Summary
The authors propose two theses:
1) | In self-psychology we must distinguish with greater consequence than has hitherto been the case between what is communicable between the psychologist and his subjects (the phenomenological aspect) and what is only communicable between psychologists (the functional aspect). It is emphasised that the basis of all empirical studies of the self should be the Naïive subject's “every day” conception of himself (his “self”) in addition, we must concentrate on acquiring a much more extensive and varied knowledge of the ways in which the self is experienced before we can incorporate the self in a personality model in a scientifically rewarding manner. | ||||
2) | The authors' basic working hypothesis for a phenomenological study of the self is that the self is a single and indivisible entity in conscious experience. While it has been general practice among psychologists to operate with more or less separate “special egos or selves” the authors will—in accordance with their extreme holistic viewpoint—speak of one and the same entity which can be experienced in a number of ways or have many different aspects. |