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Original Articles

Om ‘Ubevidste Oplevelser’

En Fænomenologisk Beskrivelse af Hvorledes Noget Umiddelbart Kan Opleves Som Havende Eksisteret Ubevidst

A phenomenological approach to the ‘subconscious’

Pages 203-206 | Published online: 18 Dec 2013
 

SUMMARY

Three ways of using the term ‘subconscious’ are distinguished:

1)

a vaguely processed perception, which can be shown to must have taken place, as in experiments with subliminal stimulation;

2)

a hypothetical construct which is inferred from some observations, as when, for instance, a psychologist concludes that an aggressive impuls must be ‘the cause’ of a certain observed behaviour of his patient's;

3)

an immediate experience of something having existed subconsciously.

It is this latter experience which it is sought to analyze in the present paper. By describing time elements as ways of appearance for a phenomenon, which does not appear in the immediate experience itself (Tranekjær Rasmussen, 1956) it is shown by means of some examples that phenomenas which appear as having existed subconsciously can be described meaningfully in phenomenological terms. It is proposed to use the term: experiences having a subconscious quality in analogy with speaking of experiences having an objective quality (Tranekjær Rasmussen. 1956, p. 32).

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