for the President, Next Steps on Arab–Israeli Dispute’, 23 April 1969, RG 59, Box 1834 Pol, 27–14 A/I, NA.

91. Kissinger, The White House Years, p.361.

92. D. Schueftan, ‘From the Six Day War to the War of Attrition’, Ma’arkhot, Vol.257 (Aug. 1977), pp.9–11 [in Hebrew]; Y. Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1977), pp.25–9, 80–81; ‘No.76’, 10 Oct. 1968, FM 4158/5, ISA.

93. ‘Middle East: Jarring Mission’, 2 Jan. 1969, RG 59, Box 1816 Pol, 27 A/I, NA.